Ericsson has confirmed its takeover of Microsoft’s Mediaroom IPTV middleware business. It is clear what the Swedish giant wants out of the deal (see Wireless Watch March 28 2013), but Microsoft also needs to readjust its content delivery strategy, delivering a turnaround strategy that centers on Xbox.
No terms for the deal were revealed as Ericsson put out a statement saying that this showed its commitment to delivery video across a variety of networks, to any type of device.
It is expected that it will try to harmonize wireless and fixed line video delivery for Mediaroom clients and others, using a combination of its own software, Mediaroom and LTE Broadcast, driven by MPEG Dash and HEVC protocols. This puts Ericsson into a strong position for delivering TV Anywhere style video on behalf of both broadcasters and pay-TV companies, on roaming devices which work with cellular and Wi-Fi connections.
No terms for the deal were revealed as Ericsson put out a statement saying that this showed its commitment to delivering video across a variety of networks, to any type of device, which of course it doesn’t. The reason that Mediaroom is up for sale is because it didn’t deliver video across more than one type of network, and it only delivered to a pre-specified list of out of date device types. We assume that merging this with existing Ericsson systems, will mean that is all behind it.
But if you add the detail from other Ericsson announcements ‘ its recent video win at Telefonica; its new encoder chip; its early steps in HEVC, Dash and LTE Broadcast; its new approach to outsourcing broadcasters, built around Technicolor Broadcast; and this week’s addition of a new broadcaster playout disaster recovery service, you start to see the beginnings of a very different company.
It doesn’t look as though Ericsson paid much for Mediaroom, probably no more than the revenue streams that are still flowing out of it. VPs at Ericsson are quoted by Reuters this week saying that the price was between that paid for the company’s last two deals, so between $99m and $234m. A sum around $150m would be a drop in the ocean of the overall Microsoft cash and revenue equation and most of the benefits of selling Mediaroom will be to offload the distraction that it offers for management.
Mediaroom revenues have been falling dramatically, although the installations are partially responsible for driving Microsoft server gains. The Mountain View, California-based division can rightfully claim that its software drives about 23% of all IPTV connected set-tops globally, with long standing deals at AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, Telus, Swisscom and Portugal Telecom. It has also had a recent major design win at Telefonica for its global video platform, which will be implemented by Ericsson. If you add recent wins by Ericsson at companies like Taiwan’s Chunghwa and Mexico’s Axtel, then this rises to 25% of IPTV set-top installs.
Ericsson claims a total of 40 deals for its own software plus Mediaroom, but that count may still include British Telecom and Telecom Italia, although one has stopped using Mediaroom, and the other never began (but Microsoft has consistently included those customers in its counts).
The deal will require the transfer of the remaining 400 Mountain View Mediaroom employees and will close in the second half of 2013.
Per Borgklint, SVP and head of business unit support solutions at Ericsson said: “Ericsson’s vision of the Networked Society foresees 50bn devices to be connected via broadband, mobility and cloud. Future video distribution will have a similar impact on consumer behavior and consumption as mobile voice has had. This acquisition contributes to a leading position for Ericsson with more than 40 customers, serving over 11m subscriber households. In addition, Ericsson will be powered with senior competence and some of the most talented people within the field of IPTV distribution.” It then cited research which said that the global IPTV market will reach 76m subscribers in 2013 with revenues of $32bn, growing to 105m subscribers and $45bn by 2015.
So what will Microsoft now do about its multiscreen entertainment and content strategy, post-Mediaroom? Don Mattrick has been running the Entertainment and Devices unit since 2010 and a clearer strategy should emerge soon, probably focusing all device, web and content experiences increasingly around Xbox.
The lesson of Apple is there for everyone to see. Initially in 2001 it launched the iPod. That led to iTunes software being written for the PC, and that, led to the launch of the iTunes music store. In time this made the move to the iPod touch and the iPhone inevitable, which in turn led to the App Store, which in turn led to the iPad. And that’s where Apple gets all its profits from (in more or less reverse order of mention). The lesson is that a device needs a service and Microsoft, like Sony before it, needs first and foremost to emulate most of the steps that Apple has taken and which have then been repeated on Google Play.
It has many of the ingredients, even if they have often not been fully exploited. The Zune Music store, merged with the Nokia Music Store, has turned up as Xbox Music with three versions – one sitting on the Xbox; one streamed on a Windows 8 device; and a subscription spanning all devices, called Xbox Music Pass.
This is where Microsoft scores quite highly in the development of its PlayReady DRM, which is almost universally used inside apps which need to deliver premium content. It has a domain capability, allowing one or a group of devices to be identified as the same subscriber, allowing content swaps between a single group of devices. This and the security levels that are imparted to PlayReady on a general purpose device like a tablet (through 3rd party White Box cryptography and obfuscation), has meant that PlayReady is used to protect content even on iOS devices, almost as a standard.
Adding the amount of video available from Xbox Video along with other apps such as Netflix and Comcast Xfinity, and the strategy involves a fantastic potential content store. And the platform also includes the Microsoft Live online tools, Skype and messaging and more apps, and some decent Facebook and Twitter links ‘ in fact, Microsoft is not far from having everything that Apple has brought to the show.
The problem here is that the Xbox was supposed to be for gaming, and the market for TV entertainment is far larger than the number of devoted gamers. So why should a non-gamer spend $200 to buy a gaming box they don’t need or want, in order to watch video or play music? Xbox is appealing to operators because they do not need to provide an extra CPE device such as a set-top box or home gateway ‘ but for consumers, it is still an expensive $200 device, over-powered for non-gaming use. Microsoft will address this with the next generation of the Xbox family, which will have one device that is more suited for delivering purely video, at a lower price, and one that extends the games console family (the Xbox 720).
If the former product looks rather like the Roku or Apple TV boxes, at the $100 or lower price point, with similar function, it could begin to sell more widely. The Xbox, like all other games consoles, was predicated on games being sold which paid licences back to Microsoft, and so could be sold for less than it cost to build ‘ the approach also adopted by Amazon for its Kindle Fire tablets, which are designed mainly to drive content purchases and subscriptions. Microsoft has sometimes made greater losses because it sold more Xboxes ‘ the antidote is seen as Xbox Live Membership, which more than makes up for subsidizing the hardware. In future it might even be possible to bundle in the playing device with membership of Xbox Live.
So Mattrick may fight for a plan which involves seeding the planet with a new generation of devices that require Xbox Live Video membership for two years in order to break even. The device would have to be just as reliable, storage and processor heavy, and even easier to use, than the current generation Xbox, in order to drive uptake to the point where it increased the population of devices overnight. With tablets acting as second screens, with a consistent content experience, this strategy could make Microsoft tablets almost as attractive as an iPad ‘ and that could literally be the salvation of Microsoft, which desperately needs success in tablets as the PC market falls off a cliff.
SmartGlass ‘ the app that sits on phones and tablets and offers a second screen experience – is supposed to be the other half of the equation. A year ago second screen syncing was the main usage, but now, more and more content is actually being consumed on the second screen, turning it into the first screen. But even so, the transfer of streams to and from the Xbox TV screen, to an attached device, has to happen smoothly, and if there is going to be interaction, then that too must happen in a slick fashion. The free SmartGlass app is currently available for Windows 8 phones and tablets, iOS devices and Android.
One area that SmartGlass could offer a breakthrough in is recommendation. In order for that to work it would have to have access metadata from all the customer’s online services. Microsoft could use technology it acquired from Israeli start-up VideoSurf back in November 2011, which is assumed to support SmartGlass’s ‘Related’ tab, which lists similar titles, for instant content discovery.
However, SmartGlass needs further development. It is not generic enough and it needs too much co-operation from each studio, and of course Apple will not support something it does not control. It performs well as a remote control but it is a first generation that is not, of itself, a reason for people to go out and buy an Xbox. For that it will need to come out with the remainder of the functions Microsoft has promised ‘ notably streaming video and music across Wi-Fi or the internet to the portable device, something the PS3 does already.
Also, to be relevant to Microsoft, the entire Entertainment and Devices division has to have a financial size which is appropriate. Right now Microsoft is a $73bn business, up by about 6% or about $4bn last year, with most of that growth coming from Servers and Tools, which was up $2bn, and the Business division, which was up $1.5bn. These are Microsoft’s bread and butter, along with Windows and Windows Live, which form an $18bn unit, the same as Sever and Tools (Business is a little under $24bn). Entertainment and Devices is just $9.6bn, about half the size it needs to be to have the attention or clout it deserves internally. The great bulk of this is Xbox revenue so, given that Mediaroom was down to around $100m, it shows why the man in charge of Xbox was put in charge of the whole video strategy. However, the E&D division made only $364m operating margin last year, which amounted to a huge loss.
So Mattrick’s plan is clear ‘ financially E&D needs to double in revenue by splitting Xbox into two types of device, to add Apple TV-style revenues to gaming. It must roll out content globally, and more than anything it must get people to use that content through clever interactions such as SmartGlass.
Right now Microsoft is selling video to people who came to Microsoft to buy gaming. It needs to be able to sell video to people who come to buy video. In order to do that Mattrick needs to work a brand trick. He must stop Xbox being thought of as a gaming box or change the name of the smaller video device ‘ perhaps it needs to be called the Xbox Entertainment Hub or the 360 Entertainment Hub – and it needs to be subsidized by a Live subscription so that it either undercuts or outperforms the Rokus of this world.
So losing Mediaroom might be a blessing, and turning what’s left into a strategy only requires one or two neat tricks ‘ but these will be no mean feat to achieve.