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4 September 2003

Nokia in delicate balancing act as Motorola sells Symbian holding

Motorola’s decision to sell its shareholding in the Symbian operating system group has radically shifted the battle lines in the smartphone market ‘ indeed, it has explicitly opened up a split in the handset market that has been visible under the surface for most of this year.

At first sight the news seems a serious setback for Symbian, but in reality, Motorola has dealt a body blow to itself in the smartphone market where success will be critical to its future health. While it runs after short term repairs to its market share through a Linux/Windows dual strategy heavily geared to China, the really interesting decisions need to be made by Nokia. The Finnish company wants to take a Microsoft-class role in enterprise and consumer technology through the smartphone and Symbian, but it will not necessarily achieve this by owning Symbian as Microsoft does Windows. Other handset makers are too big and wily to fall into the same trap that PC manufacturers did and Nokia now needs to achieve a delicate balancing act between openness and cooperation with its Symbian partners, and its goals of redefining the role of the smartphone and, in so doing, achieving a new level of market dominance.

Motorola will sell its 19% stake in Symbian and, assuming the proposed deal goes through, this will go to Nokia and Psion, making Nokia for the first time the largest shareholder, with a 32.2% share. Nokia would not say what it would pay for its increased slice, but the previous lead shareholder, Psion, whose stake will increase from 25.3% to 31.1%, said it would pay ‘17.4m. The deal puts a total value of about ‘300m on Symbian, which is contemplating an IPO, possibly early next year.

Although Motorola remains a licensee of the Symbian OS, and launched its first phone based on the technology, the A920 for ‘3’, last week, the system is now non-core for it. This change is no surprise. When Motorola joined the group shortly after its formation in 1998, it was still the world’s largest handset maker and could hope to drive the agenda of Symbian. Since then, Nokia has had a devastating effect on its rival’s market and, with 40% global share within its sights, has become by far the most important Symbian customer and in a position to drive its agenda and the progress of the whole smartphone sector.

This sector is small now but has huge potential, even in the US, where the operators may be two years behind their Asian and European counterparts in terms of service sophistication, but where enterprise suppliers ‘ notably IBM ‘ are keenly interested in the smartphone as the computing front end of the future and an alternative to Wintel. IBM has ported the mobile version of its Websphere technology to Symbian, as well as PalmOS, as it seeks to sideline Microsoft .Net.

This is the sector where Motorola knows it is at a serious disadvantage. No longer able to dominate Symbian, it is instead looking for a platform that it can control and where it can achieve differentiation. Differentiation is the word it uses most frequently itself when talking about its apparently very confused operating system strategy. It has failed in this respect in the past year, showing far less innovation than Nokia, Samsung or Sony Ericsson in its handset designs. So it has turned first to Linux and then to Microsoft Windows Mobile in its quest for a platform of its own. While Symbian is clear that it would do all in its power to help Motorola achieve differentiation on its platform and therefore stay within the inner fold, this seems unlikely in the short term.

Instead, Symbian has moved from uniting all the handset majors, leaving Microsoft’s alternative impossibly sidelined, to being on one side of a great divide. Motorola may be talking up Linux and Java, but its key alliance is now with Microsoft (see Wireless Watch issue 22). This immediately makes Microsoft a more viable competitor to Symbian than it has been before, and the loss of Motorola also heightens the perception that Symbian is too dominated by Nokia and too European in focus.

It clearly raises the issue of whether Nokia will seek to acquire the whole of Symbian, although this would alienate other shareholders and could drive them towards other operating systems. In fact, Nokia commands 85% of the Symbian base through its Series 80 and Series 60 implementations, which are also used by Siemens, Samsung and Sendo. Most other licensees use Symbian’s own user interface environment, UIQ, including Sony Ericsson, Motorola and Fujitsu.

The failure of the other shareholders to bid for Motorola’s abandoned stake has been presented as a sign that they are resigned to Symbian being a Nokia-driven vehicle and that they may, as a consequence, lose interest. However, all the shareholders bar Sony Ericsson have plenty of funds to have developed their own implementations and have instead used Series 60. Samsung grows increasingly close to Nokia in cooperating to develop new markets. This reminds us that these companies do not necessarily want to control the OS. They want a platform that enables them to bring differentiated handsets to market as quickly and easily as possible ‘ the main appeal of Symbian. They do not necessarily want to fund development of that operating system. Provided it remains open source, Nokia cannot hog developments to itself and Samsung and Siemens can concentrate on handset design and attracting applications. Such an approach does little for creativity or diversity at the interface level, but it does cater to the increasing need for handset vendors to refresh and enhance their ranges at very short intervals without reinventing the wheel each time.

Nokia’s agenda is different to those of the other phonemakers because it wants to be the new Microsoft, controlling a platform that spans the consumer and enterprise front end. For this reason, it needs to direct the OS and it needs to ensure that it is capable of supporting the enterprise class applications that are vital to the future roadmap. In such a complex strategy, being the leading player in a platform that still appears to be open and independent is a stronger card than outright control ‘ especially as Nokia is still confident of retaining its market share without needing to resort to a proprietary OS.

Motorola has no such grand plan. While Nokia has dreams of providing the key technology platform of the next decade, Motorola remains just a large handset maker, dependent on differentiation to increase its margins and on volume sales. Unlike Nokia, it can pursue its objectives using another company’s operating system ‘ provided this is not Nokia’s ‘ and can even sacrifice its brand to increase market share. Thus it has fallen into the arms of Microsoft, a strategy that we have already analyzed in detail as being ultimately disastrous to the hardware maker. And it makes operator-branded featurephones, as it has done for Orange and now for ‘3’, a sign of its desperation to increase sales.

These are decisions driven entirely by the tactical and the short term, particularly by the requirements of the Chinese market. In the quest for volume, China is clearly critical and Motorola has a strong position here, though it is being eroded by Nokia ad by local suppliers. Its support for Linux ‘ which most other handset makers have backed away from ‘ is largely driven by the Chinese government’s powerful interest in the operating system.

Its Microsoft partnership is also targeting China and this week Motorola has been in talks aimed at gaining new Chinese manufacturing partners for Windows Smartphone models, with Compal closest to completion. Motorola and Microsoft may be out in the cold in the mature mobile phone markets but in China, where growth is huge and there are no firm loyalties in place, they see a chance to cash in (see Wireless Watch issue 25).

But the fact remains that, while Motorola’s support has given a strong boost to Windows Mobile, Microsoft’s OS still has many weaknesses as a mobile phone platform, and if handset makers are nervous of Nokia’s influence, they will hardly be reassured by turning to Microsoft and its entirely closed operating system. Motorola has shut itself out of the most promising smartphone technology in order to make an alliance that will boost it its short term, Far Eastern ambitions and then crucify it later.

Symbian has to make a bigger impression on the US, but it will do so within a year as it starts to roll out CDMA implementations and as the enterprise IT suppliers’ support kicks in. At that point, Motorola will be wondering about the long term costs of entering a marriage of convenience with Microsoft.