As the US 700MHz auction approaches its end, there is a potential series of disasters on the horizon, created by this auction. It is, after all, only $20bn, and presumably the financial and telecoms businesses around the US can support an outlay of that type, even if some of it is wasted, undersold, or fails to create a new telco landscape. But the build-out costs associated with all that spectrum, when added to the $13.7bn spent on the AWS spectrum sold 18 months ago, means that the amount at stake – including capex and spectrum costs ‘ is likely to be more like $65bn. That’s another matter.
There are two ways to think of this – as money well spent to change the landscape of US wireless communications, or as a future build-out burden that might kill many smaller operations and lean back towards monopoly US services. In analyzing which way it might go, there are some disquieting issues that remain unresolved on the latest round of spectrum.
Rather than go through the various guesses of who may or may not have won the different lots in blocks A through E, perhaps it is better to have a think about just how this spectrum might be used. The auction rules say that the 700MHz licenses can be used for fixed or mobile two-way networks or for broadcast only one-way, though clearly the unpaired 6MHz Block E license is designed purely for broadcast. And the networks can be built out in either FDD or TDD technologies.
Commentators have been billing 700MHz as ‘beachfront’ spectrum ‘ an expression coined by the FCC ‘ which is a cure-all for every wireless problem, the biggest of which are bringing broadband data speeds and mobile internet to the handset; bringing entertainment networks to the handse; and taking the handset out to the far reaches of the US continent, promising a further reach, and better, more available networks.
But what might it mean instead of that? Here are a few scenarios that, while not contradicting those aims, might also emerge.
‘ The traditional US rural incumbent could be pushed out of business by the reach of the 700MHz spectrum, with the resulting push towards greater US telecommunications monopoly, not less.
‘ Some buyers of the 700MHz spectrum (depending on who they are) may find that they have overpaid, and that combined with costs of build-out and the rising costs of US debt, may push them out of contention.
‘ The auction may trigger copycat auctions around the world and set a precedent that has as negative a global effect as the European 3G auctions in 2000.
The reason that we say that there may immediately be some downside for successful bidders is that 700MHz is really not a cure-all form of spectrum. It is not much good for use in urban areas, because its main attribute, and the reason it was chosen for analog TV in the first place, is that it can travel long distances without degradation, interference or fading. But the longer carrier waves travel, the more difficult it is to tame them and the greater interference problems arise. In an urban area, many base stations are needed because of the number of people that require a voice or data connection at any point in time. So the base stations have to be close together regardless of propagation and penetration characteristics. In a higher frequency like 2.5GHz, which has inferior propagation qualities, because of the shorter wave forms, the spectrum will form far more distinctive edges to any given cell. Once the signal runs out of power, it runs out quickly and does not continue echoing off into the distance. By contrast, 700MHz kit has to be de-powered to work in urban environments.
Where the equation goes wrong for an operator like Sprint is that the 2.5GHz handset cannot be further away from a base station than its radio can reach without using up its battery too quickly. This means there is a natural maximum distance apart for two-way, mobile 2.5GHz base stations, regardless of how many people are connected to them ‘ something that is undermining Sprint, which has the perennial problem facing cellcos, how to reach the long distances between urban centers with its build-out and still look like a national network.
There is an equation here. What we have been taught to think by the build-up to this 700MHz auction is that the best spectrum is always that which goes the furthest and goes through walls. But if this is true, then 450MHz would be more valuable than 800/900MHz, and it’s not. The reasons for this are a combination of political and historical factors and plain physics. On the flip side, if you have spectrum that goes too far, then you can only use it once, or it will interfere with neighboring cells, or limit its capabilities by turning down the power.
So the best spectrum is that which carries far enough, but not so far that when you put lots of cells close together in an urban area (because of the high number of separate connections you need to support) they interfere with each other. In the end most networks will end up with the same number of base stations in urban areas, so they have a practical distance apart not decided by propagation capabilities at all, but by population spread during peak hours. What we are after is spectrum which does the best job of traveling the natural distance that urban base stations need to be apart to support traffic, but which can also reach remote rural towns in as few hops as possible. But in a world where multiband, multi-radio devices are becoming cheaper and more usable, the need for a single perfect spectrum band is declining ‘ and so, therefore, should be the price paid for any single frequency, since success is more likely to rest on a combination of bands, whether all held by one operator or by partnerships.
Increasingly in the world of cellular there are such combinations in existence already. A device may have radios operating in 800MHz, 900MHz, 1.9GHz and shortly 1.7GHz, 2.1GHz and 2.5GHz, all potentially in the same unit. This has come about because of the different global spectrum allocations, and the historic drift towards denser cellular networks, making use of shorter and shorter wavelengths. So why is it suddenly de rigueur to start the spectrum trend off in a different direction towards longer wavelengths? In the end it is more likely that a fat 2.5GHz pipe (90MHz in Sprint’s case) will become the best way to support large chunks of two-way mobile internet access in a town, and that networks will eventually emerge combining that with longer wavelengths at lower frequencies and narrower bands out of town. There are lots of combinations possible.
Which leads us to one of the first points we made, that 700MHz is fundamentally a rural get-out clause for operators that already have networks. It makes rural build-out cheaper, more effective, and quicker. So that in turn makes if more valuable to companies that already have nationwide wireless networks but in fact only serve rural areas with basic services, or through roaming deals. This is whyn AT&T and Verizon were almost certainly the major bidders, despite the early hype around a mobile internet player like Google elbowing in.
The worst thing that can happen is that someone other than those two gets a national license and tries to build a flat 700MHz network for both urban and rural wireless. That would be inherently less profitable than the way in which AT&T or Verizon would use the spectrum, and may lead to investors immediately realizing that they have overbid, leading to downward pressure on their share value.
The other worst case situation is that a company is successful which already has spectrum and a build-out program. That just puts an unsupportable burden on their capex, with two build-outs and fresh spectrum to pay for, the same result.
But in a way the success of AT&T and Verizon in these auctions is perhaps a worse scenario still, not for the rival bidders, but for US telecoms as a whole. They have both acquired a number of local incumbent operators in the recent past, and while it might have been reasonable for such a mopping up operation to continue into the future, the availability of 700MHz spectrum for rural wireless becoming available to these two giants, may make it preferable that instead of offering prosperous roaming agreements to the 100s of local incumbents throughout the US, the two major RBOCs could just reach into their territories with cheap 700MHz build-outs and snatch their customers away just as profitably.
This leaves us with the scenario that AT&T and Verizon will be getting bigger both in terms of the overall efficiency of their networks and their ability to add more advanced data features, at the same time as accelerating the destabilization of local incumbents for their consumption by merger or by simple competition. At the same time companies that do NOT have the ability to create a two-tier network may have felt the need to jump on the 700MHz bandwagon and outbid the two giants in some markets, and may find that instead of beachfront spectrum, they have less profitable, ‘;best for rural’ spectrum, that does not automatically enable the mobile internet in the way that Google has convinced the world it will.
And the FCC – by listening to Google and talking this band up as ‘mobile internet’and ‘open access’ spectrum, hyping the auction for the benefit of the US government coffers, and by ignoring the voices that called for the auction to favor rural operators – may have moved US telecoms significantly closer to a duopoly, which will have the opposite effect to all its ‘open’ rhetoric.
What situation does this leave Verizon in? It is fighting a rampant AT&T, and if it wins significant spectrum during the auction, has the dual problem of moving its future network over to LTE from CDMA, something it has already committed to, at the same time as harnessing the 700MHz spectrum. That would mean that sometime in the next few years Verizon might begin to look more and more like Sprint, fighting on too many fronts, and pilloried for overspending on capex. And while AT&T will be able to use more commoditized LTE devices, Verizon will have to pay handset makers for a special device to bridge CDMA and LTE (a challenge only a handful of CDMA operators will face in the first phase) and again similar to the Sprint situation.
The final fear is that the US auction may have set a blueprint for wireless spectrum valuations that will spread like wildfire throughout the western world, with every European government putting its 700MHz spectrum on the block between now and 2012 at too high a price, hiking the cost of mobile broadband beyond any near term viable level, shutting out mobile TV, mobile internet and the wireless entertainment market.
The main hope in all of this, for the US through Sprint, and across Europe through a variety of 2.5MHz and 3.5MHz license holders, is the WiMAX community providing a mobile broadband alternative, often in lower cost spectrum. But this will be hampered because most players will have just one slice of spectrum, with only urban build-outs likely to be profitable ‘ leaving rural wireless broadband, again, for some time in the future.
Over the coming weeks we plan to return to this issue of spectrum valuation and look first in detail at the outcome of the US auction, and its likely impact on corporate operator valuations both there and abroad.
This analysis was originally published in Faultline, Wireless Watch’s sister title, which offers weekly insights into the digital media markets and the economics of the quad play. Please contact Peter White on [email protected] for more details.