If NextWave Wireless is to live up to its name and become the next wave of radio networks in the US, it has an awful lot of work to do. So far, in 18 months of being back in business, post-Chapter 11, it has amassed $500m worth of spectrum in the US, Canada and Europe and has almost completed the development of a pretty unique set of chips which can pull together virtually any spectrum into a single broadband wireless network. This type of multi-frequency chip is going to become very popular, with companies like Intel and Qualcomm targeting the same design aims, so why should a start-up like NextWave beat them to the punch?
The company has acquired multiple technology partners, which can collectively build broadcast video networks, design handset video architectures, offer downloadable digital rights management, and create Wi-Fi/WiMAX hybrid mesh networks. But to convince anyone that its CEO, Allen Salmasi, is anything other than crazy, the company has to bring its chips to market, on an R&D budget of around $50m a year, and get its Henderson, Nevada-based mobile WiMAX/Wi-Fi hybrid system up and running, demonstrating its technology to the satisfaction of wireless service providers, cable operators, internet service providers and content companies – in fact anyone that might offer some kind of network services in the US over the next few years.
NextWave, unlike the early 1990 broadband wireless pioneers, seems to have replaced the adage ‘build the networks and they will come’ – which caused widespread bankruptcy back then – with one that says ‘buy the spectrum and they will come’. This is a (slightly) cheaper and (slightly) less risky approach, and the entire premise for NextWave is that someone else will pay for the building of a US-wide network, which will reach up to 248m Americans. What it will do is provide the technology.
If that doesn’t happen, NextWave can testify to the idea that spectrum is remarketable, having recouped over $5bn from its own PCS licenses, for which it failed to pay in its first life, leading to a long battle with the FCC, and final sell-off of many assets to Verizon on exit from bankruptcy protection. So it can always sell its spectrum, (this time in 2.3GHz/2.5GHz and in 1.7GHz/2.1GHz AWS), off once again if times get hard.
The simple idea is that by demonstrating technology that can create an IP-based triple play class network across multiple, unrelated spectrum chunks, NextWave effectively increases the value of its spectrum holdings quite dramatically, and if it can lease out these assets to companies which have the financial wherewithal to build them out, both can gain.
No-one right now has a single radio chip which is agile enough to scan up and down all of that spectrum, find the active frequencies, report into a local base station and move freely between bands as and when it wants to do some heavy lifting, such as download a video file. That’s the edge that NextWave thinks it can bring to market and there, in essence, if it succeeds, is the key to its likely future value as a company. But the aim is also on the agenda of many of the worlds largest chipmakers, so NextWave really is in a race to get there first and, at the same time, do this on a relative shoestring (considering its R&D budget is less than 10% of Qualcomm’s, for instance).
This whole improbable scenario would collapse except for the caliber of the people behind NextWave. CEO Salmasi was chief strategic officer at Qualcomm in its early days and initiated and led the development of CDMA technologies there, creating a $70bn market capitalization monster. There are plenty around prepared to bet that he, and his various engineering colleagues from other similar wireless behemoths such Motorola and Nokia, can do the same again.
Right now there is virtually no slack in the valuation that is applied to NextWave, which makes money expensive. Its shares trade around $9.54, valuing the company at $805m. It has spectrum assets on its books of some $528m, and its most recent filings show that just the spectrum that it holds indefinitely (which it can renew) is valued at $450m, with that valuation based on amortizing the amount it paid for it. It has $200m in liquid assets and the bulk of its debt, some $355m, is fresh, borrowed to buy the latest of those assets, and therefore is not due until 2010 or 2011. All it has to do by that time is convince the debt markets that it has a viable business model, and it will be able to recycle that debt and push it off into the distance.
It is making losses of around $105m a year, on revenues of just $24m, but all of that comes from its subsidiary Packet Video, a 300-person handset and portable device software designer, which leads on video capabilities carried in pure IP packets. Packet Video came out of the compression and signal processing business, and wants to be a software company able to target the entire handset market, but of course would be delighted if one such captive market were delivered through the creation of new WiMAX-style networks on spectrum sub-licensed from its parent. Packet Video was acquired for $46.7m in July 2005, prior to NextWave going public again.
On its own, Packet Video would take many long years before it could create enough business to cover the existing NextWave losses. Instead it is, like other acquisitions before it, a way of bypassing both R&D and customer acquisition by adding well respected, technologically advanced players to the NextWave stable, trying to generate a kind of snowball momentum.
The two other core acquisitions, prior to its recent purchase of TD-CDMA specialist IPWireless, were Cygnus Communications – which it acquired for just $9.8m in February 2006, and which gave it a headstart in developing WiMAX semiconductors – and Wi-Fi mesh start-up Go Networks, paying $13.2m upfront, with performance-based further payments that could have made the price as high as $25.7m (although those revenue deadlines are more or less now passed). In January, Packet Video added the acquisition of tiny Swiss Secure Digital Containers for $19m in cash.
In all, these acquisitions cost NextWave around $124m, and if we add those payments to the $528m of spectrum assets, and the $200m of cash, we reach $843m, which is less than the market capitalization NextWave had when it announced the purchase of IPWireless for up to $235m. Since then the value has fallen.
To say that the value is now under the net asset value isn’t strictly correct. When each of these companies were purchased there was plenty of goodwill in each case, and in the case of IPWireless, a considerable amount, especially given that it was more or less pre-revenue, or at least pre-volume revenue. But we can say that the sum of the value of NextWave is less than the value of the parts it has purchased. Which implies that either Wall Street doesn’t ‘get’, the NextWave proposition or more likely, only insiders get it and outsiders cannot yet afford to speculate on it until it proves that its plan is working.
But let’s be clear at least about what it is trying to do? NextWave does not dream of being a Clearwire or a Sprint, despite its purchases of spectrum across the US. Instead it dreams of being a Qualcomm.
Although its filings often state that many of its senior executives have worked at operators like Airtouch, AT&T Wireless, McCaw Cellular, Nextel and SprintPCS, that’s just to prove that it has the knowhow to build networks, but the corollary of that is that this gives it the knowhow to develop the kind of components and equipment that are valued by operators in the real world.
The networks it plans to build will be smaller and will need many separate partners. For a start it offers a great way forward for Competitive Local Exchange Carriers. Rulings on unbundling by the FCC have left the CLEC model in tatters and the rising costs of using an incumbent’s lines are squeezing this market, which is why companies like Earthlink are pursuing the municipal Wi-Fi market as a way to bypass the telcos. A hybrid network where devices can use Wi-Fi or WiMAX is a positive step for companies like Earthlink and one they are all actively pursuing. Much the same can be said for VoIP specialists like Vonage, and for smaller incumbents and even for those companies, like Level 3 Communications, which have their own fiber networks for backhaul services, but which could also welcome a way to extend their reach.
Many of the early WiMAX operators wanted to challenge the existing tier one telco hegemony, but were stuck without dedicated spectrum and instead had to share the congested and inappropriate license free spectrum. Only when NextWave proves itself will these types of operators be able to turn to the company and get the equipment and the spectrum in one place.
That could, of course give rise to many creative deals where the spectrum, and perhaps the equipment, can be leased in return for a percentage of revenue, keeping the impact on carrier cashflow down. And MVNOs on such a network would be able to establish innovative fixed and mobile schemes. Municipalities, hotspot providers, ISPs, small mobile incumbents, even tier one incumbents, might all find reasons for lighting up a specific region if both the equipment, the roaming capabilities and the spectrum were all provided in one place. Roaming connectivity would be a given, by using the frequency agile capabilities of the NextWave chipset.
One application that interests us now that IPWireless has been acquired is the potential to set up a rival to Qualcomm’s MediaFLO for mobile TV. IPWireless installs for about $10,000 at an existing base station and requires at least 5MHz of spectrum, which should give around 15 TV channels in QVGA graphics. NextWave should be able to acquire video and TV content (always under the protection of the Java Secure Digital Containers DRM), create its own TV channels, and deliver and license them to the existing tier two cellular incumbents all over the US using a slice (or multiple slices) of its own spectrum. Interestingly, Packet Video was showing a proof-of-concept demonstration of live streaming TV using MediaFLO at the NAB conference last week, which shows that even Qualcomm thinks highly of its video device capabilities.
Like the WiMAX/Wi-Fi chips of NextWave, the IPWireless chips need to be volume manufactured cheaply somewhere (probably China). The more chips, the better the discounts. And this all takes time. The arrival of all of these baseband ASICs is set for the second half of 2007, as is the arrival of the pico base stations that NextWave is building for extremely local networks. These will use adaptive beamforming antenna technology (a requirement of the mobile WiMAX standard), which NextWave acquired with Go Networks.
NextWave doesn’t need to build a nationwide network to be successful. It needs to build a base for its chipsets and then begin to address overseas markets and scale its chip production. Packet Video customers include Verizon’s VCast, NTT DoCoMo’s Foma and Orange in Europe, while its DRM subsidiary Secure Digital Containers already has deals with T-Mobile, O2, SFR, Amena, Telus, Telstra, Hutchinson 3 and Rogers Wireless in Canada. IPWireless has had trials at Sprint, and with Vodafone, Orange, O2 and 3 Group for its TDtv product, while Go Networks is really pre-revenue as yet. Even so, that’s an impressive list of companies that NextWave can call on, once it has chips, devices, base stations and a WiMAX profile that can work in most countries, across spectrum that was previously low value, because devices didn’t exist to pull it all together.
So NextWave today is valued at about the correct, high risk level for investors who have the confidence and market understanding to mix in some high risk telecoms investment and balance that against other blue chip investment. It begins to develop real value only when it proves that what it is doing will work, and that requires the arrival of a big name customer after its Nevada trials show what its technology can do, and our guess is that won’t be much before the holiday season at the end of this year. If it takes longer than that, it may already be too late.
If it achieves that, then the next time NextWave can give itself a value hike will be if one or more partners actually builds out a network and they demonstrate consumer or enterprise uptake or both. In the end the facilities that are likely to be created by a NextWave network really are multimedia based and consumer friendly, so what will trigger it up the valuation curve is when it signs a partner that has consumers as its core customers.
You may be left asking ‘why doesn’t it just make chips, and sell them on the open market?’. But there are many competitors already doing this, and the winner in that market won’t necessarily be the company that produces the best technology. The value of all such companies is being held back by the lack of available spectrum with which to build WiMAX networks, and given that spectrum is a big issue, why not solve it? That way, would-be WiMAX operators may beat a path to the door and not fuss so much over the technology on offer.
The final issue is to ask what kind of value does NextWave develop if it signs a big name cellular, ISP, MVNO, or incumbent by this time next year, and of course all of that will depend on the identity and scale of the customer. By putting its foot on the first rung of the revenue ladder for its core activity, NextWave would suddenly become worth more than the sum of its parts, because it would develop a genuine revenue stream likely to accelerate in just a year to the kind of levels where, if it acquires no more spectrum assets and no more technology companies, it could break even. And that would give it a huge extension on its window of opportunity to build itself into the Qualcomm of the WIMAX world.
This analysis was first published by our sister service Faultline, which provides weekly insights and in-depth commentary on the economics of the quad play. For details, please contact Peter White on [email protected].