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15 April 2008

A demerged Motorola will be a fatally crippled giant

You could be forgiven for thinking that Motorola’s plan to spin out its handset business will take away the vast shadow of a long term handset re-structuring from the rest of the otherwise successful businesses, and increase their value. Investors everywhere, used to the type of short term constraints of the US stock market, will be thinking much the same. But are they right?

Certainly Carl Icahn thinks so, and the agreement announced this week between Motorola and Icahn suggests that the Board also agrees, in nominating William Hambrecht and Keith Meister for election to Motorola’s Board at the Annual Meeting of Shareholders, with Meister on the Board immediately.

There is no question that Motorola is a train wreck, and the board and investors can either save the survivors, or go around shooting them all to save them from suffering. To us it looks like the latter is what’s happening. In our view every one of Motorola’s businesses is compromised by the process of demerger, not just the handset business – in terms of reduction in scale, and of being unable to fall back on other businesses when the going gets rough in any given market.

First let’s look at what those businesses are and how they will stack up separately in each of their markets. Since mid-2007 Motorola would have you perceive its activities split into three large groups, with handsets roughly half of the total. Enterprise and Public Safety are bundled together, as are Networks and the Connected Home.

In reality, Connected Home is a very much a standalone business, accounting for roughly 8% of total Motorola revenue last year, a figure expected to rise to around 11% (though this is no longer officially broken out). This is the only sector outside safety where Motorola can claim any kind of market leadership. It is not definitively number one globally in set-tops, but it is the leader is supplying cable and IPTV digital video recorders, set-tops, encoders, video on demand and other video delivery systems, and in cable broadband infrastructure to the US market, holding some 50% market share in set-tops for this market. We would guess that this business is worth just over $4bn, ahead of Cisco’s Scientific Atlanta in the US.

There is probably not a single component used in the cable and set-top business that can be reused in Networks (unless you count some of the cable infrastructure in fiber), and there is probably not a single employee that could comfortably shift between understanding the two technology types that they embrace. They have been put together to aid investor thinking, since both businesses are mature and both currently growing at roughly the market rate.

Networks is around 20% of the total business, perhaps worth $6bn and shrinking, but currently enjoying the benefits of the Sprint WiMAX build-out, no matter how slowly that may be going, as well has having a decent GSM footprint, a good US CDMA footprint, and the opportunities made possibly by the 2010/2011 shift to LTE equipment anticipated by the market. So while the Connected Home business is almost entirely US-based, the Networks business is global in nature.

Now we look at the Enterprise and Public Safety segment ‘ in total around 21% of the total business, or around $7.7bn combined. Again Motorola would have us believe that they are now nicely integrated. But the enterprise segment – partly the inherited Motorola efforts to take mobile to the enterprise, partly the acquisitions of Symbol Technologies and Good Technology – focuses on everything from barcode readers to enterprise Wi-Fi and dual-mode VoIP devices, while Public Safety is really another networks business (and for a while from 2006 was combined with Networks), building and maintaining analog two-way radio networks not only for the US government, but also for half the governments of the world. This is also going through the process of adapting to the new paradigm for public safety, based on cellular spectrum (eg the possible 700MHz US license), Wi-Fi-like bands such as 4.9GHz in the US, and mobile satellite. All this has overlap with Networks and Mobile Devices, but little in the way of shared logistics with the Enterprise business, even where this is serving public sector organizations.

So perhaps the best way of thinking of Motorola and getting a clear view is to look at it as five main revenue streams. This is how Carl Icahn seems to have seen the business, but where is he going to want all of his money? Well, not in Devices. The two largest businesses after that are Networks and Public Safety, one of them operating in a sector with some growth, the other an older, safer market in which Motorola is very comfortable.

And let’s look at it in just one more way before we begin to predict. The third diagram below is just how the rump of Motorola will look once the handset business has been separated off. Of course the rump of Motorola, (which will presumably not be called Motorola, because the only thing that will keep the handsets alive is if they keep the brand) can throw these elements together in any way it likes, but the day after the split this is how they will look. On the cash front, we assume that most of the cash goes to Motorola1 (the devices side) and that’s some $3.3bn, a kind of dowry. The remaining liquid assets, for what are currently cash generating businesses, will live in the Sigma Fund of investments which Motorola has so badly raided in order to keep it afloat (last year is spent some $7bn of its liquid assets keeping itself afloat and out of the clutches of onerous debt terms). That fund contains $5.2bn today.

Now let’s just briefly look at the challenges each business has before working out what Icahn and other professional investors might want to see happening to Motorola2.

The first thing to note is that all four of these businesses only ever fitted logically together because they all needed devices. Networks, especially in new platforms like WiMAX where interoperability is not yet proven, gains a fillip from being able to offer both infrastructure and devices, and vice versa. As cellular devices invade the two-way radio world of public safety, a strong device strategy would help Motorola2 here too. But given that Motorola is not building the satellite carried transponders in MSS, and that 700MHz in the US is delayed for public safety and that the company will almost certainly have to operate without its famous brand, this market will be challenging, especially at home in the US. Outside the US, public safety two-way radios will hold up for quite a while.

Enterprise goes head-to-head with Cisco, though the market itself has reasonable growth and the Motorola brand has driven the former Symbol to increased market share. Without the Motorola brand behind it, and given that VoIP, dual-mode and RFID (key recent innovations where the Enterprise group has been in the vanguard) have all had their first blush of youth as differentiators, the business will be under increasing margin pressure.

Home Networks is an exceptionally promising area, and Motorola2 can actually grow this leadership, based upon its US cable strength, the fact that European and Asian cable are finally getting to grips with going digital, and the rise and rise of IPTV markets. It can do this on the back of its Netopia DSL devices, its Terayon video networking for digital cable, its Tut Systems and Modulus encoding platforms, its Broadbus Ram-based VoD system and its Leapstone service delivery platform and content management systems, not to mention its European Kreatel IPTV set-top business. Looking at this business we can reflect on two years or more of acquisitions and see some sense. The US cable market is now investing heavily in DOCSIS 3.0 to stay ahead of IPTV in broadband offerings, Verizon and AT&T are in a rapid roll-out phase for their FiOS and U-Verse IPTV systems, as Europe is just entering its digital cable phase. Can anything go wrong for this division?

Of course it has to manage all of those acquisitions well, and it also has a problem in the US, where CableCard legislation has taken the ‘lock-in’ of encryption and separated it from set-top function, which makes cable operators freer to look beyond Motorola. Also with TiVo having established its DVR patents in legal actions with EchoStar it will go gunning for other manufacturers that have not licensed its ideas, and Motorola is the biggest. So there are challenges for Connected Home, but we see none of them likely to be disastrous, except that home networks is the next big thing, and it is being attacked by so many new companies that Motorola2 will have to acquire businesses to stay on top of the pile and invest on moving into overseas markets.

When we come to Networks, there are big question marks over the group that is 20% of the entire business, and will be 40% of Motorola2. It has a GSM offering and is globally about third in that market, but under pressure from ZTE; it is strong in WiMAX, but this is currently a small market and one where Samsung, Nokia Siemens and others are playing, and even Cisco is entering. It has managed to do well in CDMA, but not as well as Nortel and Alcatel-Lucent, and although it has a headstart in LTE, with products coming along, it will be up against the mighty Ericsson. Since most LTE business will come from upgrades to UMTS, a market where Motorola failed miserably, the next three years of its Networks growth will have to come from ageing networks or from WiMAX, with perhaps the only exception being Verizon, moving between CDMA and LTE, which may put some business Motorola2’s way. The question in customers like Verizon is how much of Motorola’s revenue was shunted off into devices when it did deals that included both infrastructure and handsets.

Motorola management itself says that in 2007 CDMA networks were flat and GSM and iDEN markets were down and going forwards it expects a decline in the CDMA, GSM and iDEN throughout 2008.

All of these businesses, without the brand of Motorola, and without access to advanced product specs and co-bidding from its devices division, are in danger of shrinking post-demerger. And while we would argue that Motorola as it is today would have been a perfect target for private equity 12 months ago, today PE groups would be lucky to raise an interest in each of the four Motorola2 interests.

As for Devices itself, with just $647m in order backlog, around half of what it usually is, revenues will continue to collapse until Motorola has devices which embrace the slider, touchscreen form factor made famous by Apple’s iPhone. It has already done this to a certain extent, with its AT&T deal exclusive announced last week with the Z9 slider offering GPS and the Napster music service, using an iPod-like click wheel for navigation ‘ not touchscreen, but some way towards a non-RAZR design.

Most analysts are seeing the handset division falling to $4bn a quarter, expecting it to lose some $2.7bn of revenue in the coming year, making it a $16bn business losing money. If it were up for sale, as India’s Videocon appears to believe, it would be a novelty if it were valued at less than its prospective revenue. It would be a first to suggest that it was worth less than half of its 2008 projected revenue at $8bn plus around $3bn it would have if it took half the company’s liquid assets, so perhaps $11bn. But it would be insanity to suggest that the $3.8bn that sources say Videocon is prepared to pay is the price anyone should put on one of the biggest handset makers in the world. And to sell it to an Indian company with no experience in the sector and revenues of just $2.5bn is even less likely. Granted Videocon might help Motorola concentrate more of its cheap manufacturing in India, perhaps in a partnership, but it is not going to be buying Motorola the handset business any time soon.

However, a Motorola handset division on its own is likely to have a crippled value and invite spurious offers over the next two years as it spends on trying to right the ship, assuming it can find a decent CEO. And if it did end up acquired by a Videocon or a ZTE, one of the great US brands would be dead as a name inside a few short years.

Investors may see the juicy Motorola2 rump as a tasty investment in the short term ‘ a $17bn business, growing to $19bn this year, with an 8% margin and a times 15 or 20 multiple to create a value of perhaps $30bn. But our assessment is that it would only be the case in the short term. Each of the separate business would founder and a board penetrated by corporate raiders would ensure a private equity feeding frenzy would wipe the Motorola legacy from the face of the earth in under three years. For maximum value the entire business needs to be carefully managed as a whole, and smaller assets sold to pay for the changes needed for the business to turn the corner. But with Icahn on board, and a commitment to demerge handsets already made, that route forward has already gone.

This analysis was originally published in Faultline, Wireless Watch’s sister title, which offers weekly insights into the digital media markets and the economics of the quad play. It includes insights from investment research company JRPG (www.jrpg.com). Please contact Peter White on [email protected] for more details.