Motorola’s new CEO Greg Brown has signalled that he is considering selling or spinning off the company’s largest unit, the troubled handsets division. This would be highly likely to lead to a complete break-up of the company, possibly into the four entities recommended last year by the increasingly vocal activist investor Carl Icahn. It also suggests that problems in the handset business run even deeper than the disastrous performance of the past year has suggested. Announcing yet another round of poor results last month, Brown admitted Motorola would have to wait until 2009 for turnaround in its mobile devices unit, and his willingness to consider a sale at this stage, rather than waiting for that turnaround to increase value for the core company, suggests there is significant risk attached to the recovery plan, and particularly to Motorola having a credible new smartphone platform up its sleeve to fill the gap left by the once iconic RAZR.
With such doubts flying, however, Brown will have a tough job attracting high value for a separated handset company. He seems prepared to try though. Motorola said last week that it was exploring “the structural and strategic realignment of its businesses to better equip its Mobile Devices business to recapture global market leadership and to enhance shareholder value.” In a statement, Brown added: “We are exploring ways in which our Mobile Devices business can accelerate its recovery and retain and attract talent while enabling our shareholders to realize the value of this great franchise.” Although the board said it would not discuss the issue publicly again until a decision was made, there is now pressure to make that decision quickly, since rivals will use the uncertainty to exploit Motorola’s weakness still further ‘ already, Nokia has gained its long targeted 40% market share, while its US rival has dropped to 21% and third place in the sector after Samsung.
Analysts and shareholders were broadly positive about Brown’s decision (shares rose 10% to $12.69 on the statement), though everyone wants swift resolution before there is too much damage from customer uncertainty, brand damage and defection of key staff or suppliers. Analyst Mark McKechnie at American Technology Research, said in one of the most insightful of the many research notes issued on this topic that Motorola’s ‘handset hole’ would likely persist into 2009 and that turnaround would require investment on the scale of $500m to $2bn ‘ therefore it was high time to review the options for the unit. With Nokia controlling 40% of the market, and about 75% of its profits, and having double the margins of any major competitor, McKechnie feels $8bn would a generous price for Motorola’s handset business.
With the handset unit valued by UBS at between $7.5bn and $11.5bn, there are only a few companies that would be able and willing to bid outright. Nokia does need to increase US share, but with US leader Motorola weakened anyway, it will have cheaper and easier ways to do that, plus it would face antitrust issues and steers clear of large acquisitions. LG and Samsung would be more likely bidders, since both need to bulk up their market share, and there is synergy in the CDMA sector, while Motorola’s aggressive development of ultra-low cost handsets, though disastrous to its margins, might appeal to a vendor focused on emerging markets, such as a Chinese ODM.
More likely than a full sale may be a joint venture, in which case there would be the chance for a tie-up with a consumer electronics manufacturer looking to expand in mobility. Echoing the Sony Ericsson alliance, there would be potential for Motorola to lend its mobile expertise to a strong consumer brand such as Dell (which numbers Motorola’s former handset chief, Ron Garriques, among its senior executives), but such a company would have to be prepared to cope with the different margins, structures and pressures of the handset business.
With the handset operations still accounting for more than half of Motorola’s revenues, sale or spin-off would leave the rump company in a much changed state. This could be positive for the two profitable units, Enterprise Mobility (based around the WLan and Symbol products) and Home and Networks Mobility, whose value is largely ignored in the current structure. However, both are in business of scale and would be left dwarfed by other major players in their respective markets. This could well lead to these units also being separated and sold or spun off, sparking a complete break-up of Motorola comparable to that of former AT&T equipment arm Lucent. Of course, the process already began when Motorola spun off its chip business, now private equity-owned Freescale, and other non-core operations. Even more dependent on scale is the mobile infrastructure operation, which would be left vulnerable by a reduction in size of Motorola, and the reduced leverage with customers and suppliers that would result from this. Despite the downward drag of the handset unit’s performance, the mobile networks business would also lose the advantage, much exploited by Nokia in the past, of being able to offer tightly integrated RANs and devices, especially in new technologies like WiMAX and LTE.
A complete break-up would destroy the vision that once gave Motorola real differentiation ‘ of having an end-to-end product portfolio for mobility and advanced multimedia networks, spanning devices, infrastructure and consumer equipment like set-top boxes. Increasingly integrating these lines to provide total platforms for the rising breed of converged, quad play carriers seemed a real way to set Motorola apart from its larger rivals in infrastructure, but the ambitious strategy has been largely swept aside by more pressing worries about boosting handset margins and performance.
In the wake of the wave of consolidation that has overtaken the wireless infrastructure sector in the past two years, Motorola’s mobile networking activities will almost certainly be in the sights of some of its rivals, if they can be separated from the rest of the company ‘ offering a profitable unit with some strong technologies, notably a headstart in Mobile WiMAX, though one that is unlikely to be overpriced because of its risks in trying to compete alone when so overshadowed by the scale of the big three, Ericsson, Alcatel-Lucent and Nokia Siemens Networks. However, none of these three would be likely to bid. Ericsson CEO Carl-Henric Svanberg commented in an interview following the company’s results announcement last week that if Motorola Networks came up for sale, his company would take a look but stressed that major acquisitions could create more problems than benefits. Meanwhile, Alcatel-Lucent is still struggling with its own merger and its purchase of Nortel’s 3G activities, and Nokia Siemens has similar teething troubles with its year-old venture, and so both would be likely to steer clear of further distracting major transactions. A more likely candidate might be Huawei, which has a 3G joint venture with Motorola and aims to increase its international business. Meanwhile, the enterprise and home mobility units could both appeal to Cisco.
Icahn:
A break-up of Motorola would almost certainly be into the four units outlined above, and so would deliver the demands made on Brown’s accession by the most impactful individual in the saga, activist investor Carl Icahn, who holds 5% of Motorola’s stock. Icahn put forward a four-way break-up plan in early December, when former CEO Ed Zander departed, having been put under huge pressure through most of 2007 by Icahn. Following Brown’s statement about the handset unit, Icahn made it clear he would not be satisfied with that concession to shareholder value alone, but wanted the full restructuring to proceed. ‘We believe Motorola is finally moving in the right direction, but certainly still has a long way to go,” he commented. Last year, Icahn failed in a bid to gain a seat on the Motorola board and oust Zander (see Wireless Watch May 7 2007), but may be more successful in his current effort to nominate board directors. Icahn – with personal worth of $10bn, estimated to be the US’ twenty fourth richest man – specializes in leveraging his stakes in major companies that he regards as undervalued or mismanaged, to force change, often through asset stripping. His initial interest a year ago sparked a 6.7% rise in Motorola’s share price – reflecting a general feeling that there is significant value that needs to be unlocked within the corporation, and which certainly has not yet been unleashed. Icahn is campaigning to gain four seats on the board this time around, and his affiliated companies this week delivered written notice to Motorola for the nomination of Frank Biondi, William Hambrecht, Lionel Kimerling and Keith Meister for election as directors at the 2008 annual meeting of stockholders.
Icahn wants to break Motorola into four units, believing that they would generate more value as separate entities. On the news of Zander’s resignation late last year, he commented: “In my opinion, Motorola should be split into separate companies: a mobile devices company; an enterprise mobility company; a connected home company; and a company focused on mobile networks infrastructure.’ This would look more like the structure of the company before it merged its infrastructure, public safety and government units two years ago, a decision widely seen as a poor one because, while the divisions increasingly used similar products ‘ notably WiMAX ‘ they had entirely different cultures, target markets and channels. In Icahn’s view, the non-handset units would likely be sold off or placed into joint ventures.