Nokia has spent the greatest part of its life being misunderstood by US stock analysts, and its move to acquire US mapping company Navteq, for a colossal $8.1bn, or $78 a share, is no exception.
Navteq had revenues last year of just $581m but is on track for about $800m this year, with its last quarter up 49% to 202.3m. Most of that gain has been in portable devices, particularly wireless. Its net income and cash position have grown at around the same rate. But financial analysts are still wary of the deal, and are talking it down. However, if Navteq performs at that same level for just one or two more years, the price will have been more than repaid, and if Nokia had paid less, there would have been counterbids.
Although Nokia, as the largest mobile device maker, is more exposed than anyone to ongoing price erosion, but to date it has used its scale to drive down its costs faster than its average sale price has fallen, increasing margins and generating piles of cash ‘ it had $12bn in the bank prior to the deal – which can best be spent on essential acquisitions to boost the internet services portfolio, where the company aims to generate growth, increased market influence and higher margins. Also, as more complex networks emerge, Nokia has been able to sell more complex devices at the higher end, which can also be further driven by sophisticated mobile web services. So where Motorola has suffered from device commoditization, Nokia has evaded it and resisted further price erosions.
As it shifts its strategy from merely being the handset platform of choice towards being the full mobile internet platform of choice, Nokia is likely to buy a string of companies. An acquisition like this one of Navteq gives it the stature to offer its own location-based services without a three-year run at the problem ‘ which is what it would take if it were to build its own mapping division from scratch.
But instead of applauding, the big question being asked last week by the financial community was why Nokia had paid so much for Navteq. The result was a drop across all handset makers’ share prices, and talk of core Navteq customers like GPS specialist Garmin, and Google and Yahoo Maps, going elsewhere for their maps, or buying a rival so that they are not dependent upon Nokia. One speculation was that Garmin would counterbid for Netherlands-based Tele Atlas, which has a $2.6bn takeover offer on its plate from GPS player TomTom. Others are saying that it’s too late for Garmin and that the bidders for Tele Atlas are likely to include Microsoft and Google. Investors were ditching TomTom shares early this week at the prospect of a bidding war.
But the naysayers were missing the vital point of the deal. Nokia is now in pole position to be the first to combine handset location with highly localized advertising effectively, before Google and Microsoft ‘ both hellbent on dominating mobile advertising ‘ have made their first steps. If we added localized search to the equation we would have a complete strategy.
It was essential that Nokia at least tried to stave off the combination of Google Maps and advertising on a handset, and in order to be successful it needed to buy the mapping company that had the biggest global reach in terms of maps and population covered by those maps, which in Navteq’s case is some 69 countries, so it had to win Navteq ‘ hence the high price.
There are other global mapping companies, and there is sure to be further consolidation as location finally becomes an opportunity worthy of the majors ‘ after a period of considerable effort to shrink the GPS chips and antennas to suitable size and price for handsets, and to work out the revenue streams. In the consumer world, the latter mainly rests on tying relevant advertising to location, and such concepts are leading GPS chipmakers to predict a heyday over the next two years, as top end cellular devices increasingly come with working GPS systems as standard.
Until recently, it was assumed that using a 3G triangulation process to find a location meant that these services would come from cellular operators, which would own the triangulation data. Now it’s clear that a handset maker like Nokia can offer ‘over the top’ services without any reference to an operator, something that has typified the Finn’s stance in recent weeks as it pursues an orchestrated transition to become a mobile portal player in its own right, with its music store, its advertising acquisition Enpocket, DVB-H TV services and now this move into maps, all under the umbrella of its new Ovi brand.
Last week, Nokia even added the ability to offer video from CNN, IBN, Jamba, Sony Pictures and others through its Nokia Video Center, to go with YouTube and Reuters deals already announced, delivered to its N95 devices ‘ again without reference to the video strategies of cellular operators (though initially pushed only in the Asia-Pacific region).
How many more companies of this type has Nokia got to buy? Nokia understands that there is only one internet, and that where a service ties together mobility and the web, thn these are the only new games in town. The only other issue is whether it needs to buy or partner on a search engine, which has to add the mapping data to the search and raise search advertising revenues from vendors that are physically near the mobile search user. It can either compete with Google and MSN and Yahoo on this, or partner one of the weaker ones to help support it against Google, or do its own thing.
What Nokia now has to do is smooth over ruffled feathers and convince existing clients that it will not undermine their services, and that they should stay with Navteq. In that way it will make some rival device makers, as well as Google and Yahoo, reliant on it and begin to change its relationship with these constituencies from rival to customer. Failure to do that successfully would mean that the great bulk of that $8.1bn would be wasted. But given just how much work goes into the Navteq mapping process, employing as it does 3,000 people, we can’t imagine any customers dropping its maps for an inferior service just to remove dependence on Nokia.
“Location-based services are one of the cornerstones of Nokia’s internet services strategy. The acquisition of Navteq is another step toward Nokia becoming a leading player in this space,” said Nokia CEO Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo. “By joining forces with Navteq, we will be able to bring context and geographical information to a number of our internet services with accelerated time to market. We also look forward to maintaining and enhancing the services and support provided to Navteq’s existing and future customers”.
This analysis was originally published in Wireless Watch’s sister service, Faultline, which provides in-depth commentary on broadband digital media and the economics of the quad play. Please contact Linda Elisha on [email protected] for details.