Your browser is not supported. Please update it.

4 March 2008

Japan is scene of latest handset bloodbath; more to come

Nokia executives like to point out that their company has survived, in its long history, a Bolshevik revolution, Finnish civil war and the suicide of a CEO, but while this may have engendered a resilient culture, arguably none of these upheavals was as tough as the market challenges the world’s largest handset maker now faces. In order to retain its lead, it needs to respond to two key trends ‘ the rapid expansion of the market for ultra-low cost devices in developing nations, a trend that risks depressing prices across all economies; and the emergence of the most functional and sophisticated cellphones yet, masquerading as multimedia centers and miniature internet PCs. Driving both these movements, with the very different supply chains and economics each requires, and balancing their effects on revenue and profitability, is a difficult line to walk, especially when combined with a radical and high risk shift into software platforms and mobile internet services ‘ a business with a set of economics that is entirely unfamiliar to Nokia, and sets it against powerful competitors that would, in its hardware-only days, have been useful allies.

So far, the Finnish flagship has balanced these different demands skilfully, while leveraging its increasingly peerless supply chain to ensure solid growth in the core midrange handset business, and even to achieve decent margins in the ultra-low cost sector, where its market share is impressive even without cutting its prices as far as its rivals have, especially in India. Some of its success, of course, is also coming at the expense of weakened rivals. Motorola’s troubles have grabbed the headlines, but are just an extreme example of the general pressures the whole sector is under, and part of a process of consolidation that has already been going on for several years, and will see many of the current players disappear by the end of the decade. Like most mass markets, the handset sector will end up supporting two or three vendors with massive volumes, and a few specialists with niche but highly differentiated products, which might be an element of a more generalized portfolio (Apple being the obvious example). Size or clever features/brand ‘ one or the other will be essential to survival, and companies like Nokia, Sony Ericsson and LG are chasing both, as well as trying to play in the broader mobile media space too. Two areas of the battlefield will be especially interesting, and currently hard to predict ‘ the space where PCs intersect with phones, an area that now brings the notebook makers into the mobile battle, at least for high end user bases, as well as Microsoft and Intel; and the growing range of operators, whether lower tier players or those in developing economies, whose natural suppliers would be ODMs, but which are also being targeted directly by the branded majors in their bid for market share. For companies chasing the volume, the key challenge will be getting the economics right to address markets like India, as well as making what we currently call a ‘smartphone’ into a midrange, affordable device for the mainstream user in developed economies.

The latest shake-out is taking place in Japan, which has always been a peculiar handset market anyway because of the powerful influence of the major cellcos on R&D programs and economics. With western phonemakers more willing in recent years to work closely with operators, and even produce operator-specified devices, there has been less need for NTT DoCoMo, in particular, to stick to its usual suppliers and it has been working more extensively with Nokia and others, putting the homegrown industry under pressure. Japanese vendors like Sharp had high hopes that they could leverage the advanced experience of 3G that they gained through working with DoCoMo to expand abroad, but their success has been very limited. Sanyo recently exited the cellphone business, selling it to Kyocera, following the demise of its CDMA joint venture with Nokia ‘ Sanyo’s last real chance to achieve scale. Kyocera itself is under pressure, and while its Sanyo purchase gives it a better position in the fragmented home market, it has little visibility in other developed economies, outside of niches, and recently decided to pull out of China, dissolving a joint venture with Zhenhua. As well as the disappointment over Nokia, Sanyo also suffered greatly from Sprint Nextel’s troubles, as a year ago it supplied 40% of the cellco’s CDMA handsets.

The latest Japanese casualty is Mitsubishi, which has decided to exit the handset business. Its home market is an extreme microcosm of the cellphone industry, with all the problems magnified ‘ saturation; an operator shift towards buying globally; fragmentation between too many players in a sector that rewards volume. Sharp is the only native Japanese supplier with any real presence in its homeland, with over 20% share, while Panasonic and NEC generally command about 10%, generally seen as the minimum share required to survive in the sector (outside of high value niches). Others like Toshiba, Kyocera and Mitsubishi lack sufficient weight at home and have failed to make much impact abroad, unlike some of their Chinese counterparts, which despite crushing pressures in their home market, where Nokia dominates on 37%, are taking their strong economics to gain share in other emerging markets such as India. This trend has helped ZTE enter the global top 10 for the first time, according to IDC.

The most likely way for any Japanese vendor except Sharp to survive in handsets will be through mergers or joint ventures. Casio and Hitachi integrated their development in 2004 and NEC and Panasonic have been working more closely together, setting up a joint company to develop semiconductors and operating systems for mobile phones in 2006.

Mitsubishi says it expects a one-off loss of about ’17bn ($164m) on a pre-tax basis for the year ending on March 31, because of its decision. The company, which earns most of its profit from factory automation and auto components, expects ‘100bn yen in sales from its cellphone operations in the current business year, just 2.5% of its group revenue and involving about 2.1m units ‘ giving it global market share of under 0.2%. DoCoMo is now Mitsubishi’s only customer for handsets but has increasingly diversified its supplier list, buying from NEC, Panasonic, LG, Nokia, Sharp, Sony Ericsson, Fujitsu, Sanyo and Motorola.

Key casualties so far:
Alcatel (bought by TCL of China)
Siemens (bought by BenQ, which subsequently failed to sustain the business)
Sendo (bought by Motorola)
BenQ
Sanyo (bought by Kyocera)
Lenovo
iMate (of Dubai, following end of relationship with HTC)
Danger (acquired by Microsoft)
Good (acquired by Motorola)

Ningbo Bird:

Ningbo Bird of China is to sell its 50% stake in a joint venture with Sagem of France for Yuan 159m ($22.36m).

The Chinese firm set up Ningbo Bird Sagem Electronics with Sagem, the world’s sixth largest cellphone maker, in 2005. The joint venture had registered capital of $25.4m to develop and produce cellphones for domestic sales and export.

Li Fujiong, Ningbo Bird’s deputy general manager for marketing, said the share sale was a capital restructuring move that will not affect the company’s overall business. “It’s just an ordinary capital adjustment for us,” he said. “Our core business won’t be affected at all after the sale of our stake in the joint venture.’

According to the Chinese Ministry of Information Industry (MII), 548m cellphones were made in China in 2007, up 14% from 2006, but phone prices have dropped an average 85%.