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2 November 2005

Slowing growth on DVD sales opens doors to new video markets

We wouldn’t call what the major content companies have been through recently ‘freefall,’ but one major note from Goldman Sachs which asks the question is this ‘The end of the golden goose?’ focuses on how DVD sales are going, primarily in the US.

The implication is that falling DVD sales are responsible for the 3% to 13% drop in the stocks of the big four US media conglomerates during the past three months.

DVD sales are falling right? Well that’s the impression we have all formed recently since figures came out for the first half of 2005, but actually they’re growing, just growing more slowly than recent years. Goldman thinks this slower growth will hit a wall in 2007, and then major content businesses have a big problem to solve.

Goldman is now predicting that all of the major media conglomerates but one, are going to falter as a result of this, suggesting downturns at News Corp, Viacom and Time Warner, with Disney the only major media stock that will escape the downturn. We think the reverse may be true.

First let’s paint a picture of the state of DVD sales at these companies. Each one has seen monumental growth over the past few years with 2003 witnessing overall unit growth of the DVD market of 51%, with last year being 33%. This year is depicted as a mere 10.2%. Interestingly, none of these companies experienced anything like that growth across the board, because not only are DVDs a small part of their revenue stream, but also unit prices appear to be falling (another mystery) and for every DVD sold, it is likely that this is one less visitor to the cinema, or perhaps a tiny incremental fall in the numbers of viewer watching a TV program.

So money added to the DVD pile, takes money from somewhere else in these companies’ empires.

Goldman reasons that in 2006 units sales may go up by as little as 1.2%, which could mean a decline in revenue as unit pricing falls, and in 2007 they will definitely go down, declining by around 8%, with revenue losses being even bigger, back down roughly in line with 2004 levels.

It must first be remembered that the 2004 revenue levels were extremely profitably to these organizations, so there shouldn’t be too much panic, but this loss of the media companies’ major growth ingredient has to be put into perspective against a box office slump and the inexorable shift in advertising from TV towards the internet, impoverishing one of their key customers, the TV networks.

If anything, the creation of films to a formula is being found out and the sameness behind almost all blockbuster films, and their reliance on special effects and animation effects has perhaps worn thin with global audiences.

Goldman Sachs says that the final outcome in terms of global box office drop away this year will be 10%, and although Goldman agrees it will continue falling, they say far more slowly through 2007. Here Faultline cannot agree. Media analysts the world over just do not comprehend the extent to which the business models of the last 50 years in media are being eradicated. Not only will box office not recover in two years time, but it will continue into savage decline for the next ten years or so, until the Cinema as a focal point of content, dies out completely.

Not to labor this point, but the only thing that has kept global cinema revenues up has been the roll-out of new cinemas in the Far East. This can be taken out of the equation for two reasons. One, that these same countries are the fastest growing consumer markets for things like DVRs IPTV and portal video players and two, these markets are rapidly building the infrastructure of their own content industries and will eventually fill the cinemas with local product.

The net result is that western films will reach growing competition in the cinema and need to be looking at new routes for content consumption in order to reach the same number of people.

So we think that Goldman is right about DVDs, but not nearly pessimistic enough about the future. And yet we still can’t agree with its final recommendations.

The next step in its torturous logic is analyzing out the individual effects on each of the major US media conglomerates, citing zero growth in their home video profits next year, a sector that accounts for about 26% of the annual profits for the combined companies historically. Goldman says that this will fall to 23% next year.

Goldman says News Corp is the most at risk because 30% of its profits come from home video, while Disney is at less risk because only 18% of its profits come from the DVD sector.

That’s pretty awful logic in its own right. A company like News Corp that is clever enough to grab a disproportionately large profit out of the market is probably clever enough to find new routes to market. A company that has a huge amount of DVD suitable material that cannot manage to get high enough revenues from a rising sector such as Disney, is being praised for its failure, which is being interpreted as its lack of dependence on DVDs. It’s simply muddled thinking and too simplistic.

News Corp’s Fox has done well at DVDs, so when the market falls away, perhaps it will retain more market share? Disney has done badly, so perhaps it will do even worse?

Time Warner and Viacom get 25% and 20% respectively of their profits from home video, and Goldman is predicting that only Viacom will see its home video revenue rise next year over this year, by a scant 1%. News Corp and Time Warner will decline 4% each, while Disney will drop 14%. All of which seems to back up our analysis, but in the end Goldman has recommended buying only one stock, Disney.

If Disney endures that drop uniformly, then it should lose 2.5% of its profits over the DVD downturn (a fall of 14% on 18% of total profits), whereas News Corp should lose half as much of its profits, 1.2% (4% of 30%).

In fact we think the whole idea of reaching any kind of conclusion about a business based on a sub-sector that generates under 25% of a corporation’s total profit, is a little suspect in the first place.

Debt reduction on what are hugely indebted companies have far more bearing than their DVD performance which can be swayed in a heartbeart by a sudden commercial success in broadcast TV or at the box office.

And Goldman does not appear to be taking in two key complexities within this market, first off the rise of new overnight markets like UMD sales to the PlayStation Portable or other routes to market such as through web portals and search engines, and through video iPods and the fact that TV DVDs are growing far faster than the sale of DVDs of motion pictures.

Perhaps the reason for Disney giving 5 of its popular TV shows to Apple to sell from iTunes is to ensure that Disney has some momentum behind reversing the fall away of DVD sales.

And looking down the top 100 DVD sellers at Amazon it’s unsurprising to find that four out of the top ten DVDs from TV series, led by Lost.

In fact there are at least four classes of new DVDs hitting the street, major motion pictures, motion pictures that were disappointing, major TV series and TV series that were cancelled after their first few episodes.

What often happens is that a film that people won’t travel to the cinema to watch on their only family day of the week, they are perfectly happy to order from Amazon and watch on a rainy Monday. Also the production groups behind TV series that are deemed to have failed, are anxious to recoup some of their costs and they try a DVD and are pleasantly surprised when they find that consumers liked the show, it was just that either advertisers didn’t or that not enough consumers liked it to attract advertisers..

So in part at least each company’s future success will depend upon its mix of TV versus Motion picture DVD releases. And Goldman says that DVD collections of television shows will now flatten down to just 7% of these companies’ profits with only Viacom the last to enter this market likely to show an increase. This doesn’t tally with what other analyst groups are saying about TV show videos which as recently as 2002 represented only 5% of the DVD business by revenue, but which last year rose to 18%.

There are increasingly other efforts, such as independent movies that don’t want to give all of their profits away to one of the big distribution arms, who go to 10 cinemas and then release on limited DVD runs. Later they get bigger DVD runs, encouraged by success.

These ‘failed’ efforts clog up the market and compete for money with ‘successful’ motion picture DVD releases which almost everybody has seen.

The new TV programs are also going through a phase of ‘Catch up TV’ mechanisms. If you missed an episode of ’24’ shortly you will have several options. Save it to DVD, or DVR and watch it later; find a friend that has recorded the missed episode; stop watching the series now and buy the DVD when it’s out; find a web version or an iPod version so you can catch up, or just forget about it. There will be more and more catch up TV, and we came across another one this week (see separate story) called Start Over TV that allows VoD viewers to begin a program again as long as they instigate it before the program has finished being broadcast.

It is these new formats, along with combating piracy and the revolution expected in video file downloads, that will see this market shatter radically. One source of DVDs are the back libraries of all films and all TV ever made. While these have long been considered dead, if media conglomerates create new online routes to market, each of these back catalogs are likely to create a groundswell in revenue big enough to more than compensate for the loss of DVD revenue.

Also Goldman Sachs is definitely ignoring the second generation DVD format which it sweeps aside by saying that next-generation DVD technology will have little upside in the near term, because the industry hasn’t settled on a single format. That’s just idiotic given that the industry HAS settled on Blu-ray. Also the penetration of HDTV viewing devices into the US is going to have a relevant effect, especially in richer households.

Goldman says that DVD player sales are flattening off so DVD sales will be weaker. This is anti-intuitive. The number of people out there with DVD players will rise from 73% of US TV households to 85% by the end of 2007. Surely that means that the existing DVD households will continue to buy at the same rate, and another 12% will join the party.

No, not according to Goldman, the early adopters already have bought their DVD libraries and won’t be buying any more films. This is once again nonsense. The great bulk of DVD sales are recent releases, and this isn’t going to stop, so collectors will continue to collect and early adopters will surge ahead into Blu-ray next year and off we go again, repeating the cycle.

The key thing here is the Long Tail effect. One or another of these media conglomerates will embrace the idea of putting the bulk of its older titles online before all the others. They will take a lead here and it will last. While they cannot go back five years and commit expensive DVD manufacturing resources to older programming, they can put it online and that will revitalize revenues on programming that was never going to be put on a DVD. It is this that has fuelled iTunes, at least in part.

In dollars terms Time Warner is expected to overtake Disney as the leader in home video sales this year up to $4 billion in revenue with Disney falling away to $2.9 billion, more or less in line with the other two, between them all accounting for $12.5 billion in DVD revenues.

Consumers spent a record $21.2 billion renting and buying DVDs in the US in 2004, according to a report from the Digital Entertainment Group, which means that 59% of US sales are made by these four companies.

The Digital Entertainment Group (DEG) launched by consumer electronics manufacturers, major movie studios and music companies to drive DVD adoption, also says that there are nearly 45,000 DVD titles available, and that 200 new DVD titles are released each week, totaling 10,000 annually.

The DEG says that the average price on these titles is actually rising, not going down and in the first quarter this year measured it at $21.51, up almost a dollar due to strong growth of multi-disc TV-on-DVD sets.

And it says that TV on DVD continues to be the fastest growing segment of DVD with releases up 42% in the first quarter 2005 over the same period last year. All of which contradicts the dismal outcomes that Goldman predicts.

Bottom line, the first of these companies to embrace multiple retail distribution models from online to portable player to mobile phone to DVD to UMD to Blu-ray, will keep their head of steam in video sales, and that’s what Goldman should have been looking for.