The mobile market threatens to be the Achilles’ heel osf Windows 10 as it has been for Microsoft all along. Former CEO Steve Ballmer’s last attempt at a cure was to integrate mobile hardware and software, Apple-style, by acquiring Nokia. Now his successor Satya Nadella – in a major executive reshuffle partly aimed at meeting the mobile challenge – is also converging devices and their software, creating a new Windows and Devices Group.
But this is actually a reversal of Ballmer’s strategy, subsuming the former Nokia activities completely into Windows, under the control of an entirely software-driven EVP, Terry Myerson. Meanwhile, the end of Microsoft’s handset adventure was signalled powerfully by the departure of Stephen Elop, the architect of a Nokia acquisition which Nadella has made it clear he regards as an albatross around the neck of his ‘cloud first, mobile first’ strategy.
EVP Terry Myerson, who runs the Windows business, extends his empire further by taking on the former Nokia business in a combined Windows and Devices Group. It can be expected that the handsets will fade into obscurity in a division led by a confirmed software leader (though one with mobile credentials, having led the development of Windows Phone), and which will need to focus all its energies on the launch of Windows 10.
Along with Elop, two other senior executives, Kirill Tatarinov – EVP for business solutions – and Eric Rudder, EVP for advanced strategy, are leaving Microsoft after a transition period (as is Elop’s deputy, Jo Harlow). In the key roles, alongside Myerson, EVP Scott Guthrie will continue to lead the Cloud and Enterprise Group, while Qi Lu will remain in charge of the Applications and Services Group, which includes Office and the Bing search engine.
These three executives represent the three legs of Nadella’s strategy – personal computing, cloud platforms, and productivity/business. “We are aligning our engineering efforts and capabilities to deliver on our strategy and, in particular, our three core ambitions,” Nadella said in an email to employees. “This change will enable us to deliver better products and services that our customers love at a more rapid pace.”
The first of the three, personal computing, includes mobile products but does not give them a special position distinct from PCs. This reflects the fact that W10 is designed to offer a uniform experience across all kinds of device, and also that Microsoft’s opportunities lie in the convergence of PCs with mobile and embedded gadgets – not in chasing smartphone leadership, surely a horse which has bolted long ago. Myerson’s objective is broad, to “enable more personal computing experiences powered by the Windows ecosystem,” as Nadella put it.
So Microsoft needs to channel its remaining strengths in a PC installed base and developer community, to push Windows 10 in whatever ‘post-PC’ form factors may take the place of the familiar screen/keyboard/mouse combination. Tablets, hybrids, superphones, and more futuristic designs will evolve to support all a user’s productivity, media and communications needs from one device, whether stationary or on the move.
That battle may well boil down to Windows 10 versus Chrome (which is appearing on its first tablet-like design courtesy of the Asus Chromebook Flip) – and like Microsoft, Google has been backing away from too much involvement in the hardware. Both arch-rivals are coming up with their own devices in the hope of stimulating the ecosystem and showcasing their software’s capabilities (Surface for Windows, Nexus for Android, and Google’s own Chromebooks), but both have wisely pulled back from trying to be mass market vendors themselves, Google selling Motorola Mobility on to Lenovo, Nadella effectively sidelining Nokia.
Their device designers are focused on creating new categories, as with Microsoft HoloLens, not limping along in segments defined by others (though occasionally, as with Xbox and Surface, a showcase design may turn into a commercially viable product).
Nadella could amend his mantra to ‘cloud first, personal computing first’, returning the terms of reference to Microsoft’s traditional heartland while helping redefine the ‘personal’ term to include a huge variety of device types- not just those post-PC designs, but wearables and a plethora of embedded gadgets supported by the internet of things (IoT). Here, Microsoft’s labs will still turn out hardware, such as the new fitness band, but in order to stimulate a new market for services, not create a hardware business.
The proliferation of device form factors will be one of the key challenges for Windows 10, which aims to deliver a comparable user experience everywhere from embedded and mobile products, to post-PCs and eventually TVs, games consoles and wearables (though the Microsoft Band does not yet run Windows). This is where Microsoft is still emulating Apple – not in hardware, but in the idea that, if a user can move seamlessly between devices, they will happily remain within the walled garden, and will choose the same platform for all their gadgets. So a strong W10 experience across many products would finally make sense of having a Windows smartphone for many customers, and developers.
Success is very far from assured, but Nadella does have a back-up plan. Mobile relevance, and ‘mobile first’, for him, mean creating cloud platforms which serve all kinds of mobile clients, many of which he acknowledges will run Android or iOS. While he may hope that the mobile edition of Windows 10 gains significant share on smartphones – or more probably, emerging form factors – history is against him, and the obvious fallback option is to ensure that the critical Microsoft platforms of the future – Azure, not Windows – can dominate the world of mobile and IoT services.
These are where the revenues lie, not in the low-margin world of consumer devices. As ZDnet points out, the Microsoft Band may cost $200, but that price will be rapidly depressed, and anyway, is far less valuable than recurring revenues from a wide range of cloud services which a fitness gadget can access. The Band’s core service, Microsoft Health, for instance, is built on a range of Azure services including Application Insights, Azure DocumentDB, HDInsight (Hadoop on Azure), Azure Service Bus, Azure Data Factory, Event Hubs, Stream Analytics and Azure Machine Learning.
That laundry list shows why a humble fitness band is not so humble after all, in terms of the revenue streams it may unleash from consumers and developers. Elop and his Nokia-based devices business were not going to deliver that vision, and his departure marks the undoubted end of Ballmer’s brief attempt to make Microsoft into Apple.
Elop was the Microsoft veteran who led negotiations, first to persuade Nokia to adopt Windows Phone, not Android, to replace its Symbian operating system; and then to sell its iconic, but failing, handset business to Microsoft outright. By the second deal, of course, Elop had jumped over the fence to become Nokia’s CEO, returning to the mother ship along with the acquisition.
There were even some who favored Elop to replace Steve Ballmer in the CEO role which Nadella took over last year. That speculation always seemed fanciful. Elop had done a poor job at revitalizing Nokia because he was so focused on the handsets and on his vision of the Finnish firm as Microsoft’s route to mobile significance. Yet the decision to adopt Windows Phone may well have been the final undoing of the Nokia smartphone business, which could have adopted mainstream Android and combined a huge applications base with its own undoubted design and technology skills.
It can be argued that, in selling the devices unit to Microsoft, Elop saved the Finnish firm to fight another day as a networks vendor (and to have the funds to acquire Alcatel-Lucent). But it was clear that his motivation was about his former employer, not the rescuing of his new company – but there too, his judgement and his timing were off.
Ballmer’s idea of developing a fully integrated hardware/software platform was quickly sidelined by Nadella (though it lives on in the devices actually designed inhouse, notably the Surface tablets, now a billion-dollar business, Xbox and some new arrivals like HoloLens). And in April, having already announced swingeing job cuts in the devices division, Microsoft warned that it would probably have to take a writedown on the Nokia unit, which surely signed the death warrant for Elop.
“Nadella looked in the mirror and realized hard decisions needed to happen,” Daniel Ives, an analyst at FBR Capital Markets, told Bloomberg. “These changes needed to happen sooner rather than later as Nadella and Redmond head into a crucial, make-or-break fiscal 2016.”
That fiscal year will be one characterized by mobile services, but not mobile devices. Elop’s statement said farewell graciously to Elop, saying: “He has been a strong advocate of the need to drive focus and accountability around the delivery of [Microsoft] experiences and has helped drive tighter alignment toward the ambition of more personal computing. I regret the loss of leadership that this represents, and look forward to seeing where his next destination will be.” But behind the friendly words, the door was slamming tightly shut on the Nokia adventure, and on Microsoft’s brief career as a mass market handset maker.