Your browser is not supported. Please update it.

4 June 2015

Dish courts TMO, but it has wasted the chance to be a real disruptor

Will the merger of Dish Network and Sprint, heavily on the cards a couple of years ago, prove to be one of the great missed opportunities of the US telecoms market? It now seems likely that T-Mobile USA will join forces with Dish, but if that merger takes place, it will have little of the disruptive potential that could have been there for a Dish/Sprint combination, especially outside the highly competitive, lower-end consumer markets where TMo and Dish are both concentrated.

A merger will enable TMo to leapfrog the third largest MNO and achieve larger scale, multiplay services and content partnerships. These three capabilities are vital to survival as a major player in the modern US market, where all the providers are chasing market share and growth by expanding their service offerings. A quad play is no longer enough – operators aim to use their shiny fiber/LTE platforms to support broad multiplays which include IoT (internet of things), cloud and over-the-top options alongside the traditional quartet of voice, video, broadband and mobile. They are also turning to exclusive content for differentiation, as seen in Verizon’s proposed acquisition of AOL. Such offerings enable them to account for a growing percentage of a customer’s total telecoms and media spend and to move into new regions or target segments.

However, Sprint and T-Mobile have been disadvantaged when it comes to the scale to invest in the most advanced platforms, and to content relationships. Sprint and its parent, Softbank of Japan, backed away from a bid for T-Mobile because they expected hostility from regulators, which remain anxious about reducing the number of national mobile operators in the US, especially after the waves of M&A which have taken out most of the second tier players over the past decade (MetroPCS, Leap, Alltel and so on). However, the far greater threat to US consumer choice comes from any further increase in the power of AT&T and Verizon, since they are dominant across the quad play, not just in mobile services, and so are difficult for a single-play mobile provider to touch.

These two giants continue to be allowed to bolster their platforms via acquisition, and move towards an IoT-centric multiplay and towards being content providers, putting even more clear water between their capabilities and those of any challengers. AT&T is buying DirecTV, Dish’s arch-rival, while Verizon is acquiring AOL. T-Mobile may attract excited headlines with its noisy promotions for ‘Uncarrier’, but in reality these initiatives are only disruptive at the low end of the customer spectrum, in the prepaid mobile market TMo knows well (and the big two try not to touch). Uncarrier can steal some market share from AT&T and Verizon’s lower end mobile business, but it cannot hurt their quad plays. The big two are investing in being able to offer distinctive video services, and Verizon, in particular, has said will be “comfortable” to lose market share, if the customers which are churning are all at the low margin end.

The only way to mount a convincing challenge to AT&T and Verizon is for another company to achieve the scale, rich network and content partnerships to launch a multiplay, and preferably also to adopt a non-traditional business model. Of course, over time, that challenge may well come from Google, which can already be seen to be putting the foundations in place for a massive multiplay under its own control. Google could use a combination of its own fiber and wireless, and flexible deals with third party infrastructure owners, to create a huge pool of capacity, available on an on-demand basis to thousands of service providers of all kinds. The provisioning of all those services – and their monetization via big data, advertising and so on – would of course be coordinated from Google’s cloud platforms.

This is the likely nemesis for the current duopoly, but it is years, and many regulatory changes, away. In the meantime, however, more conventional players could take some steps down that disruptive road. Sprint showed signs of doing that, in the early days of its alliance with Clearwire, which had envisaged an open access, wholesale network which could support services and devices from large numbers of retail providers. That vision fell apart amid Sprint’s pressures to protect its conventional business models, but was resurrected briefly by LightSquared’s wholesale-only LTE ideas – and could have been again by a combination of Sprint and Dish.

The two firms lapsed into hostility when Dish bid against Softbank to acquire Sprint and/or Clearwire in 2013, but they remain natural allies. Between them, they have huge stores of spectrum, some of it neighboring (Dish has the PCS H Block, for instance), much of it underused so far. Sprint has a long track record of knitting together unlikely chunks of spectrum, especially thanks to the Nextel side of its heritage, and the rapid development of TDD/FDD carrier aggregation methods, as trialled already in China, will help improve that capability. Sprint’s Network Vision modernization program was specifically designed to be able to host third party networks in different bands, and so would have been a good option for Dish – which cannot afford to launch a whole LTE network from scratch – even if the two firms did not merge. Meanwhile, Dish would have brought Sprint a new customer base, a brand presence in homes, and well-established content relationships and delivery platforms.

Now, all those advantages are likely to go to T-Mobile instead, but the potential for a truly disruptive approach seems more limited than if Dish and Sprint had wed. Uncarrier, as stated above, is disruptive only in a traditional sector of the market – it boldly casts off subsidies and fixed contracts, but it does not change the rules of how services are delivered. This would be a true consolidation, uniting two customer bases which have similar demographics, and so will make a ready target for a quad play, but not taking either partner into brand new fields, such as rich enterprise markets.

According to The Wall Street Journal, talks between the second US satellite TV provider and the fourth MNO are advanced enough to have worked out details of leadership, though the precise price and cash/stock mix remains unresolved. Both Dish and TMo have made no secret of their need to bulk up in order to present credible challenges to AT&T and Verizon.

TMo’s CEO, John Legere, insists that, since merging with MetroPCS – formerly the US’s fifth MNO – the company is in a position to overtake Sprint based on organic growth. But TMo is behind the big two in spectrum and LTE build-out terms, and lacks content or the basis for high value new businesses. It is clear that Legere’s ambitions would be better served by a larger company with more spectrum, services and customer reach, but previous attempts to buy the MNO have foundered on regulatory hostility to reducing the number of national mobile carriers. That was the main reason AT&T’s 2011 bid failed, and why Sprint/Softbank walked away from making an offer at the turn of 2014. Another more surprising stalker, France’s Iliad, also failed to acquire TMo, last year.

Dish, which has not launched commercial mobile services yet despite a series of spectrum acquisitions, would be able to merge with TMo without reducing mobile competition, and would arguably boost credible competition for AT&T and Verizon. And Deutsche Telekom – the former owner of TMo, and still its largest shareholder with a 66% stake – recently reiterated comments that it would be happy to sell most of its holding “for the right price”.

That price, of course, may still prove the sticking point for these talks, not to mention the prospect of two of US industry’s great mavericks – Legere and Dish chairman Charlie Ergen – having to work together nicely. According to the WSJ sources, Ergen would become chair of the merged company while Legere would be CEO. As for the price tag, TMo has a market capitalization of about $31bn, and Dish’s is $33bn, so any agreement would be the latest in a string of multibillion telecoms mergers in the US, the latest being Charter’s bid for fellow cableco Time Warner Cable, in the wake of a failed attempt by Comcast.

With TMo, Dish would gain a readymade mobile base of 44.7m subscribers, many of whom could be targeted for Dish’s TV and internet offerings and for a new quad play bundle (which would improve the enlarged company’s share of customer spend, and ability to go head-to-head with AT&T and Verizon). Dish has 13.8m satellite TV customers and 591,000 internet subscribers.

Dish would also finally answer critics’ claims that it is just sitting on its spectrum as an investment and does not intend to launch services. Prior to its huge spending in the recent AWS-3 auction (it bid $13.3bn, second only to AT&T), it had made it clear that it could not go ahead with its plans for nationwide LTE-Advanced roll-out without a spectrum and/or network partner to help it bridge the significant gap with existing 4G services and lure its customer base towards a quad play. It long ago backed away from any idea of building a national network single-handedly and from scratch.

At a rare analyst briefing this week, Ergen said Dish had four options for a wireless strategy – to partner with a wireless firm; to sell Dish’s spectrum or the whole company; to acquire a mobile network owner; or to wholesale the spectrum.

“Given the spectrum depth, the options are not mutually exclusive and Dish is solely focused on economics and where it can achieve the best return,” analysts at Jefferies wrote in a note on the meeting. “Given the need for service consistency, Dish appears to favor partnering or acquiring where build out costs would be significantly better (or de minimis), with network wholesale a viable option.” They stressed that Dish’s management sees no urgent need to own the network.

Dish said it saw its over-the-top Sling TV video service as the first important step in  its wireless plans, and while it played down similarities with Verizon’s plans to support OTT video over LTE, these will certainly go head-to-head in many ways.

Nevertheless, a Dish-TMo deal may prove to be little more than an annoyance for Verizon and AT&T, while true disruption may be looming from another area of US telecoms, the cable sector. The large cablecos have become increasingly determined to create their own quad plays and multiplays, and to control the wireless leg of the platform as far as possible themselves, minimizing their reliance on cellular MVNOs. This has seen Comcast, Cablevision, Time Warner Cable and others investing heavily in WiFi hotspots and homespots, which they are now starting to upgrade to support carrier-class quality of experience, with features like seamless hand-off to cellular (TWC was the first operator, last year, to start to implement this via the WiFi Alliance’s Passpoint standard). While WiFi still has some disadvantages compared to cellular, these are being reduced, and the cablecos – especially when they act collectively, as with their nationwide Cable WiFi roaming framework – are a genuine threat to the big two telcos. This potential could be ratcheted up by further cooperations – a deep alliance with Google, of course, or even a revival of the traditional partnership with Sprint. If it loses the chance of Dish or T-Mobile, one option for Sprint will be to get close to key cable operators, trading a ‘tame’ mobile network for their content and fixed-line assets. That would be yet another echo of the old, brief vision for Clearwire, in which Comcast, Time Warner Cable and Cox were investors, looking to harness the WiMAX network, and their broad MVNO deal with Sprint, to enable their wireless services.

The evolution of high quality WiFi has made that strategy unnecessary, but there must still be deals to be explored between Sprint and cable. For now, however, the cable players are looking to consolidate within their own ranks. Comcast’s bid for TWC fell through, and it has been replaced as suitor by Charter Communications, which has pushed aside another would-be acquirer, France’s cable group Altice.

Talk that Altice would bid for TWC revived dreams that the disruption broadband groups have inflicted on France might be imported to the US. When Iliad bid for T-Mobile, and then Altice was in talks with TWC, the market saw the prospect of really bold operators shaking up the US status quo. Iliad has famously sparked a price war in France by launching low cost mobile services under its Free brand, leveraging its installed base of home broadband lines to support WiFi homespots and 3G small cells, achieving coverage and capacity at far lower cost than its rivals. Similar tactics could have been applied in the US by Altice, had it gained control of TWC’s cable base.

It may still try its hand, as it is now rumored to be after Cablevision, or even Verizon’s residential wireline business. Altice, which recently acquired a 70% stake in another cableco, the number seven player Suddenlink, could buy Verizon’s wireline activities, including fixed internet and even FiOS TV services, speculates a Citigroup analyst, Michael Rollins, in a research note. “While press reports suggests many in the market believe Cablevision is Altice’s next acquisition, we believe an acquisition of Verizon’s local wireline operation (excluding the enterprise and smaller strategic business units) is more likely,” wrote Rollins.

He calculates that those wireline assets would fetch about $34bn. Verizon already sold some local wireline activities, in California, Florida and Texas, in a $10.54bn sale to Frontier Communications. “Post the pending divestiture, Verizon retains a [local] business that covers 23m homes in total within the dense north east, and expects FiOS coverage to reach nearly 75% of the footprint or 17m homes,” Rollins wrote. “A sale of Verizon’s remaining [local] operations could accelerate the reduction in financial leverage without meaningful dilution to free cashflow per share. Such a move would also increase flexibility for Verizon to more aggressively pursue spectrum purchases and further scale for its emerging wireless, over-the-top video strategy.”

Meanwhile, Charter looks set to snap up the TWC prize, along with the smaller Cable WiFi partner, Bright House Networks. One of the key objectives of this twin acquisition is to increase Charter’s wireless reach, said CEO Tom Rutledge on a conference call with analysts to discuss the deals. He said the enlarged company will be able to extend its fiber networks into new areas, especially small and medium businesses, and accelerate WiFi and other wireless efforts.

Rutledge knows what he is talking about when it comes to wireless, having led Cablevision’s ambitious program in his previous job. Cablevision was the first major US provider to adopt WiFi as its primary wireless technology rather than relying mainly on an MVNO deal or even acquiring spectrum, and it recently unveiled the WiFi-only service Freewheel, which includes voice.

Charter will “invest significantly in out-of-home WiFi,” the CEO said on the call. “We will be expanding our wireless footprint and building our WiFi network in a public way and from that will come additional opportunities to create new subscriber relationships”, again with a focus on high value business customers.

Between them, TWC and Bright House have 85,000 to 90,000 WiFi hotspots and have access to over 400,000 via Cable WiFi. Charter will also be able to exploit the MVNO agreement that TWC and Bright House signed with Verizon Wireless a few years ago and is rumored to have cellular ambitions, having filed comments with the FCC to support next year’s planned 600 MHz spectrum auction and the proposals to set aside 40 MHz for smaller players. BTIG analyst Walter Piecyk said this was “no coincidence”, coming at the same time as Charter’s acquisition bids, and added: “The number of possible buyers and/or partners for wireless has clearly increased. The underlying issue is LTE and what it’s enabled.”

In other words, as LTE’s bandwidth increases and technologies like LTE Broadcast are adopted, it becomes an increasingly viable platform for fixed broadband and fixed/mobile video services – and therefore of interest to cablecos and telcos, not just mobile specialists. Cable operators can use wireless to expand outside their fixed-line footprint and support ‘everywhere access’, while some telcos, including AT&T, are planning to use LTE as a DSL replacement where fiber-to-the-home does not make economic sense. Over-the-top mobile video is an important element of the competitive landscape now, as Verizon’s and Dish’s recent moves highlight, and for true mobility, LTE still has major advantages over WiFi.

If the cablecos do get more interested in cellular connections again, they will want to assert more control over them – as they do with WiFi – and get better deals from MNOs. Again, this is where Sprint could do something bold and set itself up as the ‘MNO of cable’, creating the wherewithal for a convincing challenge to the telcos rather than just plowing the traditional mobile operator furrow, relegated to a poor fourth place with no wireline or content partners.

To enable a radical survival plan, it will be essential that Sprint has a high capacity, flexible network to support multiple partners and many services, and also that it invests in the kind of cloud and virtualization platforms which AT&T is adopting in order – among other goals – to support wholesale partners more effectively. One of the sad aspects of Sprint’s likely demotion to be the smallest national MNO in the US is that it was such a frontrunner in terms of its network thinking. It assembled the tools for a market-transforming broadband network, but in the end, is well behind the two leaders in terms fo LTE coverage and service reach, and is even being overtaken by TMo in some markets.

Ergen, at the analyst meeting, commented on the deal he nearly did with Sprint in 2013, saying that Dish was less impressed than Sprint by the 2.5 GHz spectrum and complaining that the MNO suffered from “lack of a clear network plan”. By contrast, TMo has “simpler network design, more common spectrum bands, and already dense network (it’s dense where it exists, but needs to exist in more places)”.

Such comments will sting Sprint, which has always prided itself on being highly advanced in networks. Of course, it gambled and lost on WiMAX, which then landed it with a complex migration process in 2.5 GHz to add to its migration of iDEN and CDMA spectrum and networks to Network Vision and LTE. As well as those complications, it has perhaps been over-ambitious and so fallen behind in actual commercial delivery. However, CEO Marcelo Claure insists it is now close to its targets, and he recently received approval from Softbank to proceed with the next stage of its roll-out, a massive densification program called Next Generation Network, to build on the Network Vision modernization effort.

If Sprint pulls this off, it may finally have the market leading network, in terms of capacity and cost of capacity, which it has promised since the WiMAX days, and which could host a major cable wireless platform (or see Sprint acquired by Comcast or Charter).

Sprint has issued RFPs for its Next Generation Network and aims to increase coverage and capacity, using a combination of techniques including small cells and WiFi, as well as launching VoLTE and possibly LTE Broadcast. Up to 20,000 new sites could be added, sources say. CTO Stephen Bye told FierceWireless last month: “Within our footprint, what we’ll do is make sure that we deliver a consistent and reliable experience. As we look at densification, it’s not simply about building for capacity” but consistent data speeds and performance throughout the network.

Speaking at the recent Re/code conference, Claure boasted that Sprint would have the leading US network within two years. “You can expect in the next 18 to 24 months that our network will be ranked number one or number two in every single [major US] market.” He was referring to rankings by RootMetrics, which recently said that Sprint had overtaken T-Mobile in terms of overall network performance (though it still had the slowest network).

Claure said: “We’ve figured out a way how we’re going to go build the network – completely different network architecture; completely different way to build the network.” He added that a combination of macro and small cells would “truly unload the value of its spectrum” over time.

At that point, the cablecos may come knocking, and Ergen may regret the chain of events which landed him as chair of Dish/T-Mobile not Dish/Sprint. Sprint’s 4G story has been one of wasted opportunities so far – now it needs to deliver its network promises, and team up with Comcast or Google to ensure its own relevance, and to help disrupt the US market far more effectively than the Ergen/Legere team is going to do.