Nokia wants to be regarded primarily as an internet player. It is generally perceived primarily as a handset vendor. In reality, the Finnish giant is overwhelmingly a logistics company (it is rated the world’s number one supply chain by specialist researchers AMR, up from fourth in 2005. For comparison, Wal-Mart ranks sixth). Whether in its previous incarnations making timber and bedroom slippers, or its most successful phase in cellphones, the company’s efforts in branding and design have always been underpinned by supply chain, procurement and distribution excellence that its rivals struggle to match, and which have only improved with increased market share and economies of scale. One of Nokia’s secrets has been continuous reinvention in order to cut costs and inventory, and its latest shake-up comes in the critical area of chip procurement and design.
One major challenge that will face Nokia as it enters its mobile internet phase is how to adapt its skills in these practical areas to a software-driven business model. But with its core products set to be the bulk of its revenues for many years, it is coupling recent strategic reorganizations with a major rethink of its chip partnerships. This will have a more significant short term impact than its mobile internet shift on its ability to maintain its current dominant position, and will have a ripple effect on the structure of the whole handset processor sector, including the next moves of the one silicon giant that will always be excluded from Nokia’s favors, Qualcomm.
Nokia has been gradually altering its chip strategies for some years now, reducing its dependence on its familiar Texas Instruments and sparking changes in direction from that company and other players. Last week saw its most formal setting out of its new approach, however, basically selecting four preferred suppliers and outsourcing most of its own 3G chip development to TI and STMicro. This further rationalizes its own chains and also aims to reduce Nokia’s own hardware R&D costs by offloading more of that burden on to its chip vendors, freeing the Finnish company up to shift its development focus more heavily onto software, which it increasingly sees as the key differentiator for its handsets.
The four preferred partners are Texas Instruments, of course, across any platforms; plus Broadcom for EDGE, STMicro for UMTS and Infineon for GSM. In essence, this forces TI to compete on all major platforms, more consistently than it did before, by introducing a second source for each. “It’s fair to say that Texas Instruments is practically the sole supplier today and our reliance is high,” said Niklas Savander, executive vice president at Nokia Technology Platforms in an interview. “The reliance on one supplier is a business risk that we want to mitigate.”
Inevitably there are politics as well as technology behind these choices, and an element of Nokia, as well as pursuing its own efficiencies, also putting new weapons in the hands of Qualcomm’s challengers. Broadcom has been Nokia’s most valuable ally, and arguably its stalking horse, in its important battle with Qualcomm over licensing practises and royalties. With strengths in multimode integration, also an area heavily touted by Qualcomm, Broadcom is potentially a real counterweight to the power of the CDMA giant in the whole 3G and multimode arena, and one with the need and desire to take on Qualcomm head-to-head and represent the interests of potential backers like Nokia. In this sense it is of more value to the Finnish company than TI, which operates more as a merchant chipmaker and is increasingly differentiating itself by process more than design ‘ especially as more of its rivals outsource their manufacturing, and as the need to look beyond Nokia makes it more concerned to be neutral in vendor politics (witness its recent reference platform alliance with Ericsson).
Broadcom may not have got the Nokia nod in its coveted 3G market, but EDGE is rapidly closing the gap with GSM in the volume sectors, and any endorsement from the world’s largest phonemaker is a major breakthrough for a chip company that, despite its stellar performance in Wi-Fi, had not yet positioned itself in the front rank of cellphone suppliers.
STMicro is also being well rewarded for recent improvements in pricing and process, and for strong support of Nokia’s ambitions. Many regard the failure of the Nokia-TI-STMicro venture to challenge Qualcomm in the CDMA market – largely derailed by the CDMA company’s rewriting of the roadmap)- as the death knell for the old inter-dependence of the handset leader and TI, but by contrast the venture is widely thought to have proved STMicro’s credentials to Nokia and placed the Swiss-based company at the center of the ecosystem for the first time. The intensified relationship suggested by the new endorsement, and the exclusion of STMicro’s most direct competitors, are absolutely vital to the company, which is heavily revenue dependent on Nokia, its largest customer.
And the new deal goes further, transferring much of Nokia’s 3G development, including IPR and 200 engineers, to STMicro. In particular, it will work on HSxPA baseband products and SoCs, and although these will not impact revenue until 2010, the deepened alliance is a major confidence boost for investors in the sometimes turbulent chipmaker, especially as it represents ST’s first ever complete 3G design win, and appears to push it up the silicon value chain, just as some of its rivals are moving down ‘ including Infineon, a contrast reinforced by the fact that the German player has been chosen by Nokia for GSM, not EDGE, even though it supplied EDGE chips for the Apple iPhone.
Nokia will continue to develop its modem technology, which it regards as a core competency and still an important differentiator. This includes protocol software and related digital design for GSM, UMTS and HSxPA, and Nokia plans to license the technology to its chipset manufacturers for use in products for Nokia phones. The Finnish company is also hinting at broader licensing, so that its modem technology could turn up, via its four chip partners, in rivals’ handsets, mirroring a business that is increasingly important to Ericsson (Ericsson Mobile Platforms recently teamed up with TI to combine its own 3G modem platform with TI’s applications processors, reflecting the shift of the handset industry towards openly licensed reference platforms, with differentiation moving to the software/interface levels.)
Fellow European chipmaker, Germany’s Infineon, is the fourth lucky winner, at the high volume, price sensitive GSM end, where the company has increasingly been focusing its efforts, backing away from the massive R&D burden of taking on Qualcomm and others in 3G and beyond. With volume the key to this game, gaining a preferred position with the world’s largest producer of GSM devices is clearly an important step forward, especially as it disadvantages other GSM-oriented chip vendors, even if Infineon might have hoped for recognition for EDGE also.
What of the losers from this deal, all of which will now need to re-evaluate their strategies going forwards, or seek other entry points, such as Wi-Fi/WiMAX, into the Nokia fortress? NXP of the Netherlands is an obvious example, and a succession of disappointments in cellphones is pushing the company further towards specializing in low power products such as Wireless USB, Near Field Communications and miniaturized Wi-Fi. Freescale is a more predictable loser, its Motorola history meaning it has no track record with Nokia, but the decision also makes clear how far the company is hobbled in the open 3G market by its former parent holding on to chunks of IPR ‘ even while reducing its own levels of procurement from Freescale.
For Texas Instruments, the new approach by its largest customer ‘ which accounts for 15% of its revenue ‘ is on balance negative, even though it retains its pre-eminent position among Nokia’s silicon suppliers, and many joint IPR/R&D relationships in various areas. But undoubtedly the marriage will never be as close again, and TI will have to fight harder for Nokia wins in future technologies, as well as spreading its wings more aggressively ‘ something in which it has had several notable recent successes, such as its Ericsson deal and a major contract with Motorola. However, Nokia’s new level of multi-sourcing will threaten TI’s healthy margins in some chip categories, notably UMTS, since its near-monopoly of the largest customer is broken and Nokia is lending its weight to strengthening competitors like Broadcom, not just against Qualcomm, but also, implicitly, against TI.
But of course Qualcomm remains the major target for Nokia, and if it can increase its own competitiveness and simultaneously weaken the CDMA giant, it will count its new strategy a huge success. Nokia obviously wants to crush Qualcomm’s power in the IPR field in order to cut its costs and reduce the overall handset IPR burden. The US company’s chip business might seem of less concern, given that Nokia has exited CDMA devices once and for all and has several other sources for UMTS, most of them more cost effective than Qualcomm. However, the Finnish behemoth suffers from the fact that, recently, its enemy has proved the most effective of the handset silicon companies in executing on advanced technologies, and there is a real fear within Nokia that it will be forced, by its exclusion of Qualcomm from its ecosystem, to adopt second class, or late, chips, while Qualcomm customers like Samsung and now Motorola steal a technological march. Hence the logic of strengthening the R&D, intellectual property and financial reserves of companies that could provide a stronger challenge to the Qualcomm machine, to increase the choices in HSxPA, as well as forcing that giant to become more price competitive. In turn, this could all have indirect influence on the cross-licensing negotiations with Qualcomm, a positive outcome to which could add yet another dimension to Nokia’s cost efficiency programme, putting it even further out of reach of its challengers.