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24 July 2015

Qualcomm needs to make radical changes, but not break-up

When markets are tough, activist investors become highly vocal, and in many cases, they are shouting for one thing – company break-ups. Often, they get their way, as seen at Motorola, eBay and others, claiming to unlock shareholder value and improve acquisition chances. The latest target is Qualcomm, which is under pressure from activist hedge fund Jana Partners to separate its licensing and chip divisions.

The fact that CEO Steve Mollenkopf is being forced to take this seriously shows how difficult the smartphone sector, Qualcomm’s main market, is right now, though it also highlights risks which are peculiar to Qualcomm, notably the antitrust investigations which are piling up round the world.

Qualcomm may have reached the end of the road in terms of its unique business model, and it will have to make some very tough decisions, both to disentangle its two main revenue streams and to accelerate its move into new markets which can offset the slowdown, and rising competition, in smartphones. But that does not mean it should break up entirely. That solution reflects purely financial, and very short term thinking.

Qualcomm is an engineering company, and only by thinking of the longer term impact of inventions – not just quarter-by-quarter figures – and plowing cash into R&D not just shareholders, has the wireless industry got where it has, in terms of technology leaps, profits and long term growth. As Google CEO Larry Page once said to someone presenting an MBA-based solution to a problem: “Go sit with the engineers”.

Yes, at the point of break-up, if estimates by analysts such as Arete prove correct, Qualcomm could see its chip division valued at $74bn and its patents arm at $87bn, well ahead of its current total market cap around $104bn. In the current frenzy of semiconductor M&A, the silicon arm might then be an attractive acquisition target for a rival like Intel, or it could be better placed to make its own purchases. But if both halves remained independent, for how long would they retain their new value? Qualcomm has delivered significant growth and value for shareholders over the years, and driven many trends for the broader industry, because of its combined model.

There are certainly aspects of that model which have made life hard for customers and competitors, and the current probes into business practices at the European Union, US Federal Trade Commission and others may rule that Qualcomm has overstepped the mark from aggression to illegality. Splitting off the licensing arm would help to appease those regulators and assure them that any bad behavior was firmly in the past. But Qualcomm would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater – in order to please activist investors and antitrust authorities in the short term, it would never again be able to achieve the success that has come from the crossover between product development and patents – both based upon its engineering excellence and huge R&D investment.

Those are the key to the argument, and make Qualcomm very far from being a troll. Yes, the IPR licensing and the chips should not be intertwined in the commercial sense, but at the R&D stage, it makes perfect sense to have two ways to monetize a huge engineering investment.

If Qualcomm is found guilty of accusations of bundling, giving better licensing terms to customers than non-customers, and other bad practices, it should use its plentiful cash to pay the fines and move on, as Microsoft and Intel have done in the past. It will have to change its practices, make its processes transparent, take the hit on licensing fees that will doubtless incur (as already seen in its settlement with China’s antitrust agency, which was more about lowering fees paid to Qualcomm than punitive fines). Qualcomm will have to change its licensing structure radically anyway, and adjust to the impact that will have on margins. It may not be able to resist Frand and patent pools forever as the industry moves towards royalties based on component, not device costs, and as 5G looks set to include more patents from the open world than from 3GPP.

But it will survive these transitions better if it maintains its inventions engine and allows it to feed both business streams in parallel. For a putative licensing-only company, generating patents in a vacuum is hard for engineers and the business model. Nokia knows this – its Techologies unit, which houses its huge IPR arsenal, is already developing real world products as well as filing for patents. InterDigital, once primarily a licensing business, is increasingly building platforms and spinning of companies based on its inventions. Even with the tightest of licensing arrangements between the separated Qualcomm units, they would lose creativity and commercial motivation. Or would the chip company retain most of the engineering and R&D, which would devalue the licensing arm and restrict its ability to grow in future.

Qualcomm has proven itself able to make significant change in the past, and even to attack its own sacred cows. It has open source activities now, notably the AllSeen Alliance, which shows it learning some lessons from Google about alternative ways to achieve market power. It has embraced the old enemy, WiFi, with the acquisition of Atheros. It will certainly need to be even more open to new thinking now.

In fact, break-up is not new thinking. Qualcomm itself filed to spin off its chip business in 2000. In those days, it feared that the semiconductor unit would be barred from licensing key patents, particularly in GSM, by licensing rivals. In fact, it succeeded in doing the deals it needed and called off the plan in 2001. In 2006, then-CEO Paul Jacobs was also under pressure to break up the firm, at a time when shareholders were nervous about the transition from technologies based on CDMA, in which Qualcomm had an IPR stranglehold, to LTE. At the time, Merrill Lynch calculated that a split would increase Qualcomm’s market value by about 13%. Jacobs acknowledged that the option was being reviewed, though he said “we hope to be able to keep the company together”.

His successor Mollenkopf is taking a very similar line, saying the firm will “review strategic alternatives” even though he has consistently argued that the two businesses are complementary and are, together, more than the sum of their parts. However, at Qualcomm’s announcement of its fiscal third quarter results, he did unveil significant moves to appease Jana and other investors.

Qualcomm is to kick of the review of its options and, in the meantime, make hefty cuts, totalling $1.4bn and including 15% of its workforce, or 4,700 jobs, the biggest personnel reduction in the company’s history. It will even pare back the famously large R&D operations, which keep Qualcomm at the cutting edge of mobile chips, but also generate most of its massive patent portfolio. The company said it still planned to spend $4bn on R&D this year, but would concentrate resources mainly on areas which could create growth and new business, particularly server processors.

In fiscal Q3, which ended on June 28, Qualcomm’s net income fell 47% year-on-year to $1.2bn and its sales were down 14% to $5.8bn, the steepest drop since the fourth quarter of 2009, when device sales were being hit hard by the global recession. This time, amid recovery in many key markets, the fall in revenues is harder to explain away. Excluding one-time costs, profit was 99 cents a share. Analysts on average had projected profit of 95 cents on sales of $5.84bn.

To make matters worse, Qualcomm’s outlook for the current fiscal Q4 also fell short of Wall Street expectations. Net income will be 51 cents to 76 cents a share on revenue of $4.7bn to $5.7bn, the firm stated – well below consensus Wall Street forecasts of 95 cents on sales of $6.13bn.

The chip giant is suffering from pressures in its core smartphone market as growth has shifted to lower end products, benefiting rivals from Greater China. It has also lost business with Samsung, one of its largest customers, as the Korean giant aims to rely more on its own chips. And amid antitrust investigations in several regions, Qualcomm is also facing major changes in its main profit engine, its licensing business, as 5G looms.

Mollenkopf pointed out that the cuts must be seen in the context of exceptional growth, averaging 20% a year, since 2010. At that time, the company was beset by prophecies of doom surrounding the shift from CDMA technologies, but by getting ahead of the curve in LTE modems and SoC designs, and by amassing IPR in the technology, Qualcomm rode the early 4G wave. It more than doubled its revenues in that period and almost doubled its workforce, from 17,500 to 31,300. “We had tremendous growth in both our business and employee base over the last several years,” Mollenkopf said in an interview.

It needs to get ahead of another curve, but that is likely not to be 5G, or anything to do with mobile devices. Rivals like MediaTek are closing on the US firm and the whole smartphone market is consolidating and saturating, leading to lower margins and fewer customers to chase. Some, like Samsung and Huawei, are bolstering their own chip capabilities; others, like Xiaomi, buy heavily from MediaTek and from up-and-coming Chinese companies.

Qualcomm has survived storms before, particularly because its engineering prowess remains so strong, but it will now need to apply that brilliance to less familiar markets, such as servers and the internet of things, where it will meet other powerful rivals, including Intel.

Mollenkopf may be forced to consider break-up this time around, but a bigger contribution would be a really creative way to deliver his pledge to refocus R&D on growth markets. Qualcomm needs to recover some of its past boldness, otherwise any restructuring risks just moving the pieces around the board without scoring a win. As Bernstein analyst Stacy Rasgon said, a break-up would “kind of destroy the company in its current form”, but added: “As a precursor to something else it might have some value.”

  • In return for the moves offered by Qualcomm, Jana has agreed to a standstill period in which it will not speak publicly about the chip giant’s plans, call shareholder meetings or increase its stake above 4%. In addition to the cuts, Qualcomm has made changes to its board, with three members due to be replaced by 2016 and another in 2017. Jana gets to approve the choice of a new independent director, yet to be announced. Qualcomm also reiterated its commitment to return at least 75% of the cash it generates to shareholders through dividends and buybacks, in addition to a previously announced $10bn repurchase program.