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16 September 2005

Nokia wards off Intel with new chip procurement strategy

Nokia delighted the markets this week by raising its earnings forecasts for its third quarter on the back of better than expected handset sales and strong cost control. This is, however, just the short term yo-yoing inevitable in a competitive consumer goods market and nothing to take too seriously. Following its disappointing performance in 2003, the world’s largest phonemaker has proved adept at employing the flexible short term tactics, in terms of supply chain massage, pricing and cost reduction, that can keep each quarter reasonably healthy. Meeting the longer term challenges of its core handset industry requires far more creative thinking, even if the short termist investors, obsessed with the quarterly market shares fluctuations against Motorola, fail to understand them.

There are two key shifts in the handset market that threaten Nokia more than any of its rivals, partly because of its huge dependence on the cellphone sector, but also because of its business model and its approach to its suppliers. One is the shift of intellectual property and agenda setting for cellphones to the cellcos; the other is the increasing importance in that agenda of the chip giants such as Intel. This means that Nokia is not just dealing with the challenges that were always implicit in the cellphone market as it achieved volume, notably commoditization and pressure from low cost rivals. It has responded effectively to these with a mixture of a legendarily efficient supply chain, rivalled by few apart from Dell Computer, and a focus on new, high margin markets such as the enterprise and multimedia devices.

Instead, it is also facing a disruption of the business structure on which it has thrived ‘ one in which the cellphone maker dictates to the chip and component makers, and to the carriers, what the key requirements will be for the next range of handsets. The battle by the mobile operators to break that pattern has been underway for several years and has been increasingly successful. Nokia is the only supplier not to capitulate and agree to make an operator-branded phone, entirely to a carrier’s specifications and with its branded look and feel. It continues to rely on the strength of its own design and user interface, and its ability, through its huge market weight, to set standards, to keep the upper hand. But it has had to make major concessions, notably to Vodafone, and to cut prices ‘ hence its increasingly intense interest in handsets, such as its non-cellular internet tablet and its dual-mode Wi-Fi/3G models, that can bypass the carrier and appeal directly to the enterprise, or to a new telco customer base such as the wireline and converged operators.

We believe that the entry of the converged wired/wireless platforms and the rise of the Wi-Fi handsets will put the cellular operators under huge pressure and enable Nokia to regain some of its former upper hand. The heyday of the cellcos’ control of their own devices is almost over and, in a world where the device becomes a hub that can connect to many networks and applications, customer control passes once again to the designer of that device.

Here is where the second challenge comes into force, and it may be an even more dangerous one for Nokia as the converged market evolves. The all-IP world, where users can access a set of services and data via any device and any network connection, using any carrier, is essentially an extension of the PC model ‘ and a reversal of the mobile communications model, where the carrier controlled the services and access mechanism. But in the PC world, it was not the device maker that held the reins, but the provider of the chips and the operating system at the heart of the PC. And as we have seen over the past few years, Intel and ‘ rather less coherently ‘ Microsoft, will not let that position change without a fight.

In an open access world the operating system should become increasingly irrelevant, and Microsoft needs to meet that challenge. But the new order only strengthens the chipmaker, whose ability to shrink multiple radios and application processors on to a compact, low power chipset; to address battery issues will lie at the heart of any device’s effectiveness in an always-connected world. Most of the key technologies that will make the next generation device vision feasible are at the chipset, rather than the software layers ‘ many of the applications and services are already with us, but the challenge is to make the access devices small, powerful and usable enough to cope. That will mean support for cognitive radios, advanced antenna arrays and other innovations that lie within the control of the major semiconductor companies.

Nokia can, and does, collaborate with Intel on many projects, and there was a time when it seemed possible that the Finnish giant could even become the new Microsoft, replacing Windows with its own SymbianOS and Series x0 software. This remains an objective in the enterprise market, but increasingly Nokia is focused on Linux and Java, and on gaining control through middleware and higher layer software for those generic platforms. In this context, it can happily work with Intel in the enterprise space, but will not welcome the chip giant taking a dominant role, in intellectual property terms, in the wider cellphone sector, especially if Nokia is not retaining a parallel stranglehold on the software elements. A Wintel-style situation in handsets would increase the cost levels for Nokia because it could lose its ability to dictate prices as it can to its current suppliers, and give it less control over handset designs.

Nokia will be sure to be planning a series of counter-attacks, and the first is to use its weight to bolster a wider range of semiconductor providers in the handset market. This is both an immediate strategy to lower its costs by introducing more suppliers and more competition into its supply line, but also to create a best of breed composite platform that will, it believes, be harder for Intel to challenge. In the short term, the decision could mainly hurt Texas Instruments, Nokia’s main chip supplier and close ally. Some analysts have seen the move to be less dependent on TI as a sign that the Finnish company fears its chief supplier taking an Intel-style upper hand in the handset business. However, this seems unlikely. TI has a history of following standards, and executing very well, rather than seeking to set them, and its market position owes an enormous amount to Nokia’s patronage, something it would not lightly risk with over aggressive or greedy behaviour. And the companies’ relationship goes well beyond mere customer and supplier, with extensive joint ventures such as the CDMA manufacturing initiative shared with STMicro (Nokia’s second largest chip vendor).

It is more likely that Nokia wishes to stimulate a healthy and varied vendor community around TI, and, as handsets become more complex, to recognize that no one chip supplier can provide the whole platform. Texas Instruments gets about 15% of its revenue from Nokia, while STMicro gets 18%. Other key chip suppliers are Infineon for RF transceivers, but only 3% of its revenue is currently from the Finnish giant. Skyworks provides CDMA components and CSR Bluetooth chips. The chipmaker most dependent on Nokia is RF Micro Devices, which gains 38% of its revenue from the phonemaker.

Nonetheless, there will be pain for TI, according to a research note from Merrill Lynch, while smaller cellphone chip players such as Infineon will be boosted. Nokia has been happy, to date, to rely on just one applications processor, the TI OMAP platform, but now it is aiming to use ST’s Nomadik apps processor socket in some designs. Similarly, it will use Infineon’s integrated RF in some low end handsets in preference to TI’s new single-chip offering.

Nokia is changing designs in order to accommodate new suppliers, an example of its willingness to alter some of its architectures to maintain as much leverage as possible. Of course this is partly about short term margin protection. But it is also about preserving a wide range of different options in the handset chip sector, a task that few but Nokia would have the weight to attempt. It is in the interests of the Finnish company that there remains a good choice of chip providers and that the consolidation witnessed in the PC and other semiconductor markets does not take place. And the most important corollary of that strategy is to give Intel plenty of fronts to fight on, and thwart its bid to achieve control of the mobile communications agenda for good, even as that agenda shifts towards the open IP-oriented world that Intel knows well.