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10 January 2013

Arris has to clean out the hallways at Motorola to bring back its margins

While we were always confident at Faultline that Arris was the only trade player who could buy the Motorola Home business, we have never said what we think the outcome of it being successful would be. The task that Arris now has to take on will stretch its culture, which is predominantly US in orientation, with an acquired business, which is finally, truly multinational.

One of the most dangerous issues to beset any such deal was always going to be the TiVo legal action against Motorola, for infringing on the patents of its DVR designs. We always said that Google may be forced into the extraordinary position of having to indemnify Arris against a negative outcome for this case, since it was virtually open and shut. TiVo has yet to lose one of these, and while there is every chance that Motorola has a counter strike, in that some set top patents that it holds may well have also been infringed by TiVo, and this is rarely the case for other TiVo legal targets (although it was almost equally true of EchoStar). Will this greatly mitigate damages? The answer is no, since without a DVR design Motorola would have been in severe set top trouble some years ago.

Let’s take the hypothetical case that a legal action against Arris-Motorola, claims $1 billion (twice the amount awarded against Dish because of the size of the Motorola Installed base ‘ Dish only had 4 million DVRs) and that because of the uncertainty of any counter claims, the two wish to settle out of court for $500 million, paid over a number of years.

The indemnity given by Google is essentially 50% of the first $50 million in damages and 50% of the first $50 million in royalties, and 100% of everything above that, up to a cap of $235 million.

In our hypothetical settlement, Google would have to shell out $235 million but Arris would get landed with a further $265 million. That would still cause Arris considerably concern. If you add to that the fact that any settlement with Arris, must also license existing DVR designs which Arris has sold (only a handful of design wins) we might round this up by another $25 million. But there is likely to have been a degree of confidence that TiVo will settle for less. Negotiations will have been ongoing for some time, and although TiVo has gone on record saying that it expects the awards against Motorola and Cisco to be in the $billions, Google and TiVo may be a long way down the track of settling the dispute and may have gone close to agreeing a figure of $235 million, which we figure is a little on the low side.

TiVo has had some considerable wins at AT&T and Verizon and if it feels that the amounts paid to it in those two suits ($215 million with AT&T and $250 million with Verizon) are part of the Motorola and Cisco cases, and forgives them these installations (though we’re not sure why it cannot license AT&T and Motorola separately for the same installs), then perhaps the remainder of Motorola license fees and damages could turn out to be just $235 million. Maybe someone at Arris and someone at Google thinks so, but we seriously doubt it. And this being precisely 10% of the price paid to Google for the business, may mean that there is no feedback from TiVo negotiations in this provision, only a 10% notional cap of the amount paid for the business.

The Arris share price sits at its 52 week high, valuing the company at $1.74 billion, which is a fair price if you net out the effects of adding the revenues of Motorola Home and the effects of having to pay for it, and the danger there is in mergers of that size, with the potential to eat all the cash, and leave the company vulnerable.

The entire outcome is in the execution of the merger and if we were the Arris management, if we could get a TiVo deal done and dusted, we would have better financial visibility for the rest of the company going forwards, and we would. But as yet Arris has yet to say how it will deal with the merger.

If Arris can get successfully through the first year’s trading as Arris-Motorola (or whatever it is going to call itself) then it may well take on a significantly higher value. It says that together, Arris and Motorola Home will have a global presence with over 500 customers in 70 countries, more than tripling revenue to $4.7 billion for the trailing four quarter period. But it is unlikely to retain all of that revenue. For a start, some product lines have to be phased out due to product overlap, some staff will have to go to find the $100 – $125 million in annual cost synergies which the company says it can find ‘ sure that could mostly be in non-revenue generating roles like accounting. A reduction of the sales team to take in overlaps, may also not result in any less revenue, just lower headcount.

Arris may have the expertise to sort through the wave of acquisitions that Motorola has undertaken over the past 8 years, the most recent of which is HTML 5.0 IPTV middleware firm Dreampark (March 2011) and to Sun Up Digital Systems (May 2011), which offers multiscreen service management, and US DRM specialist Secure Media (January 2010) and Israel’s Bitband distributed VoD business (Febraury 2010).

In the past there were other IPTV related acquisitions such as US encoder business Tut Systems, and VoD applications house Vertasent, as well as VoD innovator Broadbus. Motorola then went back to the encoding market to acquire Modulus Video, which had been the first encoder designer able to encode video for AT&T’s tough U-Verse HD picture in picture requirements back in 2007.

Motorola has always nibbled away at this kind of IP focused capability including deals to buy Terayon Communications (video processing), Ucentric (home gateways), Leapstone (service delivery platform). Almost all of those operations today have sunk without trace within Motorola, but what will almost certainly be left lying around are multiple corporate cultures, multiple R&D and design agendas, and general discord.

Any acquirer worth its salt will immediately isolate the high yielding revenue areas such as set tops, DOCSIS modems, Cable Modem Termination Systems, and QAM, and look carefully at their margins, and then merge each one with the Arris counterpart division looking for synergies and cuts. Any other business, which all of those above acquisitions fall into, should then be viewed with the utmost suspicion and many of them will be reduced to a support and maintenance role, where that has not already happened under Motorola. That will perhaps stop the 3% or so margins that Motorola Home has fallen to, with its last published quarter showing a contribution of $25 million on revenues of $797 million.

We can see that this will continue to mean that revenues from the Motorola product lines will continue to fall as they have almost every quarter for the past four years. But perhaps they only need to drop by another $50 million or so a quarter, through this product erosion process, before they begin picking up. Many cable orders of Motorola products will have been put on hold for a while, awaiting its eventual new owner, but these should be resumed, after a brief period deciding which product line the cable company wants to follow, that of Motorola’s or that of Arris.

There will almost certainly be more layoffs in the process and Arris may decide that entire country subsidiaries or continents should be sold off to local businesses, and that would trim Motorola home considerably further.

But what could emerge is a business still doing some $4 billion, with dramatically lowered costs and less confusion within the product lines. But in order to do that Arris has to rationalize aggressively. Arris is committed to pay Google $117.5 million if the deals falls through, but we cannot see that happening, unless there is a sudden negative development in the TiVo case.

Arris had to go into more debt in order to pull off the deal, borrowing $2.175 billion in senior secured credit facilities through two separate $1 billion and $925 million term loans and a $250 million revolving credit facility.