The numerous financial shenanigans this week by operators, especially the embarrassing situation Telecom Italia finds itself in, and the rumors surrounding News Corp and DirecTV, are all signs of the effect we have coined the Faultline, where neighboring businesses find themselves in violent competition to invade each other’s turf.
Telcos are having their main service, consumer voice, eroded by competition, and the result is that they have lost their identity. They want to be someone they are not. The same is happening in almost every other media and communications market, and it leads to companies doing unexpected things.
Telecom Italia wants to become a media business, and so do most other businesses in the operator world. The only difference is in strategy. It has become plain through genuine movement in convergence technology that the triple play that would provide fixed line operators with internet, voice and video revenues, can now extend itself to a quadruple play, involving mobile voice and perhaps mobile video.
The problem for Telecom Italia is that it cannot afford a transition into quadruple play, due to the fact it has overspent in times past, and now carries €41 billion of debt ($52 billion), against revenues of €30 billion ($38 billion).
That means it has already been a victim of the Faultline and its share price reflects that. It’s now departing Chairman Marco Tronchetti Provera, was faced with an impossible job. Pay down debt while retaining a credible position as a future media business. What most telcos would have done is sell off its overseas investments, such as those in Latin America, and today it has announced a deal to sell its part ownership in Turk Telecom for $500 million, almost the same day that it has purchased AOL Germany for €675 million ($855 million).
Could Telecom Italia retain a stronghold with both a mobile and fixed convergence play, solely in Italy? Probably, and certainly for a while, but it’s strategy instead has been to offer a hybrid IPTV service in France and Germany, using its Alice Home and Alice Box brands, and to supplant this with more AOL broadband lines in Germany. In its home country, a deal this week by Vodafone to partner with Fastweb, seems to undermine the home strategy of operating without a mobile player and the idea of putting Telecom Italia on the block. Italy will, after all, have its own quad play.
Instead TI wants to be an expanding, European wide, triple play, just as other operators such as Orange and Virgin and Deutsche Telekom, and shareholders, are focusing on a quadruple play and converged services.
We have said in the past that British Telecom is fantastically disadvantaged trying to bring a triple play to life with no mobile arm, and now Telecom Italia, which has all the necessary strands, finds that its debt stopping it from doing the same. BT responded to its high debt by doing just what TI wants to do now, selling off its mobile arm, a move that must be hugely regretted, however necessary it seemed at the time.
We have analyzed the Telecom Italia deal in detail in another story in this issue, but other deals announced this week are related to the same stampede for convergence.
Dutch telecoms group KPN said it will buy the Netherlands operations of Italian Internet service provider Tiscali paying €255 million ($323 million) for the privilege.
What KPN gets are 276,000 broadband and 126,000 dial up customers. What Tiscali gets is the opportunity to drop out of both the Dutch market and the German market, where its operations are also for sale, and spend the proceeds on a strong IPTV triple play in the UK, with its Homechoice acquisition, and in its home territory of Italy.
Again there is no fourth play, the mobile element, for Tiscali, but perhaps its doesn’t need one or can add one later.
The truth is that the underlying infrastructures of mobile and fixed communications ARE separate, except in the extremely new world of broadband wireless (only Sprint has voiced a strategy with four services delivered over the same wireless infrastructure).
So there are no fundamental underlying reasons why an MVNO, or partnerships with tier 2 and 3 cellcos, can’t be the basis of a quadruple play. So for Tiscali, and for Telecom Italia if it does succeed in selling off Telecom Italia Mobile, it may remain a viable strategy.
But although there are no technical reasons for having the same infrastructure, there are political and other dimensions to the quadruple play. Two organizations will squabble over who makes all the money. They won’t have economies of scale on content purchasing, they won’t be able to merge their content back end operations. They may run into regulatory issues.
So while it is reasonable for Tiscali to go cap in hand to someone like Vodafone and cut a deal either for an MVNO or for a package deal that includes all four services, this is only because it doesn’t threaten the mobile operators with its size or its market power. And any way it’s going to be tough for Tiscali to find a way forward, on its reduced footprint, once quad play economics begin to emerge. But it is an entirely different thing to give up a huge mobile brand like Telecom Italia Mobile and then try to build partnerships with what used to be your rivals, even with a company that will have virtually no debt. We can’t see Orange, Vodafone or T-Mobile falling for that one, because they either have, or are building their own quad play and anyone else is too small for Telecom Italia to partner with.
And similarly it is ok for Vodafone to cut a deal with Fastweb, because this will create the first quadruple play in Italy, using Fastweb broadband lines for the fixed portion of Vodafone’s service.
That service may compete with both Fastweb’s existing triple play, and with Telecom Italia’s potential for a quadruple play, but Fastweb wins out of it. It has only under 1 million customers, and it will gain access to the 24 million customers of Vodafone. So it has opted for a partner that can scale, despite the fact that it may end up competing with it. That deal is currently only about telephony, and converging phone services over wireless and fixed lines.
If Vodafone begins to offer video over the same lines, it might just as well buy Fastweb, and we would expect that to happen eventually.
In the UK, Vodafone felt a similar partnership with British Telecom was adequate and in Germany it has begun a convergence strategy with its Arcor subsidiary.
Quite clearly the way forward for Telecom Italia, given all of this, is to sell off the 22 million Brazilian customers it has, where it has no chance of any kind of fixed line play, to one of the stronger international majors, Vodafone, T-Mobile, Telef’nica, TeliaSonera and Orange, and use the money to pay down debt. That would halve its mobile buying power, but a true quad convergence play across large swathes of Europe would more than make up for this.
But there are more deals, both rumored and announced this week which show the effects of the Faultline. The Telecom Italia story has thrown up the fact that its Chairman was in secret negotiations with News Corp CEO, Rupert Murdoch, which some commentators think might buy Telecom Italia Mobile.
This is of course nonsense, just as the idea that Murdoch is about to pull out of its stake in DirecTV in nonsense.
Murdoch is a remarkable businessman and he would undertake neither move. He MIGHT sell Sky Italia to Telecom Italia, although we doubt it, as that’s where he got it from. He MIGHT sell content to a Telecom Italia business that has sold off its mobile division.
He is supposed to be disillusioned with DirecTV and the prospect of it acquiring a return path in the US so that he too can set up a triple or even quadruple play. John Malone of Liberty Media, a business with a substantially lower worth than News Corp is said to be stalking further ownership in News Corp and getting close to owning more shares than the Murdoch family. A poison pill has been put in place to defend against this, and yet the US national newspapers see Murdoch running scared from the US king of media.
But selling off DirecTV disadvantages his Fox properties, and his MySpace and other internet acquisitions and reduces his scale in content buying. DirecTV is also growing at a fast clip.
The fear of Malone is supposed to be so palpable that Murdoch will risk everything just to get him out of his News Corp ownership, and he is thought to be discussing swapping control of DirecTV in order to get those shares back under his control.
If any of that’s true, Murdoch would not be out in Italy buying a mobile company, instead he’d be in the US, at home, fighting his corner. It might be different if Telecom Italia was in the US, where it would make up a quad play, but it’s not.
It is a tricky situation with Malone but the value of News Corp would likely fall if Murdoch lost control and the wonders that he has worked at DirecTV, getting it into profit and building up a substantial cash surplus, would mean that its value would plummet if he were no longer at its helm.
A better strategy for him would be to buy Liberty Media shares and build a stake that would scare Malone into swapping shareholdings and force him on the back foot setting up his own poison pill shareholder agreement.
So here we have companies that no longer are sure what they are. We have one telco that wants to be a media company. We have one media company that is trying to buy control of a TV operator, and a TV operator that has big content interests needing the benefits of becoming a fully fledged telco, or at least an ISP, with an IP return path. And iin such an environment, anything can happen, most of it bad.