One of the most eagerly awaited 3G license awards finally took place, in Russia, and the results have pleased vendors but angered competitors and social reformers. The Ministry of Information Technologies and Communications gave out three licenses, to the big three operators – MTS, Vimpelcom and MegaFon – which will now spend a potential $3bn between them over the next few years to create their networks. The choice of winners was no surprise – the controversy really arose over the decision not to allocate a fourth license. This could have gone to a more disruptive operator and brought some competition into the tightly controlled Russian mobile sector, which in effect also controls the market in many of the former Soviet states. Instead, 3G is unlikely to have a major impact on mobile and converged services, or on industry structure, for some years. The Ministry’s choice not to award a fourth franchise – though it retains the option to do so in future – reflects not only the relatively undeveloped nature of competition in the fast growing Russian territory, but also the dilemma that faces all regulators: whether to stimulate competition and new services or whether to stick with the safe route of backing operators that at least are likely to be able to build out their systems and pay their bills.
This is an issue that faces all regulators, and nowhere will it be more critical – and politically telling – than in the forthcoming auction of 700MHz spectrum in the US. Many groups are pinning their hopes on these extremely useful frequencies – those advocating new competition for the telcos, those seeing the chance finally to obtain decent rural broadband services in the US, and the vendors that believe 700MHz will be a vehicle for new technologies such as WiMAX. But in the absence of some positive discrimination against the incumbent carriers, all these hopes could come to nothing – but a deliberate policy of encouraging alternative players raises the risk of license holders proving unable to keep their promises, for financial or operational reasons.
The Russian Ministry has taken the low risk path by selecting the players that are, undoubtedly, the best placed to afford the expensive roll-out, cope with the intricate politics of Russian telecoms, and understand the challenges of a major wireless deployment, further complicated by the background of economic and political uncertainty that still pervades Russia.
Many of the participants have since claimed the contest was full of “irregularities”. The regulator, the Federal Communications Agency, angered two contenders, Smarts and Network Telecommunications Company, when it dropped them from the race at the start of April. These two operators have now launched a lawsuit against the agency, claiming it placed misleading information about them on its official web site. Some smaller players are also arguing that the outcome of the license bidding was predetermined, and are seeking to form a coalition to try to force the agency to issue a fourth 3G license.
Whatever the outcome of these manoeuvrings, and even with the experienced operators in charge, the 3G process is unlikely to be any quicker or less problematic than it was in western Europe, and we are unlikely to see commercial launches before the first half of 2008 – although MTS is promising late 2007 – and then only in Moscow and St Petersburg. Outside the major cities, the cellcos will have the same challenges in finding a profitable business case as their counterparts elsewhere, and will have to maintain other activities to generate the needed cashflow. In addition to the license fee of 2.64m rubles (about $100,000) each, the carriers will have to spend an estimated $1bn on build-out, if they are to cover the same footprint as current GSM, plus there will be additional spending to clear up those of the UMTS frequencies (in Russia, in 1935-1980MHz, 2010-2025MHz and 2125-2170MHz) that are currently in military use. VimpelCom indicated the scale of the windfall for the hopeful equipment vendors when it said it would spend at least $350m in capex on 3G in the coming 18 months. Ericsson, Nokia Siemens and Alcatel Lucent are already lining up their cases against local suppliers.
These money generating activities are likely to focus on expansion of GSM and GPRS services, especially in under-tapped regions, including some former Soviet states, and on broader geographical expansion (see inset) – rather than on accelerating the move towards next generation applications and quad play. Although the Russian operators are also interested in WiMAX, we are not expecting to see the mobile giants attempting what their counterparts in some other high growth regions – notably India and Brazil – hope to do, that is, to leapfrog 3G services elsewhere by moving quickly to a 3G-plus system and applications, using a combination of UMTS, WiMAX and quad play technologies.
So while the 3G build-out will generate welcome revenues for the UMTS suppliers, the auction does not represent any significant upheaval in the Russian mobile industry, nor a chance for new services or a rapid move to innovative applications and quad play. Indeed, the return on investment for the big three cellcos remains uncertain, despite the high growth in Russia’s mobile revenues. Russia is the second largest emerging market in terms of total subscriber base – on 151.9m last year, just ahead of India and behind only China. It is also the fourth fastest growing mobile market among all the world’s nations, after China, India and Pakistan. (Analysts estimate mobile penetration in Russia is about 68% – its figures are skewed by the fact that users tend to own several SIM cards, and indeed the installed base of SIM cards, at almost 152m, is actually larger than the population, around 140m.) But this growth is still heavily focused on voice and text, plus business services in the urban areas, and the huge scale and low population density of many Russian markets will make it hugely challenging to offer 3G on anything close to a national scale, or to tap into underserved communities.
So there is still risk, for the operators and the regulator, even from selecting major players to run 3G. It remains to be seen whether the US authorities – despite the criticisms of Russia’s stance voiced in the US – are any braver when it comes to 700MHz.
Altimo’s ambitions:
Altimo, the telecoms arm of Russia’s massive investment company Alfa Group, already has stakes in both VimpelCom and MegaFon, plus a turbulent but potentially far reaching alliance with Norway’s Telenor, and it represents the expansionist face of modern Russian business, looking to become a global player alongside Vodafone, China Mobile, Telefonica and others.
Last month it published its first Mobile Development Index, in which it has worked with experts at the Russian School of Economics, the London Business School and the UK’s Cambridge University to evaluate the investment opportunities represented by 52 international markets.
Using data from the 2002-2006 time period, Altimo has generated a composite index in 11 regions, which gives a powerful clue as to where its near term expansion plans may lie.
Altimo’s research has led it to conclude that the most attractive emerging market opportunities in the near term will be in south and south east Asia. Five of its six most attractive target markets are in this region – Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia and the Philippines, in that order; CIS being the sixth. Despite low average income, these all have high projected per capital GDP growth and significant current capex plans.
While western Europe is saturated, there may still be chances for alliances in north America, which has comparatively low penetration levels. Despite geographical proximity, Altimo is underwhelmed by the opportunities in central and eastern Europe, which still has high penetration, although close to home, it remains highly interested in the larger CIS states. It remains wary of sub-Saharan Africa because of low per capita GDP prospects.
Altimo CEO Alexey Reznikovich commented: “We’ve benefited already from a near doubling of our assets under management over the last 18 months to some $20bn as a result of earlier investment decisions made by our team. We are sure there are tremendous opportunities to come, particularly in South East Asia, as this report highlights.”
Altimo holds stakes in many Russian/CIS operators including VimpelCom, MegaFon, Ukraine’s market leader, US-registered Russian operator Golden Telecom, and players in several central Asian states such as Uzbekistan. Alfa plans to invest up to $2bn in Indonesia’s telecoms sector, and recently set up an office in Vietnam. The aim is to be in the top 10 in Europe by the end of the decade, and the company is exploring the option of taking a minority stake in a major western cellco, rather than making piecemeal investments in single-country players.
Uzbekistan:
One day after winning a 3G license in Russia, MTS also gained 3G and WiMAX allocations in neighboring Uzbekistan.
“With stable growth of the Uzbek economy, the necessity to develop a WiMAX network is driven by the increasing need by both the mass and the corporate segments for access to high speed mobile internet that is currently limited by the insufficient development of fixed line networks,” commented Oleg Raspopov, acting head of MTS’ foreign subsidiaries. The company will initially provide internet access using WiMAX in capital Tashkent, offering speeds from 64Kbps to 512Kbps, from the start of 2008.
In addition, Uzbekistan’s regulator, the Communications and Information Agency, has awarded a national 10-year 3G license to the local subsidiary of MTS. The cellco is planning to begin developing its 3G network this year after selecting a supplier. It will go live first in Tashkent in 2008, followed by Samarkand, Bukhara and Andijan.