Should the mooted merger of Lucent and Alcatel be agreed, it will spark a wholesale restructuring of the communications equipment business, one that arguably should have taken place far earlier, when the telecoms recession bit at the start of the century. While the companies devastated by that downturn have largely pulled themselves out of the mire by now, few are really flourishing, and there are still too many suppliers in a sector whose big buyers remain risk-averse. These suppliers face a double challenge ‘ maintaining respectable margins on the heartland businesses, such as GSM and DSL hardware, under pressure from new challengers, notably from China; and investing R&D into the emerging trend for all-IP convergence, in the hope of winning one of the few major contracts that will emerge in the next two years. Until the upgrade of wireline and wireless networks to IP, and the associated telco spending on platforms like IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), become widespread, rather than the preserve of a few pioneers like BT and AT&T, there will remain far too few plums to share among the convergence suppliers.
A combined Alcatel/Lucent would generate revenues of more than $25bn a year, at current rates, with analysts estimating closer to $30bn for the first year together. This would bring it into line with Cisco ($25bn) and Ericsson ($19bn) and narrow the gap significantly with the giants, Motorola ($37bn) and Nokia ($42bn) which both have significant revenue from devices. It would also likely prompt further consolidation in the midmarket, with Siemens’ networks division and Nortel in the firing line, and Cisco a probable acquirer as it steps up its efforts to penetrate the large carrier market, and to take on Alcatel in IPTV, while defending its router and edge network stronghold against incursions from the core network suppliers, notably Alcatel itself. Nokia could also be an acquirer, since it will increasingly have to make a strategic decision whether to build up its infrastructure business by gaining offerings in wireline and other convergence elements, or defocus on it and concentrate entirely on the handsets that drive the vast bulk of its revenues.
Lucent/Alcatel would be a strong competitor in all segments from the edge of the network to the next generation core, with dominance in DSL, IPTV and CDMA, and vulnerabilities in GSM-based technologies and potentially broadband wireless/4G, though this market remains highly undefined at this stage. This would put further pressure on all its rivals, especially Cisco and Nortel, to ensure they, too, had a complete set of products from edge to core, and including key software like IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS).
In this situation, pooling of resources to gain economies of scale and global reach makes good sense. Nortel, one of the last vendors to extricate itself from the nightmares of the recession, has taken the approach of forming strategic partnerships with just the vendors that most threaten its traditional revenue streams ‘ notably Huawei of China and LG of Korea. In return, these companies gain access to a more advanced R&D programme than their own in key areas like IMS, and to a strong north American base. Full merger is a far more risky strategy, but will become a more common one, and not one that is necessarily off the cards for Nortel ‘ just because its rumored takeover by Cisco last year did not materialize, does not mean that deal would not have been a good one for both sides. Large vendors need to have comprehensive reach both in product terms ‘ so they can bid for as large a part of the big fixed/mobile IP convergence contracts as they can ‘ and in geographical reach, balancing well established markets with faster growing emerging ones. So Ericsson has bought Marconi to address its Achilles heel, its lack of significant wireline strength (once considered a bonus but now looking like a problem in the converged arena); and Motorola is known to be seeking new acquisitions to flesh out its wireless dominated portfolio too.
A Lucent-Alcatel merger would dwarf all this however, creating a genuine powerhouse that would combine market leadership in DSL (Alcatel’s) and CDMA (Lucent’s), and form the second largest wireless supplier after Ericsson. Indeed, although neither partner’s strength in GSM/W-CDMA comes anywhere close to the Swedish giant’s, Ericsson would be the supplier most disadvantaged in the short term by the possible deal. Like Lucent itself and, to a lesser extent, Motorola, Ericsson has come through a period of severe decline with a turnaround guided by an inspirational new CEO, Carl-Henric Svanberg. (Lucent’s head, Patricia Russo, who joined in 2002 and has masterminded the company’s recent convergence ‘driven turnaround, is tipped to take the CEO position at Alcatel-Lucent, with the French company’s less visible head, Serge Tchuruk, being chairman.) For all Svanberg’s sterling work in returning Ericsson to profitability, streamlining its operations and building up new revenue streams, the company is not yet secure in its recovery, and is vulnerable to its lack of major wireline activities and its shortage of the type of strategic partnerships Nortel has made. We would expect to see Ericsson courting partners that would bring it greater reach in products and geography, perhaps Huawei itself or fellow Chinese company ZTE.
Although the Chinese companies remain small in terms of global market share ‘ Huawei has about 5% of the world wireless infrastructure sector ‘ they are rapidly growing, aggressive and have a strong route into their home base, which will be one of the most important markets of the coming few years, and into India. To counter this influence, the western vendors have been building up their own activities and partnerships in these two vast economies, and Alcatel has been more successful than most, with ventures such as its Alcatel Shanghai Bell unit and close collaborations with government authorities in both countries. This is one benefit, along with well established links in a wide spread of world markets stretching right back to its French colonial roots, that Alcatel would bring to a marriage with Lucent.
Indeed, although the two parties are keen to present the proposals as a ‘merger of equals’ ‘ perhaps partly to allay the increasingly protectionist sentiment of the US powers towards their homegrown companies ‘ in fact the French partner brings far more to the table. It is significantly larger, and its profits are more convincing ‘ although Lucent has been profitable for the past two years, much of this has come from paper gains from overfunded pension schemes. Alcatel’s strongest current revenue streams are still in growth, while Lucent’s, in CDMA, is under increasing threat from other wireless systems, with its strongest potential growth products as yet largely unproven in revenue terms.
Lucent’s dowry will revolve around its north American presence ‘ Alcatel has counted greater presence in the US market as a key strategic goal since before the two companies’ last attempt to merge, five years ago ‘ and less tangibly, its enormous prowess in engineering and R&D, springing from its roots in AT&T Bell Labs, one of the most significant contributors in history to wireless technology. Lucent’s ‘innovation engine’, Bell Labs, was spun out of AT&T in 1996 and generates about two patents a day, with over 30,000 to its name, plus six Nobel prizes and key contributions such as the transistor. Although it has been scaled back considerably since its heyday, it still provides Lucent with an enormously advanced R&D facility, but one that is often criticized for having too little measurable commercial return for the company ‘ something Alcatel’s broader channels and partnerships with R&D organizations in emerging economies could help to change.
And, partly because of Bell Labs, this will not be a merger of two tired giants, as the Ericsson-Marconi deal sometimes appeared. Despite Lucent’s recent troubles, both companies have shown real signs in the past year that they are on the verge of a new dawn, with Lucent’s key turnaround product being its advanced IMS, and Alcatel’s being its IPTV systems. These technologies have got both players into a pole position within the next generation build-outs of the major US Bell operating companies ‘ an important factor, since the likely merger of AT&T and BellSouth will reduce the number of major deals for telecoms vendors to chase in the US, and will itself be an element prompting further supplier consolidation.
Although Alcatel has its own IMS, Lucent looks set to sweep the board among the Bellcos, signing up AT&T, BellSouth and their mobile arm Cingular (all soon to be one entity) last fall, and poised to win at Verizon too. Lucent’s killer advantage has been its advanced home subscriber server (HSS), a key element of the IMS, which unifies subscriber information from all legacy systems. The IMS contracts will start to have a welcome impact on revenue at an early stage, putting Lucent ahead of most of its rivals in terms of real financial benefit from IMS. ‘Lucent’s IMS initiative is further along than we, or anyone else, originally thought, with revenue recognition now likely to occur in the first half of 2006,’ Russo said in November.
In another hot area, IPTV, the balance is reversed. Lucent has some IPTV activity on its DSL platforms plus R&D in wireless IPTV, and has partnered with Microsoft on some major bids, including one for BellSouth. But Alcatel is dominant here, has a more far reaching alliance with Microsoft and has netted the AT&T IPTV contract, as well as working with the telco on fiber to the home trials. The parallel mergers of AT&T-BellSouth and Lucent-Alcatel would assure the French giant of the largest US IPTV deal, building on its existing success in Europe in this market. It also has a share of Cingular’s W-CDMA build-out contract.
To be a market leader in all key areas of next generation converged networks, the partners would ideally need to gather more strength in GSM/W-CDMA/HSDPA, which will be the primary 3G platform, and in emerging next generation wireless, such as WiMAX and LTE. Lucent has done advanced work in integrating all these networks via IMS, but as in other areas such as DSL, it is stronger on the architectures of convergence than the actual network equipment. Alcatel has come to market with the first pre-certified base stations from a major vendor supporting mobile WiMAX or 802.16e, and has a growing share of the GSM-based market, especially in greenfield and French territories. The merged company would have about 10% global share in GSM-based networks, with the emphasis on Alcatel’s emerging economy bases and on its key W-CDMA accounts, Cingular and Orange. But among the giants, Motorola and Nortel are likely to lead the pack in WiMAX, and Ericsson and Nokia, of course, dwarf their European neighbor in the GSM family.
So the combined company would still have its gaps, though its greatest risk will be how quickly it can achieve its own convergence, trying to marry together some overlapping product ranges and, more importantly, very divergent corporate cultures. And that’s if the US governments do not find a way to block one of the jewels of US technology heritage, and the guardian of highly sensitive systems such as wire tapping networks, falling into French hands.
Likely deal structure
Despite the companies’ insistence that this is a merger of equals, a deal is likely to be structured as an acquisition by Alcatel, if US authorities will permit that. The deal is likely to be based on current market value, without any premium for Lucent, which analysts feel is unwarranted. Lucent’s current value is around $13bn while Alcatel’s is about $21bn.
The companies were previously near a deal in May 2001 where Alcatel would have paid $22.8bn in stock for Lucent. That fell apart at the last minute, reportedly because Lucent was seeking a merger of equals rather than accept a buyout.