Your browser is not supported. Please update it.

10 July 2015

Microsoft writes off Nokia deal, and not before time

What connects a 150-strong start-up in Helsinki with the largest software company in the world by revenue? The short answer is ‘Nokia’, but this week saw another parallel between Jolla – the company set up by many of the Finnish giant’s former MeeGo operating system team – and Microsoft. Both backed away from the vipers’ nest of the device business to concentrate on licensing their mobile operating systems, and on trying to make a small inroad on the Android/iOS fortress.

Jolla has spun off its nascent hardware business to focus on its Sailfish Linux-based OS, and has said farewell to its CEO Tomi Pienimäki in the process. Chairman Antti Saarnio will run the software-only firm and said in a statement: “After three years of intensive Sailfish OS research and development we are now moving full speed to new bigger waters, which requires full focus on software from the team.”

At Microsoft, the break with hardware is less decisive, but has also cost a former CEO his job (the departure of Stephen Elop, former Nokia CEO and head of the ill-fated Microsoft handsets unit, was announced last month). It has also cost 7,800 other people their positions (in addition to the 18,000 job losses announced last year, 10,500 of them from the former Nokia business), as Microsoft writes off its disastrous handset adventure.

Its near-exit from smartphones is more humiliating than Nokia’s own. Losing the 40% market share of its handset heyday was a sad comedown for the Finnish firm, but with an adaptability that has characterised its 150-year history, it offloaded the ailing business to Microsoft for a decent price (which will now help fund its acquisition of Alcatel-Lucent), and is returning to sustainable profit based around infrastructure, patents and the Here mapping business.

Ironically enough, while it presumably gloats over its good timing, it could easily overtake Microsoft again in handsets, when it re-enters the game next year via its program to license its designs and venerable brand to third parties (as already seen in the Foxconn N1 tablet). After April 2016, its non-compete deal with Microsoft will have expired and it is expected to develop Android-based reference designs, bearing its famous blue logo, to license to third parties. A CCS Insight blog post said: “This supplier approach is a twist on being an ODM. The phones aren’t white-labeled but rather blue-labeled devices.”

While history will see the recent Nokia handset saga as a sad but logical progression of events, Microsoft’s foray into smartphones has been a mistake from start to finish. Just over a year after the deal was finalised, the US firm has written off the whole acquisition, taking a record charge of $7.6bn on assets related to the Nokia purchase. Considering that business was acquired for $7.2bn, in April 2014, it is now essentially being valued as worthless.

Still, Microsoft hasn’t quite abandoned the pretence that it was a rational move to enter the smartphone hardware business – one in which it had no track record or real credentials, and at a time when the sector was already reaching its peak. It claims it will continue to sell handsets, but on a far smaller scale – though if the recent turmoil among cellphone vendors has taught us anything (see separate item), it is that this is now a business of scale.

John Chen at BlackBerry is facing a devices game whose economics make it impossible to be a niche player and where even a company with the massive reach of Samsung is struggling for profits. But BlackBerry has a long and emotional ties to cut with hardware – Microsoft never needed to get into the space at all, especially as Nokia was already its captive poodle when it came to a Windows Phone partner.

Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella has danced around the issue until now, while making it clear he wanted to distance himself from devices and focus on ‘cloud first, mobile first’, meaning mobile services not handsets. But last month he finally got out the long knife, and Elop – architect of the successive Microsoft/Nokia deals, first from the Microsoft side and then as CEO of Nokia– departed.

The remaining smartphone activities will focus on three segments, said Microsoft. One, predictably, is business, and here there is strong sense to maintaining some presence for Windows Phone, because it will morph into Windows 10, the operating system which Microsoft hopes will run across all kinds of devices from mobile to PCs to many emerging hybrid formats. Like BlackBerry, Microsoft has an enterprise installed base to target – though Nadella has a clear fallback plan should Windows 10 not dominate business users’ handsets, increasingly supporting Android and iOS with Microsoft’s cloud services and key apps such as Office.

The other two surviving smartphone segments are ‘value’ and ‘flagship’, suggesting that Microsoft will still turn out both entry level models (the area where Nokia, in its final days of independence, was succeeding best) and high end Lumia offerings. However, it said it will significantly reduce the number of Lumia products it launches.

Nadella, in a memo to employees, wrote that the three target segments were ones where Microsoft could “make unique contributions and where we can differentiate through the combination of our hardware and software. We’ll bring business customers the best management, security and productivity experiences they need; value phone buyers the communications services they want; and Windows fans the flagship devices they’ll love.” In the longer term, Microsoft devices will “spark innovation, create new categories and generate opportunity for the Windows ecosystem more broadly. Our reinvention will be centered on creating mobility of experiences across the entire device family including phones.”

He summed up, saying: “We are moving from a strategy to grow a standalone phone business to a strategy to grow and create a vibrant Windows ecosystem including our first party device family,” Nadella said.

But like his previous moves to pull back from handsets, this seems halfhearted – and in fact echoes decisions by his counterpart at BlackBerry, who has repeatedly failed to bite the bullet and exit the smartphone business. If Samsung is struggling to achieve growth and profitability in handsets, it seems a lost cause for Microsoft, with its estimated 2.5% share of the smartphone OS landscape.

In 2014, Nokia and then Microsoft released nine new devices, and only a few low end models have appeared this year. One Microsoft source said the firm still plans to unveil one flagship device this year, but it will be difficult to narrow the gap with the iPhone and Galaxy families, especially after a year without a high end model to throw at those monsters. With the exception of Xbox, Microsoft has only succeeded in hardware markets where it entered before real device specialists had secured a strong foothold – as with the Surface tablet. Like Google’s Nexus range, the Surface serves as a showcase for the operating system and cloud services, to attract users and developers, rather than a major contributor to revenues. Microsoft could use the remnants of the Nokia engineering talent to follow the same approach with Lumia, releasing a few models in order to promote Windows 10 and lure partners. But like Google, it can rely on partners for these cutting edge releases, reverting to its traditional Windows model rather than competing with its own OEMs.

Any broader handset activities – as Google also found with its brief attempt to retain Motorola’s handset business – is a lost cause for Microsoft.

But does the likely exit from cellphones make the demise of Windows Phone more likely? That has been rumored for some time, and speculation was intensified when Microsoft sold its Bing mapping activities (with 100 engineers) to Uber at the end of last month.

However, while the Nokia relationships may have intertwined the Finnish hardware with the Microsoft mobile OS, the latter has technically remained hardware neutral, and it is a positive that its owner can now revert to concentrating entirely on software. In many ways, the debate about the possible death of Windows Phone is a red herring. It will be overtaken soon enough by the mobile edition of Windows 10 anyway – and that has to be retained for W10 to have any chance of achieving its critical aim, of being an OS to span every kind of user device.

It is far from certain that W10 will achieve that aim, given all the players and platforms fighting to dominate the post-PC world, but it has a fighting chance. Without a mobile edition, it will not have that chance. Windows Phone was attacking a cellphone-only base in which the power players were already entrenched and it failed to make headway. W10 is unlikely to penetrate the mass base of entry level smartphones either, but what it needs to do is be the preferred choice for any user who has more than one device and wants a common user experience (across a PC, tablet, smartphone, and in future, new post-PC form factors plus console, car, TV and so on). And Windows Phone did at least demonstrate that Microsoft can actually design an innovative and attractive OS.

Of course, the reasons to push W10 in this way are different from those which drove Microsoft’s earlier OS releases, right up to Windows 8 and Windows Phone 7. The business model is shifting away from licensing to generating revenues from the services that the OS enables, more and more of them delivered from the cloud to a wide range of end points. The need to have Windows on those end points is reduced if the cloud platform unifies the customer’s experience, content and apps – which weakens Microsoft’s position but also enables Nadella to build his plan B around delivering services to third party device platforms.

In this strategy, he seems to be defocusing on the Bing search engine, which was once envisioned to become the cornerstone of a broad set of Microsoft web services which would be another way to unify the user experience over different hardware, and tie consumers into its software. Now the Uber agreement, and the lack of recent expansion of Bing beyond its core search capability, suggests that the mood has changed. Indeed, this may be the real wasted opportunity of the failed Nokia deal. When the two companies agreed their original Windows Phone licensing pact, there was much talk of them jointly creating a mobile web platform, including aspects of both firms’ portfolios such as Bing, Nokia Here and other elements. But real activity largely failed to materialize, and though Microsoft licenses Here, it failed to include the mapping unit in its acquisition – yet another error, given the strategic importance of location platforms in the web world.

If Uber acquires Here as well as the Bing maps team and creates a full service targeting auto makers, telcos and other groups, it will be yet another reminder of the chances Microsoft has wasted in the mobile market. In the case of the Nokia handsets, however, that was not a wasted chance, just a waste of money. As analyst Jack Gold of J Gold Associates put it: “It was a mistake to begin with. A monumental mistake. Microsoft had no business being in the cut-throat, low margin phone business. Who’s making money in phones besides Apple?”