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16 July 2008

Sony Ericsson mulls Indian merger to pursue market share goals

In an ironic twist that illustrates the market power of India, the fortunes of two of the top five handset makers may depend on partners from the subcontinent. Motorola’s soon-to-be separated mobile phone division is still being eyed acquisitively by Videocon and, reports suggest, other Indian manufacturers; and now Sony Ericsson is said to be considering merger with Spice, the cellphone division of Indian group BK Modi.

If the deal were to materialize, it would catapult Sony Ericsson from hovering between fourth and fifth place in the Indian handset rankings to leapfrog Samsung, LG and Motorola into second place, and this would also put it in third place globally (assuming Motorola continues on its downward slide) and would improve its chances of achieving its target of being number two after Nokia by 2012. BK Modi, which owns 64% of Spice, is asking for 80-100 rupees per share, which would value Spice at up to $174m. Between them, the two companies have a run rate of 600,000 units a year in India, still well behind Nokia’s three million. Samsung is estimated to ship about 450,000. Last month, BK Modi, headed by the tycoon of the same name, divested its 40% stake in mobile operator Spice Communications, to IDEA Cellular. The group also owns Cellebrum, a mobile value added services company, and Hot Spot, a handset retail chain.

The deal would accelerate a process that the Japanese-Swedish joint venture has already begun ‘ trying to supplement its success in high value but fairly niche webphones with greater overall market share, and in particular a larger presence in high volume emerging markets. India has been its particular focus since it signed a deal in September 2007 with French consumer electronics giant, well known for its supply chain efficiencies, to target the subcontinent and try to chip into Nokia’s massive market share there. While Motorola threw away too much of its margin by racing headlong into ultra-low cost handsets for India and other high growth territories, Nokia has struck, so far at least, a skilful balance between retaining margin and boosting volume, harnessing its economies of scale and its logistical and manufacturing excellence ‘ which it even seems to have succeeded in transferring to its Indian plants and ventures, despite the country’s uncertain track record, compared to centers like Taiwan, for commodity hardware manufacturing efficiencies.

So the goal for the rest of the big four is to weaken Nokia, and this is shared with India’s own handset business ‘ nascent and with little weight outside its own country or in high end phones, but with the significance that derives from the sheer numbers involved. So it is logical that Indian companies should team with, or even merge with, the tier one players ‘ the former get brands and expertise in cellphone design and supply chain; the latter get a less painful, higher margin route into the world’s largest and fastest growing market. This is a pattern that has already been seen in China, where Alcatel and others put their handset operators into Chinese joint ventures and homegrown vendors like Huawei are just starting to make an impact abroad, but are looking for foreign partners to help. And of course, in China Nokia has retained its number one position despite a growing native industry, again down to its superior logistics and the way it negotiates and manages China-based manufacturing and R&D ventures.

A deal with Spice would carry high risk for Sony Ericsson though, because it would dramatically alter the balance of the company, which already carries the complexity of being a JV between two companies with radically different objectives and cultures. Just as acquisition of Motorola Devices by Videocon would represent a short term rescue at the expense of the culture and key differentiators of the company, a similar worst case could be made for SE/Spice. Clear dangers include the devaluation of SE’s chief asset, the Sony brands (Walkman, Cybershot and potentially PSP ‘ see separate item), by applying them to too many and too cheap handset models; a Motorola-style crash of margins; a difficult merger process and culture change; and a resulting company that is driven too much by volume, and has a reduced value to feed back to its parents, in terms of profits but also support for their own core brands, especially Sony’s consumer electronics product ranges, which need a well branded and highly valued mobile element.

Financially, the risk is equal since the two parents have equal ownership, but strategically, the risk is higher for Sony, since the integration of the cellphone products and brands with its other portfolios needs to be enhanced not diluted, amid the move towards fixed/mobile media networks and the incorporation of all media platforms into a single user experience. Ericsson, by contrast, has often been expected to opt out of the venture at some point, as handsets get less strategic and less important in supporting its mobile infrastructure sales, especially as the Swedish giant moves more heavily into services at the expense of hardware. In the cellphone world, the most important Ericsson activity in terms of strategy and intellectual property is increasingly not SE but its Mobile Platforms unit, which creates reference designs and platforms for the wider market. Ericsson could certainly do without the financial impact of a mistaken merger by its JV, especially with its core markets under pressure, but strategically it could walk away more easily than its Japanese partner.

There would be positives to the deal too though, notably if the two companies retained their own brands and some of their organizational structures, in order to avoid the dilution of the Sony value and a negative impact on what has been SE’s greatest success, building impressive share growth and profits in media phones and well branded smartphones. Despite this, which made SE the star of the handset world last year, the venture does need to expand its market share and make a smooth transition to lower end smartphones and midrange models priced for new markets ‘ even if it stops short of the truly ultra-low cost sector. It has taken some steps in this direction, notably with the Sagem effort, but so far it has been suffering from the move towards higher volume, and is warning of a disappointing quarter, largely because of product delays and the squeeze on the margins on high end phones.

A more dramatic move than the Sagem alliance could enable SE and Spice to pool significant manufacturing and logistics activities, and some R&D, and if well managed, SE could combine its own well regarded processes with the low cost base of its Indian partner to achieve strong efficiencies. Spice is currently setting up a local manufacturing facility in Baddi in Himachal Pradesh rather than procuring its handsets from contract manufacturers in China and Taiwan. It recently launched the ‘People’s Phone’ with its former sister company, the Spice cellco, for 599 rupees (about $15).

And of course, the merged entity would gain improved buying power for many components that could be reused across both product families. A dual-brand strategy would have one problem though ‘ the Indian and Chinese phonemakers know that one of the key benefits of tying up with established manufacturers is access to their brands, as even in highly budget conscious user bases, customers want well known brands and a large majority will pay as much as they can afford to acquire a famous name phone rather than an ultra-cheap one.

But whether merged or not, Sony Ericsson has a tough balancing act to achieve. It has often reiterated that there are no plans to compete in ultra-low cost sectors as yet, but rather to focus on sub-smartphones with strong brand but stripped-down feature sets compared to the high end offerings. In considering a possible Spice deal, it would do well to bear in mind the words of former CEO Miles Flint on announcing the Sagem deal: ‘Without profit, you’re nothing. It’s baked into our DNA: profit before growth.’

Sony Ericsson in India:

In 2007, in its quest to overtake the Korean vendors and Motorola, Sony Ericsson formed alliances with Flextronics International and Taiwanese ODM Foxconn to make 10m handsets in India within two years, and a design partnership with France’s Sagem for low end phones. These indicate a policy of protecting the high margin smartphone business for 3G, while expanding rapidly in GSM, where ODM partners are vital, and which represents the main source of market share growth until growth economies start to adopt 3G broadly. The two-tier strategy should be copied with local manufacturing deals in other high growth regions such as Latin America or even China.

However, results from the Indian activities are not yet making a significant difference , especially with Nokia piling increasing levels of investment into manufacturing and super-efficient logistics in the country (India has overtaken the US as the Finn’s second largest volume market after China).

Although the Flextronics and other partnerships look sound for spreading the risk of moving to high volume, and tapping into strong expertise in manufacturing and logistics processes, overall the Sony Ericsson strategy for emerging markets seems to have various holes. One is the sparseness of its distribution network in large nations like India, and the fledgling nature of its Indian development centers, compared to those of Nokia. Also, it does not play in the CDMA market ‘ although Nokia hardly competes in CDMA, it does have a badged low cost range for India and north America.

New technologies will need to be supported to reduce costs without sacrificing too much margin. Although the venture’s parents contribute strongly in terms of consumer electronics design and brand (Sony) and advanced cellphone platforms (Ericsson Mobile Platforms), neither of these giants is highly experienced in low cost, low power systems, although EMP has been making strong moves recently in that direction. Above all, Sony Ericsson needs to introduce more single-chip technology, plus software that leverages the best user experience from limited physical resources ‘ trends that are currently being driven by Nokia and its partners, and by Qualcomm.

Sony Ericsson’s latest smartphones:

The latest four additions to Sony Ericsson’s line-up will be the Feng, and three phones with girls’ names, the Alicia, Linda and Patty. The Alicia is the most shadowy, but its official name will be Walkman W707, and it will be a flip-phone for the price sensitive mediaphone market, with a midrange camera with no autofocus, but highly optimized, like all Walkman models, for music. It will debut at the end of the year.

Coming sooner than that, in October, will be the Feng, or W302, which will be a Walkman iteration of the existin S302 cameraphone. The musicphone version will feature a midrange camera, 176 x 220 resolution screen, and a wide range of colors. It is being unveiled this week along with the W595 (Linda) and W902 (Patty).

The W902 is a candybar Walkman with a 5megapixel autofocus camera with LED flash, 152Mb of internal memory and support for 8Gb Stick Micro M2 memory cards. It will cost €330 and ship in November.