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6 March 2006

Exiting Japan is a small Band-Aid; Vodafone needs to think radically about 3G

Vodafone remains in the headlines and in shareholders’ bad books, with the UK’s largest ever writedown of that most intangible of assets, goodwill, reflecting the reduced value of, primarily, the German business it acquired with Mannesmann. The writedown will be between £23bn and £28bn and will raise further question marks over the future of CEO Arun Sarin. The current crisis at the world’s largest mobile operator has also prompted it to enter talks with Japan’s Softbank to sell the ailing Vodafone Japan unit. An exit from Japan would reflect the cellco’s evolving strategy to focus on high growth areas rather than global brand, as its core territories become saturated, but there is also a whiff of the kneejerk about the talks, as though placating shareholders with this sale will distract their attention from calls to cut back further, notably by selling Vodafone’s 45% share in Verizon Wireless.

If a Japanese sale is what it takes to steady the ship, it is probably a sacrifice worth making, especially as the country is about to open up to further mobile operators. But the pressure on Sarin is unjust. He has shown himself a shrewd and intelligent CEO, whose problems are stemming from two factors largely beyond his control, and to which shareholders need to give him the leeway to respond effectively. One is the massive sums paid in 1999-2000 for assets that were vastly overvalued. This is not so much about the $101bn Mannesmann purchase, since the stock that Vodafone issued to buy the Germany company was also massively overvalued at the time, and it is highly probable that without that acquisition, the value of Vodafone would be less now than it is in reality. It is far more to do with the purchase of the 3G licenses in western Europe, and overpaying for those pieces of paper was a mistake made by all major European cellcos. It also relates directly to Sarin’s second problem ‘ the fact that his predecessor’s administration, like many of its competitors, believed that 3G would allow mobile services to be sold at a huge premium. Instead, flat rate portable broadband in the shape of Wi-Fi, flat rate or free VoIP and the emergence of alternative technologies supporting 3G-type applications threaten to make cellular services into a commodity in developed markets, throwing into question whether companies can ever get a return on their huge 3G investments in Europe.

Sarin’s Vodafone has inherited the miscalculation and has not dealt with the aftermath any worse than its rivals, and significantly better than some, though it lacks the benefit of a wired network arm with which to pursue the emerging convergence market. Introduction of flat rate cellular voice and homezone services in Germany, continuing investment in the Live! portal brand, expansion into less developed markets such as Turkey ‘ all are sensible and creative, but other tactics will require shareholders to underwrite even further investments of funds, notably creating mobile TV networks and upgrading to HSxPA. Ironically, the Verizon Wireless venture that several major institutional shareholders are so keen to cash in is one of the real bright spots in Vodafone right now, with its storming growth and a 3G strategy, based on CDMA EV-DO, that is actually working.

We have suggested before that a merger of Vodafone and its joint venture partner Verizon Communications could be a more promising way forward out of the current mire, especially given the possibility that AT&T could acquire BellSouth, giving it full control of the two companies’ cellular joint venture Cingular Wireless. Such a merger ‘ which was previously mooted when Vodafone was considering bidding for AT&T Wireless two years ago ‘ would give Verizon a larger cellular arm and international presence, and give Vodafone a wireline unit in a huge market plus freedom from the short termism of UK institutional investors.

Vodafone is having to cope with the fact that 3G has failed to deliver its commercial promises and that a new round of network investment will be required to encourage uptake of premium services, which even so, will not attract the ARPU that was hoped for in 1999. This black picture makes the likely sale of the Japanese unit into a sideline. It is estimated to be worth $8.4bn and $11.6bn, and Softbank might pay a premium as it is desperate for a mobile license, and so this could enable Vodafone to placate shareholders with an increased dividend. But this does not address core problems, such as the slowing of growth in revenue that Vodafone warned about last week, and the pressure on pre-tax earnings, which it said would fall by about 1% a year (excluding Japan) because of pricing pressures, additional investments in customers and changes in termination rates. This makes even the writedown of goodwill look like just a blip. The fact is that Vodafone is seeing faster growth in 3G handset uptake than many rivals, but at the cost of heavy subsidies and a disappointing impact on ARPU. It needs to accept that the return on 3G is not just delayed in its core European territory, it is never going to happen. Key tests will be how much money it has to pay for 3G expansion licenses in 2.5GHz next year, and whether it is able to reduce its reliance on 3G as its main growth driver ‘ by acquiring or merging with a wireline unit, forming alliances in key territories, building out alternative networks that support better cost per bit and premium services (such as WiMAX or TD-CDMA), and/or increasing its enterprise and government revenues.

These are tactics that have been employed by its US partner, with a good degree of success in many areas. Vodafone needs to get closer to Verizon, not break with it. And Sarin should not be pilloried for decisions made in the past, but given some freedom to make difficult new decisions about how to cope with the changed picture of mobile communications.