After the initial flurry of excitement over the bid made by Iliad, the parent of Free in France, for T-Mobile USA, we have calmed down somewhat.
At Faultline we like to think about things that would disrupt markets, not that it is all that pleasant if you happen to be one of the market players when that happens. And we were thinking that if a similar system to Free were to emerge in the US, in a market that is typically exceptionally fat with margin and where the customers have a high degree of discretionary spend, and where there is minimal competition ‘ things would change radically and overnight.
But there is many a slip betwixt cup and the lip, and the first thing to consider is whether or not such a deal will get done.
It needs to be at the right price or T-Mobile managers and shareholders will not let this deal through. It also needs to be a bid that is not equaled or bettered by Sprint, backed by its new parent Softbank of Japan. We now know that Sprint has decided to pull out of the bidding, worried about the regulatory issues, and so that won’t now happen.
Iliad’s run rate, on account of Free, is around €1 billion ($1.34 billion) per quarter, just over $5 billion a year right now and that is on the back of breakneck growth in mobile. Iliad has grown from 7.4 million mobile subscribers last September, to 8 million at Christmas and 8.6 million at the end of March. It has only grown 131,000 in fixed lines during the same time, to reach 5.7 million.
In France in net adds, it has taken 80% of all new net adds, which shows the extent of its disruption. Its revenue was up 10%.
The surprise bid happened about 3 hours after we went to press last week, when Iliad offered $15 billion in cash for 56.6% of T-Mobile US, a decent premium to the T-Mobile USA share price. This would likely put Deutsche Telekom, the T-Mobile owner, into a very similar position to that which Vodafone found itself in at Verizon Wireless, a minority shareholder without control.
The deal was to be financed by a combination of debt and equity and Iliad said it had the support of leading international banks for the debt and the equity portion would be approximately €2 billion which the company is good for.
But once the surprise was over, T-Mobile restored some calm to the market by saying that the bid was far too low, and rejecting it. Now that Softbank and sprint have pulled out of the running, it may be that it now regrets that rejection.
In March 2011AT&T offered $39 billion for T-Mobile USA, and the German parent was only too happy to take the money. It has now acquired a bit more spectrum and a bit more cash from AT&T in the course of that deal being turned down by the authorities, and it has acquired MetroPCS, but T-Mobile is in as bad a position as it ever was in the US, having to invest hard and work on its network with a heavy capex spend.
This deal values T-Mobile at far less than the AT&T deal, under $30 billion (despite some double talk from Iliad that suggested it was higher) and if anything those additional assets should have meant T-Mobile USA’ s value should have risen. But the market capitalization of T-Mobile US is down at $27 billion.
The truth is that ANY management team who has had an offer of $39 billion, is going to be uncomfortable accepting a much lower bid, but in this case they have two other reasons for feeling uncomfortable. Firstly the $3 billion in cash and the spectrum that T-Mobile got from AT&T should have inflated the company’s value, despite the fact that from the first day the AT&T deal was announced, customers voted with their feet. So until recently the company was losing subscribers.
Throughout the year it took to turn down that deal T-Mobile had roughly 33 million customers, in 2012 it continued to have 33 million customers and it had just begun growing and had reached 33.9 million customers when in May 2013 it added 25% to its size by merging with the 9 million MetroPCS customers, to put it close to 43 million subscribers.
That momentum has been continued with some aggressive marketing and a lot of network spend, and has resulted last quarter in T-Mobile claiming it now has 50 million mobile customers in the US ‘ so once again, why would its value have gone down, not up?
But the issue doesn’t stop at pure financials. Deutsche Telekom has always had a soft spot for France Telecom Orange. It has traded subsidiaries such as the Orange Netherlands business, which is now T-Mobile, and they have partnered on Everything Everywhere in the UK, where the two subsidiaries merged to create the market leader. Right the way across Europe there is hardly a country where France Telecom runs a strong Orange subsidiary where there is also a strong T-Mobile presence. There is mutual respect and a feeling of partnership.
It’s fairly obvious that despite gaining a heap of roaming revenue from Free in France, which has formed the basis of the Free cellular network, the existence of Free has long been a pain in the side of Orange, and it may well have communicated this to its erstwhile partner Deutsche Telekom. Free has harmed revenue growth among cellular operators in France and smashed margins ‘ simply by the combination of offering WiFi First connection and exceptionally low priced data connections.
By taking this to the US, it would empower Free beyond any other market. If T-Mobile in its current state can grow market share against the large operators AT&T and Verizon, then T-Mobile with some of the native aggression that Free has shown in France, would accumulate customers rapidly. But it would be an unholy culture clash, and existing T-Mobile staff would probably not enjoy the experience.
If it went on to achieve the same performance in the US as it has had in France, where there are only 72 million cellphone subscribers, and where Free has acquired 8.6 million customers in a little over 2 years, it might acquire some 36 million new customers in the larger US market in a similar time frame. To do that it would need to absorb around 4 to 5 million customers each quarter and if it did that with current market gains, every single other MNO in the US would have to lose market share, roughly 2 million between them.
Now we hear loyal Americans everywhere saying that their market is more aggressive and competitive than the rest of the world’s cellular, but the truth is that while Americans truly understand extreme competitive marketing, their margins are way too high to suggest that this really is a competitive market. People pay too much to businesses that are very rich already. The moment that someone who is truly disruptive enters this market and is prepared to take pricing to the floor, everyone will feel the pinch.
But there are a few important differences. First off Free has no WiFi footprint across the US and it has relied on that in France, where it has 5.7 million Homespots, to allow its customers cheap data plans.
Secondly, Free has not yet completed this deal and doesn’t have a government imposed, reasonably priced roaming deal in place and will have to rely on its own network. Of course T-Mobile, unlike Free in France, has a perfectly good network, so can cope. But then again, as we keep saying, it hasn’t bought the company yet.
As far as we can see, Sprint could not afford to allow this interloper into the market, because Free is a genuine predator and will come after Sprint customers. By pulling out of the bidding this week, it is showing how powerless it is in this affair.
But if Free wins at T-Mobile, Softbank will have failed in its original aim to become the ‘alternative’ cellular operator ‘ the underdog up against AT&T and Verizon, with good ideas ‘ because that role may fall to Free.
So what price T-Mobile? The $30 billion valuation is nowhere near enough in our view and that may put the price beyond the reach of Iliad, although whoever takes this prize will have the backing of all the major, rather gung-ho banks, to make this happen, a little like the Verizon Wireless buyout of Vodafone, so whatever it takes would have been offered to both Sprint and Iliad and Sprint has decided that regulatory concerns were more important.
The key to success in this market would be the general availability of WiFi. Comcast and its other partners in the Cable WiFi Alliance, will be making some 1 million planned commercial hotspots available, and Comcast alone says it will have access to 8.3 million hotspots, including almost 7 million Homespots, by the end of this year. You do not work that fast spending capex like water, if you have not already lined up your partners to help you pay for it and it looks to us that Comcast has always had it in mind to work either with Sprint or as an MVNO of Sprint, or without a cellular operator ‘ offering perhaps a WiFi Only phone agreement rather than a WiFi First deal.
WiFi Only has never been proven, and Cablevision in the New York area had a good go at making it a reality and failed, so we give less credibility to that idea.
The only other two ways to see this WiFi harnessed is if Comcast cuts a deal with one or more of the majors ‘ AT&T and Verizon ‘ which we understand is not on their current agenda; or Comcast cuts a deal with T-Mobile, which would perhaps explain why the urgency to buy the company has suddenly emerged.
Once one MNO works a deal with the cable initiative to offer WiFi First services, and they are marketed at breakneck speed, then AT&T and Verizon ‘ who’s WiFi capability is tiny compared to cable ‘ with AT&T having just 30,000 Hotspots and inferior homespot software and devices ‘ they will probably conceded defeat and begin to buy bandwidth from Comcast and pals.
So if there is a shortfall financially in securing T-Mobile, why wouldn’t Comcast make an investment in the company, to secure its direction. And it since it cannot now do this with Softbank, who outbid it for Sprint in the first place it might do this with Free.
In fact if Comcast stands idly by and does not stimulate the purchase of T-Mobile, then the WiFi First idea may never get off the ground in the US.
What can AT&T or Verizon do to prevent this? The answer is not much. There are regulatory issues if Sprint buys T-Mobile, but none if Iliad buys it. AT&T has already been told it cannot buy T-Mobile, so it cannot bid itself, and Verizon is still digesting the buyout of Vodafone’s share in its own network and any further action will be seen to leveraging too much debt. Classically a move like Comcast’s, which jumped in ahead of Charter to buy Time Warner, is the way to go ‘ for one of the majors to announce a merger that the regulatory will not approve, just to frighten off everyone else, and then let the regulator take a year or so blocking the deal. But we cannot see this happening this time.
We had expected, along with everyone else a counter bid from Sprint, followed by a raise in the bidding from Iliad, and perhaps another rejection by the T-Mobile parent, before the outcome is clear. With Sprint dropping out it simplifies the deal.
Meanwhile AT&T and Verizon will fire every weapon they have into the ensuing regulatory war, in order to preserve their market share and margins, but we feel there should be nothing that either of them can do, if Iliad comes up with the right money. There are perhaps more regulatory objections to Sprint merging with T-Mobile USA, which is perhaps why Comcast may choose to throw its lot in with Free and while Deutsche Telekom may risk upsetting Orange in order to increase the value of its US asset.
And of course if Comcast does not make an appearance somehow, either cutting an offloading deal of injecting cash, then the other likely player is Dish network, which still needs to find a home for its spectrum assets and a partner for its video services, although just what Dish brings to the party give the T-Mobile is spectrum rich, is unclear.