The abrupt settlement of Qualcomm’s 15-month legal battle with Nokia over patent licensing and business practises has far wider implications than most such compromises, because in reality, it is more than a commercial d’tente between the market leader in handset chips and the market leader in cellphones. As such, it will have an impact ‘ making the IPR payments and revenues of both companies more stable; reducing uncertainty around the future of Qualcomm’s licensing business; doubtless cutting Nokia’s costs. But far more significantly, it is also a step towards resolving two far wider disputes ‘ the cold war between Nokia and Qualcomm, which started well before their patents agreement expired in April 2007; and the debate over the IPR burden in next generation handsets, which will affect costs, prices and competitive alliances through the whole sector as it moves into HSPA, LTE and other advanced technologies.
On the first count, the relationship between Nokia and Qualcomm, the new pact opens the door to the mighty Finn buying chips from the CDMA giant, a decision that would rock the structure of the handset silicon business and make Qualcomm even stronger against its rivals, freed from the restrictions that the hostility to its IPR practises have imposed, in recent years, on the competitive agility of its chip unit. Settlement with Nokia may make spin-off of the licensing unit (QTL or Qualcomm Technology Licensing) less necessary ‘ CEO Paul Jacobs had hinted this was a possibility should European Union probes, in particular, go against the US giant ‘ but if it brings major contracts with Nokia over the next year or more, it could also give the chip division a taste of unfettered competition, and strengthen its ability to compete on its own merits, and Qualcomm’s ability to handle the blow of separating the division that accounts for one-third of its revenues, but 60% of its profits.
There is no explicit mention of chip buying agreements in the settlement, but it is almost inconceivable that Qualcomm would have settled this quickly without a strong whiff of a silicon deal with the world’s largest phonemaker. Without such a prospect, settling early was not to Qualcomm’s advantage. It has been clear for years that it will have to modify its licensing structures and practises as its CDMA patents become exhausted and as 4G technologies, where it will be less dominant in IPR terms, start to emerge. But these trends will not hit Qualcomm hard for a few more years, and in the mean time, it could play for time, sticking to the traditional licensing norms while it could, while enhancing the competitiveness of its silicon business ‘ as it has been doing impressively, hence its overtaking Texas Instruments as market leader in handset basebands; its lead in advanced technologies like software defined radios and embedded laptop wireless (Gobi); and its expansion into sideways markets like Intel’s notebook territory and media devices (Snapdragon).
The patents transfer aspect of the deal, though vaguely outlined, also points to more than the normal licensing compromise, and to an agreement that, while confirming Nokia’s utter dominance of its market, also brings Qualcomm’s chip business new benefits, even while underlining the medium term reworking of its IPR unit. Nokia has transferred various patents, including some in OFDM/4G, to Qualcomm. This hints at a close potential relationship that will strike fear into the hearts of TI and other Nokia chip suppliers. Nokia is less aggressive than Ericsson and others about using its patents as a revenue stream in their own right, preferring to employ them to improve its price and cross-licensing negotiation position. And it has a history of sharing them with key partners as part of strategic R&D activities ‘ notably with TI and recently with STMicro ‘ that often lead to the creation of highly advanced silicon geared to Nokia’s particular specifications and market requirements.
If a similar arrangement is on the cards with Qualcomm, it would go a long way to counterbalancing the US giant’s negatives in terms of reduced IPR power and the slow but certain contraction of the CDMA market. It would boost confidence in the chip designer and its post-CDMA potential, and generate volume that could help it achieve the price efficiencies that will soon be essential ‘ already its most loyal partner, Samsung, is second sourcing single-chip 3G products from Infineon and publicly using the German firm’s lower prices as a stick with which to beat Qualcomm.
What areas might be natural for a Nokia-Qualcomm cooperation? Although the chip company has strong products in W-CDMA and HSPA, Nokia probably has these bases covered with STMicro and TI, so its eyes are more likely to be on relatively untapped markets ‘ though Qualcomm’s single-chip 3G product, which enables a smartphone without the need for a dedicated apps processor, could be of interest for midrange and emerging smartphone markets, given that TI and STMicro have no similar offering, and Nokia has not taken the main rival, from Infineon. Other areas of possible cooperation could be embedded 3G+ for notebooks, PDAs and other non-cellphone platforms, an area where Nokia attempted and failed to play with Intel but has since been weak. Qualcomm has one of its most highly differentiated products here, Gobi, the software defined embedded 3G chipset that takes on Intel on its own turf and supports CDMA2000, W-CDMA/HSPA, and possibly future standards, dynamically. Gobi is a crown jewel, but other areas where the patent exchange hint at future cooperation could be HSPA+, where Qualcomm appears to be edging ahead of TI in prototype products, and LTE/OFDM. Here, Qualcomm claims significant IPR holdings, but has not revealed details ‘ Nokia’s patents will help augment the arsenal, but Qualcomm’s success in LTE will depend primarily on the excellence of its engineering and its ability to attract major customers early. However, the Nokia deal, and the inclusion of LTE, WiMAX and OFDM alongside GSM and the CDMA-based technologies, all set the precedent for Qualcomm to be able to collect royalties in the 4G market, even from OFDM-only vendors, even if this will not be on the terms it enjoyed in CDMA and 3G. Previously, its rights with OFDM-only vendors had been tested only with small agreements with WiMAX start-ups like Soma Networks.
Another possible knock-on effect of the truce is that Nokia could seek to achieve one of its key goals, improving its US position, by re-entering the CDMA handset market in force. Although it has a couple of ODM deals for CDMA devices for the US and India, this is a sector it has tried several times to penetrate ‘ notably with TI and STMicro earlier this decade, and then with Sanyo two years ago ‘ but has failed because of its refusal to buy chips from Qualcomm, and the problems in bypassing the CDMA leader’s strangehold. Now the way could be open for Nokia to address this sector again without having to fund its own chip partners.
All this is potentially positive but still vague and probably uncommitted. The obvious downside of early settlement is that Qualcomm will have to accelerate its rethink of its patent charges and practises, and will likely come under pressure to sweeten its terms as it renews licenses with other major customers. This will not be an unexpected challenge, but it will still be a painful transition, and one that has come earlier than many hoped. But at the LTE/WiMAX phase, whatever Qualcomm’s IPR holdings turn out to be, it will not have the whiphand that it enjoyed in CDMA, so it will be forced, even without the kick from Nokia’s lawyers, to go along with new norms in a market where the other major patent owners, like Ericsson and Samsung, are signing up to notions of open source, open licensing through patent pools, and low IPR burden to drive low cost devices ‘ total patents charges of 5% of the cost of the handset is the goal of Nokia and Ericsson.
Other Nokia chip suppliers will potentially be far more badly affected (see separate item), if Qualcomm really does break into the Finn’s inner circle of suppliers, especially as TI and others are lagging behind the CDMA giant in terms of actual product execution in some of the markets on which Nokia is most focused, like HSPA+, laptops and low cost smartphones. But the positives that Nokia will see from settling this issue and setting new precedents for new generation licensing assumptions and charges, will also affect its rivals, improving their own negotiating power against Qualcomm, and leading to general progress in the bid for lower cost handsets to address the ‘next billion’ cellphone users in emerging markets. Although the Nokia deal is specific and not directly replicable, it could still set new expectations across the sector, reduce the power that Qualcomm has over phonemakers, increase the ability of smaller chipmakers to compete, and contribute to the ongoing trend for dramatic price reduction across the cellphone industry as companies target emerging markets and turn to software for differentiation.
Another company that may be affected more specifically is Broadcom, which has been Qualcomm’s other main patent-related antagonist over the past couple of years, and despite some individual court wins, has not reached an overall settlement with its larger rival. Broadcom, itself a new Nokia supplier ‘ possibly partly as a reward for putting so much legal pressure on Qualcomm ‘ is now open to a deal of its own. “We hope that yesterday’s settlement reflects a new approach by Qualcomm to finally resolve these ongoing disputes in a manner that is equitable to both sides,” said David Rosmann, Broadcom’s VP of intellectual property litigation. “We remain ready and willing to enter into an agreement that protects the intellectual property rights of both parties.” In a similar conciliatory mood, Qualcomm CEO Jacobs said in an interview: “I hope that this is kind of a new stage in the industry and people will be more interested in finding compromises.’ It is also possible that, since Nokia has dropped its participation in an antitrust complaint before the European Commission, the other companies involved ‘ Broadcom, Ericsson, Matsushita (Panasonic), NEC and Texas Instruments, may follow suit.
Recap: the deal
Nokia had paid $1bn over the period from 1992 to 2007 for Qualcomm patents, but the US company had already accepted that it was ‘paid up’ for the older technologies, and it was IPR in W-CDMA and some surrounding or emerging systems like OFDM and GPS ‘ all of which will be vital to the current and next generation of handsets ‘ that were at issue. Nokia had put $20m a quarter on the table as the amount it believed to be appropriate once it had cross-traded its own enhanced patent portfolio with Qualcomm’s. Cross-licensing and even exchange of patents are features of the settlement and will help make it sufficiently complex that it cannot be taken as a direct blueprint for Qualcomm settlements with other handset makers, though it will increase their negotiating power. It is highly likely that Nokia will pay more than $20m a quarter, and it has stated that it will make an upfront payment.
It will also assign ownership of a number of its patents to Qualcomm, strengthening the chipmaker’s revenue streams in IPR even as, presumably, it will be agreeing to license these technologies under terms acceptable to Nokia. Some of the patents transferred from Nokia are understood to include OFDM rights ‘ this is an area where Qualcomm is seeking to strengthen its hand, and it already claims, though with no proof offered, that it has the world’s largest OFDM patent collection. This sets out an interesting scenario ‘ Nokia and other vendors reducing their patent holdings, or entrusting them, effectively, to the guardianship of licensing specialists, but in return, imposing a new and more equal licensing policy on these companies. Nokia, unlike Ericsson, uses its patents mainly to improve its bargaining power with suppliers rather than for direct revenue, hence why this aspect of the Qualcomm deal is characteristic and significant. Sharing of IPR could conceivably lead to joint R&D, as it has in the past with TI and STMicro.
Qualcomm CEO Paul Jacobs said: “This agreement paves the way for enhanced opportunities between the companies in a number of areas.’ Nokia, with typical sang-froid, underplayed the agreement, refusing to field its CEO for a comment, though CFO Rick Simonson gave an interview and said the deal would meet Nokia’s financial objective of lowering royalty rates and getting Qualcomm to recognize the value of Nokia’s own IPR. “You have two of the most innovative companies agreeing on a basis and an overall rate structure that doesn’t slow up innovation in the industry,” he said. “It’s a big day.”
For the third quarter ended June 29, Qualcomm said its net income fell 6% to $748m, or 45 cents a share, down from $798m, or 47 cents a share, a year earlier. Revenue rose 19% to $2.76bn.