The tortured history of Japanese operator IPMobile seems close to an end, with the company filing for bankruptcy protection ahead of a deadline this Friday to roll out services. The failure of a service provider in this hugely competitive wireless data market – where even incumbent DoCoMo is under pressure and Vodafone withdrew altogether – is hardly surprising. What is more interesting is whether, with Japan’s 2.5GHz auctions looming, IPMobile’s TDD licenses in the 2010MHz-2025MHz band provide an opportunity for a carrier to pursue an alternative path to broadband wireless ‘ or whether, especially if the peculiar conditions attached to this spectrum in Japan are maintained, the IPMobile experience will be final proof that the day of niche technologies in wireless is over.
IPMobile announced last week that it had returned its mobile licence and filed for bankruptcy with the Tokyo District Court. It had failed to attract new funding, following NextWave Wireless’ decision to back out of a shortlived joint venture, and the collapse of talks with wireless investment firm Distacom. Last Wednesday, it had debts totalling $7.8m.
After NextWave’s withdrawal, IPMobile made a last ditch effort to stay in business with a technology switch, from TD-CDMA ‘ the TDD branch of the UMTS standard, whose only major backer, IPWireless, is owned by NextWave ‘ to the Chinese 3G platform, TD-SCDMA. The operator petitioned the Japanese Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) to allow it to keep its license and extend its roll-out deadline, set for November 9, on the basis of a new business plan based around TD-SCDMA. However, before the MIC ruled, it became clear IPMobile would not be able to fund its new strategy, and the Ministry will now take back the license this Friday, and officially revoke it by the end of the year.
The agency has not yet said when it will reallocate the spectrum, or whether this will be with the same rules, but there seems to be no reason why it would not be opened up to WiMAX. This could potentially offer a WiMAX opportunity for an operator that fails to gain one of the three upcoming 2.5GHz licenses, or ‘ if the regulator permits ‘ a large player that is excluded under the 2.5GHz auction rules from owning more than one-third of an operator in that band, and might seek a larger stake in a 2GHz operation. When IPMobile gained its license in November 2005, it was mandated to use an IMT-2000 TDD technology, which at that time made TD-CDMA the only realistic choice. But as IPMobile’s failed recovery plan indicates, the band is not tied to a single technology. TD-SCDMA is another candidate that now has real equipment available, although it remains unproven and unlikely to gain significant volume outside China. That leaves WiMAX, which was recently accepted as an approved IMT-2000 technology and whose predominant flavors are TDD.
Although 2GHz is a non-standard profile, there would be several vendors willing to adapt their systems for a national contract in Japan, and WiMAX would almost certainly bring a potential 2GHz licensee better economics and supplier choice than TD-SCDMA, as well as being commercially ahead of LTE. Volume will be the key issue in this extremely competitive market, where cost efficiency and a strong choice of multimedia devices ‘ not just handsets ‘ will be vital to success. As IPMobile pointed out in its filing to the MIC, the fact that TD-SCDMA will be used for at least one 3G network in China assures it a certain level of volume and economies of scale ‘ the main reason for IPMobile’s proposed platform switch was to take advantage of cheaper equipment and handsets that it would gain from going with a multivendor standard, but WiMAX could have been an even better choice.
By sticking with TD-CDMA, IPMobile would have been tied to NextWave and, almost certainly, the only active OEM, UTStarcom, since it looks increasingly unlikely that TD-CDMA will gain extensive traction and volume around the world. It was rejected for the Sprint Nextel 2.5GHz deal, and even though many European cellcos already own IMT-2000 TDD spectrum, and have under-exploited it, few of them have gone beyond trials (or in Orange’s and T-Mobile’s cases, isolated deployments in smaller markets). Given that TD-CDMA had this readymade market in western Europe, but has still failed to capitalize on that, the IPMobile failure looks like its final death knell as a full member of the 3G family.
This raises the question we have always asked ‘ why did NextWave, which is developing its own WiMAX-oriented semiconductor and equipment platforms, as well as acquiring broadband wireless spectrum in the US and elsewhere, buy IPWireless? If it was looking for a customer base, it will have been sadly disappointed. As the European cellcos’ lukewarm response shows, IPWireless’ hopes that its technology would be included in the evolution path towards LTE, giving UMTS operators an early vehicle for data services, have been dashed; and now its flagship customer has first deserted its technology, highlighting the issue of lack of volume, and now gone out of business altogether. We have to assume that NextWave will now incorporate parts of the IPWireless technology, particularly some of its TDtv mobile television offering, in its own R&D roadmap, but in a mobile broadband world where most vendors are moving towards fairly commoditized, standards-based hardware, and a high level of services, NextWave’s approach seems both expensive and old-fashioned.
The IPMobile saga:
Despite the tough market conditions, IPMobile hoped to steal a march on mobile broadband services from larger operators by exploiting the data-oriented qualities of TD-CDMA in its relatively cheap spectrum, before WiMAX and other such platforms came to market.
It won its exclusive 2GHz national license in 2005 (see Wireless Watch October 17 2005), along with backing from Liberty Global and a group of leading Japanese internet and IT companies, which invested ’50bn ($430m) in the company. The main investors in IPMobile were virtual mall operator Rakuten, ISP Internet Initiative Japan and publisher Shoeisha. In October 2005, IPMobile increased its capital to about ‘1.32bn by issuing new shares to Liberty Global, CSK and others. At the time of the license award, Liberty Global then offered additional financing of more than ’20bn, while the rest came up with a combined sum of at least ’30bn.
The company aimed to achieve nationwide coverage by 2012, and at launch, planned to offer a flat rate service with downlink speeds up to 5.2Mbps and uplink speeds up to 858Kbps. However, it went through a string of delays and stakes in the operator changed hands with alarming regularity. It had originally planned to launch service in three cities in October 2006, but was later forced to scale back to Tokyo only. It then said it planned to launch a full commercial service in the capital in the first half of 2007, but had to revise this schedule again. By September, it had lost the backing of technology partner Multimedia Research Institute and NextWave, which had acquired a stake of almost 70% just two months earlier from Mori Trust, had sold it back, apparently concluding that it would not be possible to create a profitable business model in Japan, even while actually owning both the technology and the exclusive spectrum.
The last hopes for IPMobile were to gain funding to the tune of $100m from Hong Kong-based Distacom, in order to roll out initial services and keep the license intact, and to create a more attractive business case based around TD-SCDMA. However, it was too little too late, and the license will revert to the MIC.