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7 February 2013

Verwaayen to quit ALU, which proved too fractured to support his vision

The telecoms infrastructure business is one of sad contrasts at the moment. A week ago Ericsson’s CEO Hans Vestberg was in London presenting a generally strong set of results and a credible roadmap, projecting an air of cautious confidence ‘ just what customers and investors welcome in these tough times. More importantly, he set out an agenda which balanced short term revenues with long term growth.

A few days later, his counterpart at Alcatel-Lucent, Ben Verwaayen, resigned his post, effectively admitting the failure of his four-year plan to turn the giant around. Verwaayen said in a statement that it was ‘clear to me that now is an appropriate moment’ for the company to seek new leadership. He joined as CEO in 2008 two years after the firm was created from the merger of Alcatel and the US’s Lucent Technologies. That marriage was poorly executed from the start and has piled on billions of euros worth of losses ever since. A year ago, Verwaayen said ‘We were a company on a cliff. We don’t want to be a company on a cliff’, but though fears of bankruptcy have receded as cost-cutting programs start to take effect, the firm remains teetering on that cliff, despite recently announcing new credit lines and, this month, a €2bn loan package to buy time for a more radical restructuring.

Of course, the main difference between Vestberg’s situation and Verwaayen’s is that the former’s predecessor Carl-Henric Svanberg had already done the hard work of righting the Ericsson ship. It is easy to forget how close that was to capsizing after the telecoms crash at the start of the century, and Svanberg went through the all the painful restructuring, cost cutting and business rethinking that Verwaayen took on a few years later. So why did Svanberg succeed in 2003 ‘ when Ericsson delivered its first quarterly profit, in Q303, since 2000 ‘ while Verwaayen did not a decade later?

Some differences are obvious ‘ the bursting of the telecoms bubble in 2000 was painful but the global downturn was far less deep and prolonged during that period than during Verwaayen’s tenure; Ericsson had greater scale even after a massive restructuring by Svanberg which worried even hawkish investors with its size. Most significantly, Svanberg did not have to cope with a huge and disastrously executed merger, which tied two rocks together in the hope they would float. Alcatel and Lucent, which merged in 2006, had plenty of product synergies which should have delivered stronger market share and greater efficiencies. Instead, the necessary work of integrating the product lines, axing those which were no longer core, and implementing unified structures and processes was hardly addressed in the first two years, when the two sides’ technological and cultural differences were hardly helped by keeping both the respective CEOs, Alcatel’s Serge Tchuruk and Lucent’s Pat Russo, at the helm in an uneasy and ineffective partnership.

The dark legacy of the merger’s execution, combined with a global crash and the ensuing eurozone debt crisis, were a terrible base for a turnaround effort. However, Svanberg’s Ericsson, like ALU, teetered close to the cliff of bankruptcy, according to many analysts, in the early years of the century. One of the differences which is more specific to the two men and their respective approaches is also a factor here. Svanberg had a clear and far-thinking vision of where he wanted his company to end up, but on that road, he was an executor, with strong abilities in creating step-by-step roadmaps with clear goals, and picking effective lieutenants. Verwaayen is also a clear thinker, but has perhaps suffered from too much vision. He engineered a major turnaround at BT, which a decade and more after privatization was still behaving like a combination of a cumbersome, state-run bureaucracy and a gentleman’s club. He transformed not just the financial results but the culture and strategy, and the same multifaceted achievement was hoped-for at ALU. However, at BT he benefited from having one big idea ‘ that BT should be at the cutting edge of the move to all-IP networks, supporting a multitude of service providers and revenue streams on the back of its huge 21st Century Network project.

At ALU, he similarly came up with a far-reaching and ambitious vision based around big ideas ‘ making ALU a leader and enabler in key trends such as turning telcos into web players; converging media, IT and communications platforms into a single ecosystem; pioneering new networks to handle the coming surge of data packets. All these were correctly identified as vital issues for the operator customer base, and in many cases identified ahead of rivals. One of Verwaayen’s problems, though, was that the services and products based on these ideas would only really command a major percentage of most carriers’ budgets from 2014 onwards. Telcos are certainly investing in Telco 2.0 services platforms, applications ecosystems, greatly distributed access networks ‘ but in most cases, cautiously and without generating huge spend. Those which are at the cutting edge, in China, Japan and Korea, often partner extensively with local favorites.

For example, the flagship of the wireless business has been the lightRadio architecture, since that was unveiled two years ago. It reflects key trends to deconstruct the RAN, virtualize baseband processing, reduce the size of the cell site equipment, and eventually take all those changes and implement them in HetNets of small cells. But that is a five-year plan, at least, for most operators, and in the meantime, many continue to spend on dull old macrocells, network modernization schemes and managed services ‘ all areas where Ericsson and Huawei, while far less innovative in their vision of the next generation platforms, happily use their economies of scale to sweep up most of the business even at low margins.

Too much vision, balanced by insufficient pragmatism about the timescales for change, and unsufficent ruthlessness in the reorganization. That appeared stringent at first, but in fact the offload of non-core units, the reductions in headcount and the rationalization of business units has, with hindsight, looked hesitant and piecemeal ‘ and there is far more to come. The new CEO, whoever he is, will almost certainly be charged with putting his foot on the accelerator in reorganizing the company, cutting costs further and rescuing the balance sheet. Some of Verwaayen’s more visionary projects are likely to suffer, and perhaps ALU will be broken up altogether.

He may not have been as brave on the operational side as Svanberg was in 2000, but he brought impressive qualities to ALU, and those who have been calling for his head may soon find themselves with a severe case of ‘be careful what you wish for’. The likely route now is a negative one ‘ a shift away from grand medium term plans to reinvent the company, and a more pragmatic short term scheme to save its life, probably by tearing it apart or reducing it to a far smaller entity. One clear option will be to find a CEO who is skilled in breaking up large conglomerates whose size and diversity has become a liability not a strength ‘ whereas Verwaayen, despite a long string of divestments and cutbacks, had clung to the idea of keeping the heart of ALU, in carrier networks and services, intact. Insufficient ruthlessness in cutting costs certainly looks, in hindsight, like a failing, suggested last fall when Verwaayen significantly increased the operational powers of his CFO Paul Tufano and introduced more swingeing cost cutting plans.

His successor will have some stronger cards to play however. The cultural schism in ALU have been bridged, the wireless business ‘ once considered a strong candidate for sell-off ‘ is generating some growth, and the IP unit is performing strongly, vindicating the decision to take a converged view of the all-IP telco network.

The recovery plan unveiled in 2008 would almost certainly have delivered its results, perhaps slightly ahead of schedule, had the global crash not intervened. ALU posted its first ever annual profit a year ago. But while few could have foreseen the prolonged eurozone debt crisis, the company reacted too slowly to its impact, and clung to strategies which were too reliant on telcos increasingly their budgets rapidly for the broadband explosion to come. So hallmarks of the roadmap, such as ‘Telco 2.0’ services platforms, and an early leap into small cell platforms, pushed all the right buttons for carriers ‘ but even now are not taking a significant portion of their budgets. Ericsson’s Vestberg made similar points ‘ that operators are interested in the big ideas and the new-look networks, but until now, the Swedish giant’s revenue mix has been heavily skewed to low margin modernization and coverage schemes, rather than the more profitable capacity upgrades.

Ericsson sees that balance shifting from 2013, and ALU’s lightRadio and other platforms should start to come into their own. It may be too late to keep the firm intact. After making a profit in 2011, it crashed back into a $1.85bn loss for fiscal 2012.

It also reported a 2012 loss of €1.37bn, compared to a €1.1bn profit in fiscal 2011, on revenues down 5.7% year-on-year to €14.45bn. There were some signs of improvement in the fourth quarter, but the firm still suffered a €1.2bn loss and a 1.3% fall in revenue to just over €4bn.

Poor performance at the Networks division – revenues down 2.2% to €2.4bn – hit Q4, but there were better revenues from wireless, up 2.2% year-on-year to €913m. The strongest contributor was North America, where ALU has a role in most of the major 4G roll-outs, while Asia-Pacific saw double-digit decline. The strongest business unit was IP, up 26.4% to €574m on deals in the Americas, Japan and China, but Optics fell by 22%. Wireline sales declined 7.4% to €388m; the Software, Services and Solutions division was up 5.5% to € 1,38bn; and the Enterprise segment was down 3.7% to €207m.

A recurring failure has been improving the cash position, even when ALU has managed to turn a profit. ALU burned though €1.03bn in the first nine months of 2012, compared with €978m in the same period in 2011, and Exane BNP Paribas analyst Alexander Peterc told Bloomberg: ‘Alcatel-Lucent is now a balance sheet story. This is a first signal to shareholders ahead of a significant dilution of equity holders. Asset disposals would, likewise, strongly diminish Alcatel’s future cash generation.’ Although free cashflow was a positive €355m in the fourth quarter of 2012, it was still a negative €679m for the year.

So more drastic cutbacks beckon, though not under Verwaayen’s watch, though he has agreed to stay on until a successor is found. He will be seen as a CEO with brave vision and strong leadership skills, but who underestimated how difficult it would be to implement that vision during a global recession, and took his eye off some critical operational balls like cash and deep cost cutting.