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4 October 2012

Navteq unit, not Lumia, carries the burden of reinventing Nokia

Significance: The obstacles in the path of Nokia becoming a top three smartphone vendor again are well known, and only reinforced by the high impact launches of Galaxy S III and iPhone 5, compared to that of the feature-rich but undersung Lumia 920. This has scored some points, such as an exclusive with AT&T, and is likely to edge up market share both for Nokia and WP8. This will be despite a more competitive landscape for the Finnish firm, even in its Windows niche, with intensified interest from Samsung and HTC, and the possibility of a Microsoft own-brand smartphone. However, the one area where Nokia can shine, especially over Apple, is in its location unit, which may generate only 4% of revenues, but provides the most promising stepping stone for future growth, and a transformation into a business built upon web services and user experience rather than hardware volumes. But the hardware is still necessary to keep Nokia in anything like the form and size of the past, so while spinning off Navteq as a separate business may look appealing, it will be very much a last resort should the massive investment in making Lumia a stand-out smartphone (despite rather than because of Microsoft) fail to pay off in the next 2-3 years.

The most significant change in Nokia’s fortunes since it threw in its lot with Windows Phone is that it is no longer in control of its own destiny. It can deliver a strong smartphone like the Lumia 920, but creating its own differentiated user experience is a question of bartering with Microsoft to be able to customize the platform ‘ and in the meantime, Microsoft itself could come up with its own smartphone, adding to Nokia’s list of competitors. Nokia will only regain the upper hand, and be able to dictate terms to its software partner, if it delivers significant volume of Lumia devices and becomes not only the leader in the Windows Phone space, but the engine to drive its market share out of single figures. Yet Nokia’s days of creating markets and establishing vast distribution channels are over ‘ those channels are still there, but are increasingly suited to lower end devices than Lumia. At the high end, Nokia has to start from scratch in building its network, and is heavily reliant on Microsoft’s influence here too. It has already made some missteps ‘ the exclusive with AT&T for the Lumia 920 harks back to the early iPhones, but it is only worth cutting off a large portion of the US customer base if AT&T puts the same kind of effort behind Lumia as it did the iPhone (unlikely).

With all these challenges, plus the specter of renewed interest in WP8 from Samsung and HTC, there is one area where Nokia still full control, market leadership and superiority over Apple ‘ not in any devices, but in maps. The furore over Apple’s underperforming navigation offering only highlighted how strong Nokia’s platform is, and the timing was good to announce a string of new licensees for the technology it acquired ‘ for a massive $8.1bn ‘ with Navteq. This is now the heart of a dedicated business unit which is growing fast and shows off some skills nobody knew Nokia had. It has the makings of a strong company in its own right, which could be spun off or sold, with the maps forming the basis of an ever-expanding range of web services, not just for PCs and phones, but for cars and the ‘internet of things’.

This, then, is the best part of Nokia now, though of course far too small to rescue the firm in anything close to its historic size and power (Navteq is currently only about 4% of group revenue). But Nokia will take any compliments it can get right now, and it received one from Apple CEO Tim Cook, who was forced to grovel to users over the deficiencies of the new iOS Maps. He highlighted how tough it is to build a decent navigation application ‘ hence why so many third parties are flocking to Nokia rather than building their own. Google is the main alternative, but comes with more political conflicts and control issues for many players than the weakened Nokia.

Cook even specifically mentioned Microsoft Bing Maps (powered by the Finnish firm’s technology) as an alternative iPhone customers could use while they waited for Apple to fix its own app.

The sorry saga has demonstrated how tough it is to make a strong maps platform, reinforcing Nokia’s broader (though often unheard) message that it will regain power by investing heavily in difficult features which bring real user value, and a high barrier to entry for competitors ‘ shifting away from focusing R&D on most apps, which are easy to emulate and can be obtained from partners, or from ‘plumbing’ (basic phone functionality, again not hard for others to copy). ‘For location to be meaningful, you need a map and a map platform- – either you go in and spend multiple years creating that asset or you acquire that asset,” said Nokia’s EVP of Location and Commerce, Michael Halbherr. “Over the years we’ve built this asset, and that brings us into a very strong position. It’s not something you can catch up to very quickly.”

CEO Stephen Elop made the same point about the overall product strategy, citing the imaging capabilities in Lumia. The low-light photography feature represents ‘five or six years of work in our labs, engineers doing nothing else but working on that technology. Saying, ‘oh, this year, we’re going to do our own phone’ doesn’t allow you to do that. You have to make those investments over a period of time.’

As though to push home the truth of that strategy, at least in maps, Nokia announced new customers for its navigation platform, which in addition to the firm’s own Maps and navigation offerings, now powers those of Microsoft Bing, Amazon, Yahoo, GPS navigation specialist Garmin, daily deals giant Groupon, and consumer electronics maker Pioneer. Most of these deals have been signed in the past couple of months, and in the past few weeks Nokia has aggressively expanded the reach of its maps into embedded deals with carmakers, signing alliances with Ford, BMW, Mercedes, Volkswagen and Hyundai for in-car systems.

Nokia is also spreading its location wings in a different direction, via a deal with Oracle. This arrangement will not, at least in the short term, generate the kind of uptake seen in consumer location services, but it takes Nokia ‘ and mapping in general ‘ deeper into the enterprise, allowing developers to add the facility to their Oracle applications. Nokia will hope that success in corporate apps will also drive adoption of its Lumia handsets, although in many cases there will not be a direct association, and the growth opportunities for Navteq rely on being multi-platform and, in many cases, unbranded.

Under the new agreement, Oracle users can license Nokia Location Platform services directly from the phonemaker and integrate them into business software. Oracle competes with Microsoft in some areas of enterprise software, raising the potential for Nokia Maps to be widely used across the corporate world. In the BYOD (bring your own device) environment, the endpoints may often be iPhones or Android devices.

Oracle has developed a built-in link between Nokia Maps and its Fusion Middleware MapViewer ‘ described as a Java J2EE service for rendering maps and creating mash-ups based on spatial data. This removes the barrier of customized map integration, making it easier for enterprises or their software suppliers to include geolocation data in their apps.

Financial terms of the deal were not disclosed. Oracle, which is holding its Oracle OpenWorld event this week, said it has 400,000 business customers worldwide, including all Fortune 100 companies, and 114,000 have adopted Fusion Middleware, while 80,000 use the apps portfolio, whether on their premises, via the cloud, or as a hybrid of both.

“Nokia has been on a mission for the last 18 months to sign mapping and location deals with large internet players,” CCS Insight analyst Martin Garner told Reuters. “The deal with Oracle extends this and broadens the large enterprise market for Nokia’s location services.”

If only the smartphone business was seeing the same kind of growth and market interest. The new Lumia 920 attracted good reviews with its sleek design and heavy emphasis on key Nokia strengths ‘ maps, and its camera/imaging technologies including PureView. However, awareness in key markets such as the US remains low, although that should be helped by AT&T’s launch this month on an exclusive basis, which usually guarantees an enhanced level of marketing and sales effort from a carrier ‘ not that Nokia is in a position to extract significant promises from US cellcos. There are hints that Lumia models for Verizon will follow soon, emulating an approach that worked well for Samsung when it was building US smartphone share with early Galaxy models ‘ it created customized versions for each major cellco, even with different brand names, and only insisted on its harmonized Galaxy logo once it had a hit on its hands.

Of course, Samsung itself is now making more of those kinds of efforts in WP8 too. There is a double-edged sword for Nokia if carriers really do get behind WP8 as a counterweight to Android and iOS. Having done the early heavy lifting with WP7, when the interest of other OEMs was lukewarm, the Finnish firm could be left with an installed base which cannot upgrade automatically to WP8, and the prospect of rebuilding that base in WP8, but with intensified competition. Samsung, ZTE, long term mobile Windows leader HTC and others also want to hedge their bets against Android and will be encouraged to do so by a growing market share for WP8.

Nokia may even have to compete with Microsoft itself, which is once again reported to be readying a smartphone under its own brand (apparently forgetting the disaster that was the Microsoft Kin handset). Like Google with Nexus, the aim will be to showcase what Microsoft regards as the ideal user experience for Windows Phone 8 and build developer relations.

The latest rumors surfaced from sources in China. According to China Times, Microsoft has contracted smartphone developers and assemblers in the country to build it an own-brand phone, to be unveiled next year. It would apparently carry the same Surface brand as Microsoft’s tablet, emphasizing the increasing convergence of the Windows 8 and WP8 user experiences.

The timeline means, however, that Microsoft would not have its own handset ready at the launch of its new mobile OS, which has already been shown on devices from Nokia, Samsung and others ‘ with the tablet, it angered some PC partners by unveiling its own gadget before its licensees had the chance to do so.

In many ways a handset would be a logical move after the Windows giant’s controversial decision to launch its own Windows 8 tablet, but moving into phones would, of course, cause tension with its leading OEMs, Nokia and HTC ‘ and possible quench the recent burst of enthusiasm from Samsung, ZTE and others, which see WP8 as a way to avoid being over-dependent on Android and Google.

Nokia CEO Stephen Elop said rather pointedly in a recent interview that his firm could do things with WP8 that Microsoft could not, confirming the assumption that Nokia has greater rights to customize the OS than other licensees, but also raising the specter of fragmentation which has haunted Android. However, as noted, that special treatment will only still be available to Nokia if it delivers returns to Microsoft in terms of market leading sales. He insisted that a Microsoft phone would not change the relationship. ‘It’s incumbent upon us at all points in time to build the world’s most innovative smartphones. Which is what we believe we’ve done,’ he said.

He said in the interview: ‘What Microsoft has done with Windows Phone is create a square in which you guys can do certain things, Samsung, can do certain things, HTC can do certain things. And then the things that you do within that square are things that are unique to you. But, there isn’t necessarily a Nokia build of Windows Phone.’ He added: ‘We have rights beyond any of the other manufacturers to do unique things and to enforce certain exclusivities for our products. We don’t disclose what those are, or the extent of those. But we have the ability to differentiate. We earned that right by being the only company who said ‘we are placing our primary bet on Windows Phone’. That was a specific negotiated aspect of the relationship.If the OEM you’re competing with is Microsoft, that makes the world a little more different. We still preserve the same rights under the contract, regardless of who is making those phones.’

He also told CNet that the firm was putting significant effort into establishing ‘Lumia’ as a brand, rather than Windows Phone ‘ another potential flash point with Microsoft, which is obsessed with Windows branding, and a mirror of the Android market. There, early adopters were keen to ride on the high profile created for the Android name by Google’s marketing machine, but now the bighitters are promoting their own identities, such as Samsung’s Galaxy ‘ a family which may not run only Android in future, breaking the association with the Google OS.

Elop also says customers are still swayed by feature superiority, not just by apps and user interfaces. He said many vendors are relying on standard hardware platforms, but Nokia is differentiating with functions such as optical image stabilization, wireless charging, navigation capability and others, which go ‘above and beyond Windows Phone’.

As so often with Nokia, most customers and market watchers see only the tip of the iceberg of its mobile vision. That was true of the underrated former CEO Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, who had many of the right thoughts about building a broad mobile web and cloud platform, turning Nokia into the supplier of a platform that happened to have good devices driving it (but would eventually migrate to third party hardware). The problem was, the execution was too slow and the vision poorly communicated. In Elop’s tenure, there is clearly less focus on a unique software platform, and more on distinct hardware, but he still has the objective of building highly differentiated services, such as maps, on top of the Windows Phone foundation (moving to the greater potential of W8 in future).

He set out the broad strategy in the recent interview, saying it rested on three pillars. ‘The first is the smartphone strategy: winning with Microsoft around Windows Phone. The second is our mobile phone strategy: connecting the next billion people to the internet. And then a third pillar of our strategy is something we call future disruptions, the things we’re doing in the labs which define the next steps in terms of devices and experiences that will differentiate. Supporting all of this, the location-based services.’ In other words, it all comes back to the maps. A unit which currently generates 4% of revenue is carrying the burden of being the template for the future hardware/software experience that will make Nokia a household name again. There is a clear back-up option though ‘ if the smartphones do not catch fire, create a separate and valuable business around Navteq, a range of other services built on the same model, and probably extending to an important aspect of the deal with Microsoft ‘ the convergence of the two firms’ mobile web platforms, which brings Bing and others into Nokia’s orbit. Perhaps Kallasvuo’s vision of turning Nokia into a web services company was not so far-fetched after all, nor his decision to pay $8.1bn for Navteq so crazy.