It doesn’t matter where you stand to look at the DirecTV swap in ownership that Liberty Media boss John Malone and News Corp CEO Rupert Murdoch have hammered out, it appears to be a disaster.
It seems to be bad for News Corp shareholders, bad for DirecTV as a competitor within Pay TV, and it’s likely to be the undoing of Malone in the long term. Perhaps, after all, it is some good news for TiVo.
The rationale for the deal appears to have been Murdoch’s acceptance that he cannot go on forever and his desire to leave his family firmly in control of New Corp. Malone threatened that by building up a stake in News Corp, which he has now swapped for the controlling 39% interest in DirecTV which News Corp held, which will be paid for from News Corp money, used in a buy back of Malone’s shares.
This is a deal that could not have happened without the dynastic pretensions of Murdoch, and it was done in the interests of his family, not all of his shareholders.
But that aside why do we think it is a disaster. The truth is that the last time that Malone ran a cable operator was a decade ago and he hasn’t got the marketing flair which has been infallible to Murdoch over the years. Murdoch has always known what content would sell and what wouldn’t whether it was putting a picture of a bare breasted woman on page 3 of a newspaper, or buying up important sports rights for TV.
The key things he has done at DirecTV are to rid the company of customers with low debt ratings, improve the service’s content, significantly drive up subscriber numbers, and manipulate the balance sheet to sell off assets and provide him the capital to do all these things.
His undoing, if there has been such a thing, was the failure to permanently drive down churn, always up around 22% per annum, representing the wasteful turnover of 3 million customers each year. If only he could have dealt with that issue, he could have made DirecTV so valuable that it would have been outside of Malone’s reach.
What Malone is known for is financial engineering, and he relentlessly pursued painstaking negotiations with holders in what was Liberty International and massaged it into the biggest cable operator chain outside of the US. Each deal took aggressive manipulation of minority interests over a three year period, until all of the non-US Liberty holdings were either sold off, or merged together into one profitable chunk now called Liberty Global, a separate business.
So that’s what everyone is expecting him to do once again, but he is going to find scant assets to move around now that Murdoch has spent the same three years fixing things up at DirecTV. It is a satellite TV operator pure and simple, no longer saddled with an unprofitable satellite operating business in PanAmSat.
The two unfinished moves that Murdoch has lined up which were supposed to further drive down churn were to commit to new satellite contracts to deliver 1,500 High Definition channels, which would give DirecTV a HD bouquet of nationwide and local channels throughout the US, and seek out a return path in order to create a triple play business. He is on track to deliver more HD capacity than any other Pay TV operator, so that will continue to work in Malone’s favor.
And we’ve all done the sums on the return path, and if Clearwire had been made the right offer it could have provided an ideal path in the form of a nationwide footprint of WiMAX broadband wireless. This would eventually lead to interactive advertising, and potentially localized advertising, and the ability to offer cheap VoIP and cheap broadband to the home. This would definitively drive up customer spend per home, and many people feel it would have driven down churn.
We happen to agree that it would have driven down churn, but by how much? In a world devoted to triple play, and now ready to move onto the quadruple play, involving mobile connection as well, service pricing risks going down in order to attract customers. But if, for instance, we look at Cablevision that was the first of the US cable operators to get its triple play plans together and offer genuine VoIP services, it has risen its ARPU to $100 a month from $88 a month, to the end of last year, while adding some 340,000 high speed internet customers and 510,000 phone customers in a year. It doesn’t publish churn figures, but if DirecTV could achieve similar figures it could have been expected to add something like 20% to its ARPU, and therefore its revenues, simply by offering a return path.
So why hasn’t it done it, and will Malone now go ahead with any plans to do this? Our thoughts are no. Malone is a financial whiz that will attack the issues at DirecTV from the balance sheet down, not the technology up.
He is more likely to try to merge DirecTV with EchoStar, and further strengthen its content. He has no desire to actually run DirecTV on a day to day basis, so unlike Murdoch, there is no real problem in merging it and letting the EchoStar management run the entire shooting match, something that might suit Charlie Egren at EchoStar.
The resulting merged operation might then be offered as a way out for one of the major telcos in the US, they could replace their IPTV efforts used in defense against the cable triple play, with a far cheaper hybrid that offers satellite TV and DSL delivered broadband and VoIP.
So far the Verizon FiOS fiber based TV and the AT&T U-Verse IPTV have been painfully slow to build out, so much so that AT&T has an interim back up plan called Homezone that already relies on EchoStar satellite TV.
EchoStar could have done a deal with AT&T, a long time ago if either were interested in a merger, so that appears a non-starter, especially if it involves the combined $30 billion market capitalization of DirecTV and the $17 billion valuation of EchoStar. A deal costing $47 billion is not the easiest to complete even for companies valued at $104 billion (Verizon) or $137 billion (AT&T).
It is bad enough getting regulatory approval, which was once denied back in 2002, for an EchoStar DirecTV merger, but getting further approval for merging an IPTV owner with the only remaining satellite TV player in the US, would be almost impossible. Under a new US government, more difficult still. So anything that Malone does will have to be at arms length with the US telcos, or risk unacceptable delays while awaiting approvals that may never come.
The telcos have already turned that proposition of arms length partnership down in the past, so the best that Malone can hope for is to merge with EchoStar, a move that will still leave him with a Pay TV service, with a high churn rate, which needs a return path. Unless he deals with that through a new route to the home, such as WiMAX, he will have a millstone around his neck.
Another of the problems that he would have to deal with in this instance is that of who is top be the set top supplier to DirecTV. It used to be TiVo and this was recently shifted to devices designed by News Corp subsidiary NDS, and put out to tender to major Consumer Electronics vendors.
Any merger between DirecTV and EchoStar would almost certainly mean that NDS was thrown out, not only as the set top supplier, but also as the conditional access supplier, potentially in favor of the joint venture that Nagravision has with EchoStar in the US. There is then the problem of outstanding litigation between EchoStar and TiVo that might be resolved by giving TiVo some of the combined pie.
So a DirecTV plagued by churn deficiencies, and without a return path for a triple play, leaves Malone with an almost impossible job on his hands of improving the DirecTV business, and its share value would begin to sag as soon as this became obvious to Wall Street that he had little weaponry, which so far has seen nothing but good in this deal.
For Murdoch, his long term ambition to own a pay TV operation in the US would be dashed, and there would be few options in sight to address this. Could he make a bid for Time Warner Cable, a business that Time Warner has consistently tried to float separately, and which filed its registration documents in October.
Interestingly Time Warner has to release a significant number of the TWC shares as it IPOs in order to pay for its purchase of Adelphia cable TV operations. That would amount to around 17% to 20% of the shares, worth $5.5 billion to $7 billion, and a move by Murdoch to take an intimidating stake in this IPO would make eyebrows rise.
If that’s not a good transaction for Murdoch, he will have to look for another, because after the deal with Malone, the Murdoch family will hold 40% of all the News Corp shares up from around 30%. This is probably too much. If other investors feel that News Corp is too closely held, they will depart in droves and there will cease to be enough of a market in the shares to sustain a high valuation. Although diluting his holding is what has taken Murdoch to the brink, he has to risk diluting it somewhat to retain interest from outside investors.
Liberty Media will also regain control of some regional sports cable TV channels that it had previously owned in Pittsburgh, Seattle and Denver, as part of the agreement with News Corp as well as acquiring the 38.6% of
DirecTV that News Corp owns.
But the deal will leave Malone stranded in a company that has a tough job to keep a lid on churn, and without the know how or belief in technology to cut the necessary deal with Craig McCaw’s Clearwire. Murdoch would be left with less leverage for his Fox assets, no pay TV in what is now his native US, and too tight a holding of News Corp stock.
Another option for Murdoch is to spend more time and money taking Fox onto an internet business model through MySpace and IGN Entertainment and to seek other purchases of that type, and forget forever about owning a Pay TV operator and transfer his entire business to the internet over time. In which case look for him finding a $2 billion to $5 billion portal target in the short term, post deal, future.