The handset market is acquiring a new generation of CEOs. First Nokia’s Jorma Olilla passed the reins to Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, then a month ago Hideki Komiyama replaced Miles Flint at Sony Ericsson, and now Ed Zander is to depart Motorola, to be replaced by COO Greg Brown from January 1. The manner of the three men’s departure reflects the different fortunes of their companies, with the first two taking the helm from successful predecessors leaving on the crest of a wave, and now looking to the next stage, mobile web services. By contrast, Zander, much fanfared when he took over four years ago, is now widely being written off as a failure ‘ a judgement that is over simplistic ‘ and his successor faces, rather than the challenges of moving ahead to a new era, the decisions of how to stem the current decline, and whether this would be best achieved via the break-up of the company.
As Ed Zander departs as CEO of Motorola, activist investor Carl Icahn is calling for the break-up of the company, and for the handset division to stand alone. This is the division that accounts for two-thirds of the company’s revenues, but suffered a 36% year-on-year fall in sales in the third quarter, leading Zander to say, in a miracle of understatement: ‘The one disappointment this year has been mobile devices.’ He went on to say: ‘The management there had a strategy that proved not to be correct. That’s been corrected. We’ll be back’. The fact that Motorola has not shown signs of coming back quickly enough, losing its number two spot in the market to Samsung and under threat from Sony Ericsson, has cost Zander his job, but Icahn’s plans would divorce handsets from many of the aspects of the business that could provide Motorola with strength going forward, and where Zander’s legacy will be positive. The big questions for new CEO Greg Brown ‘ currently president and COO, with particular responsibility for turning round the handset division ‘ are whether this turnaround is possible based on the mobile phones alone, or whether, like its European rivals, the handsets will do better as part of a broader product platform and brand.
Nokia has web services, Sony Ericsson has the Sony media empire ‘ although, of course, both have been part of elaborate restructuring plans, with Nokia putting infrastructure into the Nokia Siemens venture and Sony Ericsson itself being a result of Ericsson’s defocus on handsets. So what Icahn wants is not unprecedented in the wireless industry, with the Asian vendors now the only other ones to own both infrastructure and handset businesses outright. But this fact in itself could give Motorola an opportunity to differentiate itself from its cellphone rivals ‘ not in mobile internet, where it would be hard pressed to catch up with the Scandinavians, but in offering the handset as part of an integrated range that stretches horizontally, to other devices such as in-home products, and vertically to infrastructure. In emerging 4G networks, on which Motorola Networks has staked its future, the winning of the Sprint Nextel contract by the three leading phonemakers showed the advantage of being able to offer both ends of the system in an early market where interoperability and off the shelf devices are not yet a reality (Nokia has always used this point as a reason to hold on to its own infrastructure business). And as those same mobile broadband networks move beyond the handset, and indeed rely on other devices for their business cases, Motorola could do well to bring its phones and other products like set-top boxes closer together to support the nascent quad play sector.
Icahn wants to break Motorola into four unit, believing that they would generate more value as separate entities. On the news of Zander’s resignation, he commented: ‘In my opinion, Motorola should be split into separate companies: a mobile devices company; an enterprise mobility company; a connected home company; and a company focused on mobile networks infrastructure.’ This would look more like the structure of the company before it merged its infrastructure, public safety and government units two years ago, a decision widely seen as a poor one because, while the divisions increasingly used similar products ‘ notably WiMAX ‘ they had entirely different cultures, target markets and channels. In Icahn’s view, the non-handset units would likely be sold off or placed into joint ventures ‘ Huawei would be an obvious choice for infrastructure, because the two firms already have a partnership for UMTS, and the Chinese vendor needs a western ally to step up the pace of its plans to grow aggressively outside China. Enterprise mobility could appeal to Cisco, given its crossover with Motorola in corporate WLans, metrozones and open systems public safety; as could connected home, as a complement to Scientific Atlanta, Linksys and the IPTV strategy.
Given its apparent new interest in WiMAX and carrier class equipment ‘ even if this is mainly to drive metrozone and ASN gateway business ‘ could conceivably consider the Motorola networks unit too, although it would be an atypical move. Divesting the infrastructure business could be seen as a proactive move, designed to exit the sector before it gets far tougher ‘ as it will for Motorola, partly because of the consolidation and price slashing of the market, a situation in which it increasingly is dwarfed by Ericsson’s scale; and partly because much of its current revenue is drawn from legacy technologies that will become more expensive and unprofitable to maintain. The notable example is iDEN, the Nextel technology that has been Motorola’s biggest single revenue stream in networks, but which will be phased out.
However, it is unclear how much value Motorola shareholders would gain from a sale. The legacy business, and the high risk that Motorola took when defocusing on its failed UMTS strategy and pinning all its hopes on emerging networks (WiMAX and LTE), may deter possible acquirers. Ericsson has been steering clear of major RAN acquisitions and is almost entirely focused, in wireless, on GSM, UMTS and LTE. Alcatel-Lucent and Nokia Siemens are digesting their own mergers and Nortel, although its ‘ straight to 4G’ strategy echoes Motorola’s, is still undergoing turnaround and would be more likely to be a target than a predator in the M&A race. That leaves Samsung, which might welcome the boost to its WiMAX business, and the Chinese majors, Huawei and ZTE, but none of these would be prepared to pay a high premium, given the problem of the legacy businesses, which would not fit well with their models.
Whether Icahn gets his way on quartering Motorola remains to be seen, but he has certainly, as the company’s third largest and most vocally disgruntled shareholder, played a part in his departure, which has been widely speculated upon. Zander made the usual statements about spending more time with his family, but it is clear that he has failed to deliver on his early promise, and is, to some extent, succumbing to shareholder pressure, and avoiding the fate dealt to the CEO of his largest customer, Sprint Nextel’s Gary Forsee.
The past year has indeed been disastrous for Motorola’s largest business, sacrificing far too much margin in the race to gain market share through ultra-low cost handsets for developing nations, and repeatedly failing to come up with a device to succeed the iconic RAZR, still a bestselling phone, but now with its margins slashed and no effective replacement in the high end territory where Motorola needs to compete with the Nokia N95, LG Prada and Chocolate, and Apple iPhone.
But Zander should not be written off in the same way as his ineffective predecessor Chris Galvin. He may have taken more credit than he was due for RAZR, which was in the works before he joined the company, but he created better conditions for such a product to thrive, and at least started to address many of the structural problems that plagued Motorola, from its inefficient supply chain (especially relative to Nokia’s) to its destructive culture of fiefdoms. He paid far more attention than Galvin to communicating with and supporting key customers and under his auspices the Networks and Connected Home divisions gained more ambitious visions and a commitment to emerging technologies.
In contrast to the headhunting exercise that took place when Galvin departed, and the decision to bring in new blood and pass over COO Mike Zafirovski (now CEO of Nortel), this time the baton has been passed uncontested to Greg Brown, who has been president and COO since March, and previously headed four different businesses at the company, as well as masterminding the $3.9bn acquisition of Symbol Technologies, the second largest in Motorola’s history.
While Wall Street has not reacted strongly to the idea of a break-up, it has been cautiously positive about Brown, who is seen as strong in the very area that has been Motorola’s Achilles’ Heel, operational and supply chain excellence. Some of the undoubted improvements that have taken place under Zander have been the work of Brown, and he will need to make further improvements to have a hope of closing the gap with Nokia. The one achievement, though, that would most engender confidence in the new CEO will be the same one that initially set Zander on a positive course ‘ the production of some compelling new handsets. Brown needs this personally, to address fears in some quarters that he is a capable pair of hands but not impressive enough for this hard task (accusations of lack of vision may not be bad though ‘ the same fears were voiced about Kallasvuo, who is proving, now he is out of thee shadow of the previous CEO, to be a very powerful force). Without the killer handset, though, it will prove a very difficult turnaround for Motorola, whether it becomes just a handset firm or stays intact.
Note: Zander will serve as a strategic advisor to the CEO until January 5 2009, when his contract ends. During 2008, he will receive salary, benefits and stock worth an estimated $10.7m, plus $5.3m in deferred compensation. If the board had terminated Zander’s five-year contract, he would have been entitled to severance worth $28.5m-36m.
Handset performance in Q3:
Motorola is continuing to lose ground in global share of handset sales, according Gartner Group’s latest estimates, which saw overall growth of 15% year-on-year in the third quarter, 289m units shipped, compared to 251m.
Gartner expects strong sales for the fourth quarter with sequential growth of at least 10%, and maybe as high as 15%, which would lift annual shipments to 1.14bn units.
Nokia maintained its top position, while Samsung was again number two ahead of Motorola. Nokia’s share is calculated at 38.1%, up three percentage points from the same period last year. The Finnish group sold 110m phones in Q3.
Samsung’s share also increased, to 14.5% from 12.2% a year earlier, but Motorola took a major hit, with its market share declining to 13.1% from 20.7 % in Q3 2006.
Carolina Milanesi, research director for mobile devices research at Gartner, commented :
Overall, sales were mainly driven by strong performance in Asia-Pacific and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa.
Gartner suggests Nokia also managed to raise operating margins in the quarter, despite the fall in average price of its phones to €82 from €90. The lower average price was linked to the higher proportion of ultra-low cost devices sold in the quarter. Nokia led this sector as Motorola shifted focus away from it.
The fourth and fifth position in the Gartner rankings were taken by Sony Ericsson, with an 8.8% share, up one point on a year earlier; while LG also increased its share by one percentage point to 7.1%. This means the top five represent nearly 82% of total global sales.
Sony Ericsson’s new man:
64-year old Hideki Komiyama has a hard act to follow, taking the reins from Miles Flint last month. Flint took several leaves out of Nokia’s book, notably by asserting tight control over procurement and the supply chain ‘ to the point where Sony Ericsson has felt able to enter lower cost handset markets, especially targeting India, and so trying to emulating Nokia’s currently successful balance of high end media phones plus huge market share in emerging economies. Also like Nokia, Flint focused on branding, and made Sony Ericsson the most successful handset maker on this front by leveraging the Sony Walkman and Cybershot tags. His successor aims to make even greater capital out of those brands, and possibly also the PSP, while also copying Nokia’s shift into multimedia web services.
While Flint has departed in the glory of having transformed Sony Ericsson from a floundering joint venture created from its parents’ unloved handset unit, Komiyama, a Sony veteran, faces ‘a daunting challenge’, as consultancy CCS Insight puts it. The area of the market where the company has thrived ‘ multimedia smartphone ‘ is now one of the most competitive, and the move to low end models remains high risk for a company that, despite its 35% increase in earnings in the first three quarters of this year, cannot leverage the economies of scale or the efficiencies of Nokia. Yet sub-$30 models are becoming crucial to market share expansion, and to keeping Sony Ericsson in its number four place, not to mention boosting its ambitions to enter the top three.
Apart from the tough job of keeping the right balance between high end and low end models, and between market share and profit margins (the balance Motorola got so wrong), Komiyama’s initial decisions will focus around software and services, as he bids for an influential position in the evolution of mobile internet platforms. The web services strategy has been launched around the PlayNow music system, and will make strong use of the Sony brands, but needs further refining in functionality if it is to compete with Nokia Ovi. The new CEO will also need to streamline the operating system policy – it uses Symbian OS in only 18% of phones, in contrast with Nokia’s 53%, which gives the latter an advantage in efficiency, developer support and time to market. However, Sony Ericsson also needs to make decisions about what to do about Linux and other emerging factors like Google Android, while also chasing a more prominent position for its UIQ user interface, which it shares in a joint venture with Motorola, and which needs to be more aggressively enhanced and marketed to operators and licensees, if it is to make an impact on the ambitions of Nokia Series 60 to be a de facto standard.