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14 March 2013

Google and Microsoft squeeze OEMs in their moves to OS convergence

Two separate strategies by the major platform suppliers threaten to squeeze all but the most powerful of their device partners. One is the bid by Google and Microsoft to sell hardware as well as software. In order to make their mark, they will need to compete with their OEM partners, at least at the cutting edge where credibility lies. The other is less definite, but all three mobile OS vendors appear to be looking for future convergence between their mobile and desktop platforms. This is logical as the lines blur ‘ as Android and iOS move to large screens and bigger processors, and as touch comes to PCs, there will be increasingly little to differentiate the traditional categories. But in these scenarios, what happens to a company like Nokia, not only competing with Microsoft but also stuck with Windows Phone, an OS that could be crushed by the extension of Windows RT to smaller devices.

Of course Nokia can, and should, adopt Windows RT rapidly and start innovating in form factors beyond the handset ‘ unless it wants to concentrate entirely on the midmarket, in which case it should major on Asha, a platform it fully controls and which has real differentiation. But to go into tablets and full Windows, it will have to venture into an unfamiliar competitive landscape and increase the number of firms it has to rival, going up against all the traditional PC makers.

The Finnish firm acknowledged the risks in a recent financial filing, in particular citing the possibility that Microsoft will launch its own smartphone to join its Surface tablets. Nokia had previously indicated that the decision to bring out Surface was one factor that had made it cautious about putting out its own tablet any time soon.

In its document, it also lists other risks, including that Microsoft could sideline or even dump Windows Phone and rely entirely on Windows 8, following the emerging trend to converge mobile, PC and TV operating systems and applications bases. There is already considerable harmony between W8 and WP8, but the latter has been squeezed into a smaller corner than originally envisaged ‘ for instance, it cannot run on larger screened devices like tablets, limiting the options for its OEMs.

Nokia’s perception of the risks in its decision to throw its lot in with Microsoft has shifted in the past year. In its 2011 filing, it saw the chief threat being the impact of Windows Phone royalties on its profits, as it moves from royalty-free Symbian.

In its 2012 document, it says: “Microsoft may act independently of us with respect to decisions and communications on that operating system which may have a negative effect on us. Moreover, if Microsoft reduces investment in that operating system or discontinues it, our smartphone strategy would be directly negatively affected by such acts.”

It adds: ‘Microsoft may make strategic decisions or changes that may be detrimental to us. For example, in addition to the Surface tablet, Microsoft may broaden its strategy to sell other mobile devices under its own brand, including smartphones. This could lead Microsoft to focus more on their own devices and less on mobile devices of other manufacturers that operate on the Windows Phone platform, including Nokia.’

Since unveiling the Surface tablet, designed to showcase what Microsoft regards as an optimal experience for the two strands of W8 ‘ the ARM and touch-enabled Windows RT, and the x86-based W8 Pro ‘ there has been an expectation that it will also design a handset. This would have less clear advantages for the software giant though ‘ unlike tablets, the smartphone sector is full of entrenched vendors, and Microsoft would have to decide whether to support WP8, thus alienating key partners Nokia and HTC, or push Windows RT down to the small screen, effectively sidelining Windows Phone altogether.

Microsoft has been in the front seat in terms of OS convergence with its recent moves to harmonize the code base and user experience of its two platforms. But Google is set to play leapfrog, and appears poised to bring Android and Chrome closer together. Three actions this month point to eventual convergence ‘ the launch of the Chromebook Pixel, a touch-based version of the search giant’s thin client device; the integration of the important Google Now system, a rival to Apple Siri, into the Chrome browser, which is replacing Android’s own native browser; and the decision to bring both Android and Chrome under one executive, Sundar Pichai.

The last of these moves came with the news that Andy Rubin – creator of Android and head of the business unit since selling his start-up to Google in 2005 ‘ was to take another, undefined role at Google. Google CEO Larry Page wrote in a blog post: “Andy’s decided it’s time to hand over the reins and start a new chapter at Google. Andy, more moonshots please!’

This increased speculation that Google would soon integrate Android’s Dalvik virtual machine and Java-like framework with Chrome’s programming base, allowing the web-based notebooks to run Android apps rather than operating entirely online in the Chrome browser/OS. Despite the rise in cloud-based apps and streamed content, users cling stubbornly to at least an element of local apps and content, especially when connections are not always reliable. An Android option would give them the best of both worlds, allow them to run their Android products on all their devices, and justify the price of the Chromebook Pixel, which at $1,300 equates to four or five old generation Chromebooks from Samsung or Acer, or several tablets, and is even more than a Macbook Air.

This price tag, for a device which, at heart, is just a browser on a laptop, seemed peculiar when Google unveiled the new Chromebook, and the powerful touchscreen was not enough to explain it. But the launch highlights the reason Google is designing its own hardware ‘ it believes it can create a Rolls-Royce experience, to showcase the best aspects of its platforms. It does not need to make the highest sales, since it benefits from any Android or Chrome usage, whether on its own devices or not, but it sets out a standard it hopes users will embrace, thus enabling it to drive partners’ design strategies.

This is a bold theory, and Pichai may be the man to spearhead it. Page wrote in his blog post: ‘Going forward, Sundar Pichai will lead Android, in addition to his existing work with Chrome and Apps. Sundar has a talent for creating products that are technically excellent yet easy to use – and he loves a big bet.’

That bet may be too big. Unlike Microsoft, Google does not have entirely malleable OEMs. Making its own hardware and converging Chrome OS and Android will pose new risks for device makers in both camps, and some, like Nokia, will have limited power to resist, but will just have to look for ways to carve out their own identity and avoid being squeezed out. But this can hardly be said of Samsung, with its dominance of the Android market arguably greater, in commercial terms, than Google’s own. And Samsung makes Chromebooks too, so how long will it be before we see a converged ‘Galaxy Chrome’? Which might obediently follow the design guidelines set out by Google, but would more probably harness the underlying software ‘ open source after all ‘ to create Samsung’s own experience. The Korean vendor, which for years did very little in software, is learning its lessons in this respect. It is no Apple, but it is getting creative about user experience and integrating its hardware with content and UI.

Google should concentrate on creating the kind of services it does well, keeping its user experience so advanced that users embrace it and OEMs have to support it. Google Now, not Nexus and Chromebook Pixel, is the cornerstone here. The product, part of Android JellyBean and a response to Apple’s popular if flawed Siri personal assistant, is key to Google’s bid to broaden its remit ‘ from conventional search engine to provider of a whole range of personalized web services.

If Google loses the initiative in search, it will be under severe threat, especially as it has often been ineffective in extending its advertising model to applications like social networking. Siri-like technologies threaten to change the whole concept on which internet search is built so creating a superior rival is not just important to the Android/Apple war, but to Google’s broader business. Google Now has the heavy burden of ensuring Google, not Apple, defines the new approach to search, and of widening its owner’s scope into every aspect of web behavior. Like Siri, the idea is that Now should be part of a user’s everyday behavior and become indispensable.

And now it is coming to Chrome OS, a further indication that the two Google operating systems are converging. Of course, there is a lot more to converging two platforms than porting a few services and UI components, though bringing touch to the Chromebook is a major step. There will be programming frameworks and tools to integrate, apps to rewrite, internal teams to realign, user expectations to reset. There is the risk of encouraging users to buy just one device instead of two or three ‘ not a problem for the old Google which made money from increased web usage, more of an issue for the new Google with its Motorola subsidiary and its Nexus line. After all Microsoft has taken many steps to unify Windows 8 and WP8, but has stopped short of uniting the two under a single division or executive (Windows Phone remains in the Entertainment and Devices unit with Xbox)

Most difficult of all, perhaps, in Google’s case is harmonizing two entirely different visions of how mobile usage will develop. While Android was its weapon to ensure Apple and Microsoft did not run away with the post-PC platform, in some ways it jarred with Google’s web-oriented outlook, relying as it did on the old PC traditions of local storage and processing. Chrome OS was far more at the heart of the Google worldview, stripping away the ‘fat’ OS and the local activity in favour of a browser on a screen, always connected to the web and drawing down all its apps and content online. This is where increasingly reliable always-on connectivity and HTML5 frameworks are ultimately taking us, but it will be a long road. Facebook has turned its back on HTML5 and users continue to be addicted to local platforms. Chrome OS on its own is ahead of its time, yet it needs to exist so Google can seize the cloud/browser behavior as it develops ‘ rather than ceding it, perhaps, to Mozilla or Ubuntu. Giving customers a mixture of both environments, at least for now, may be to acknowledge the flaws in its web vision, but it will be a strong tactical move to keep Google relevant in all flavors of mobile web usage.