Sports broadcasting, the engine that drives pay TV and to some extent all commercial TV, is subject to the same disruptive forces and stresses as the whole video industry during the march towards IP based Internet distribution. In this three part series we examine the upheavals affecting sports broadcasting as the value of rights to premium live events continues to escalate way ahead of inflation, while the number of sports channels goes on rising. We will aim to define the shape of sports broadcasting in years to come and in this first part we set the scene and then drill down into the issues facing the major sports broadcasters themselves, such as ESPN, Fox Sports and Eurosport.
Sports has been driving pay TV almost since its outset and has also been a huge competitive factor for commercial broadcasters in their battles to attract eyeballs and in turn advertising revenues. In return, TV has had an equally profound impact on professional sport, driving a global industry now estimated to be worth around $600 billion a year, according to a study of sports teams, leagues and federations by A.T. Kearney. This grand figure includes everything to do with sport at all levels from grass roots up to global events like the football world cup, including infrastructure construction, sporting goods, licensed products and live sports events.
The sports events market itself, defined as ticketing, media and marketing revenues for the major events, is currently worth about $80 billion by our estimate, extrapolating from 2009 figures provided by an independent study commissioned by Lagard’re Unlimited, taking account of the inflationary growth in sports TV and associated revenues since then. That study itself highlighted how the global sports industry is growing much faster than national gross domestic product (GDP) around the world, a trend which again has continued and been amplified further since then.
The value of sports broadcast rights is set to increase 14% year on year to $25.6 billion in 2014 from $22.5 billion a year earlier, substantially up on the average 5% growth rate prevailing between 2009 and 2013, according to business advisory firm Deloitte. It also greatly exceeds the anticipated 4% rise in global pay TV revenues for 2014, which itself shows how major operators and broadcasters are now paying effectively above the odds to seize major premium rights in the bid to retain or gain market share and squeeze out smaller competitors. This has led to bidding wars that have stoked up the price, for example between BSkyB and BT over rights to both English Premier League (EPL) and Champions League football.
The overall premium sports market is very skewed towards a few blockbuster sports and is becoming even more so. Football, still referred to as soccer in the US to distinguish it from the NFL (National Football League), which is still much more popular there, is the number one sport with global revenues of $28 billion in 2009 and set to reach $40 billion in 2014 given the rapid growth in rights payments since. This was almost as much in 2009 as the combined total of $32 billion for all US sports, including the big three of NFL, basketball and baseball, plus the National Hockey League, tennis, golf and Formula 1 racing. Although there are no figures to confirm this, it is a fair bet that football has since closed that gap has now overtaken total combined US sports by now, given the rise in value of the rights packages sold in Europe. Rights for the most valuable football league, the EPL, went for £3 billion ($5 billion) for the three seasons currently running, that is 2013-14, 2014-15, and 2015-16, up 70% on the £1.75 billion for the preceding three.
Some comparison with the US can be obtained by looking at the lucrative NFL, with the major networks Fox, NBC and CBS currently paying around $3 billion a year collectively over the period 2013 to 2022, compared with $1.93 billion a year over the preceding 10 year period. This is a 60% rise, but over 10 years, compared with 70% over just three years for the EPL.
It is worth taking a glimpse at two of the A.T. Kearney charts to illustrate the relative revenue contributions of the key sports, even though they are for 2009 and have one or two flaws. The first one gives global revenues, while the second gives some idea of regional breakdown and also relative growth rate.
Since those charts were compiled, football has increased its share of revenue further, so would show up as an even bigger blob on that second chart. Rugby is an interesting case, since it would not have been singled out as a major sport a few years before that. It is still confined largely to six nations in Europe and three in the southern hemisphere, being the national sport only in New Zealand with a population of 4.4 million, but has nonetheless gained steadily in popularity ever since the sport’s inaugural world cup was held in 1987. Each world cup since has attracted growing numbers of second line nations into the event, with Russia for example participating for the first time in 2011. As a result rugby is now the world’s fastest growing sport and the A.T. Kearney chart fails to recognize its growing presence in Latin America, notably Argentina, as well as expanding TV revenues in Asia-Pacific from Japan but especially Australia, New Zealand and Oceania.
The other omission from that chart is cricket, largely because TV revenues have really exploded since 2009 on the back of its fanatical following in India with its population of 1.24 billion. Revenues mushroomed after the formation of the Indian Premier League (IPL) in 2007 involving a new short form of the game called 20/20 because it involves just 20 six ball overs, or 120 balls in total, per side, more suitable for TV because it lasts only a couple of hours. Now IPL TV rights are worth around $100 million a year and rising, so that coupled with sponsorship and advertising earnings means cricket is very much on the radar screen as a global sport, even if its popularity is confined to countries of the former British Empire.
Nevertheless there are still only five major players in sports from the perspective of TV and while all of those have global reach, revenues are highly concentrated geographically. Football is the only big sport that could be called truly global, but even that attracts relatively small interest in India and despite its passionate following in Latin America, 80% of TV and other revenues come from Europe by most reckonings. Revenues from the other four major revenue earners, NFL, basketball, baseball, and national league hockey, are concentrated in North America.
Tennis, golf and Formula 1 are the other three key sports and these do have almost global reach, but in revenue growth are being outstripped by the ‘big five’ especially football (soccer). The big five therefore loom large in the strategies of major sports broadcasters, including those few hybrid operators such as News Corp (21st Century Fox) with its Sky properties, which offer pay TV services as well as making content available through third party outlets.
But it also worth emphasizing that rights packages associated with the big five only account for around 6% of overall sports revenues around the world, although at the same time a much higher proportion of total TV sports revenues. This gives us an important clue over one of the trends in sports broadcasting not so widely acknowledged, which is the growth in transmission of second line and also local events, particularly in the US but also increasingly Europe, encouraged by the OTT revolution.
So TV could start looming larger for these smaller sports. For the big ones it has become center stage in a sport’s value chain that is built around four pillars that are increasingly interlinked. These are the properties, such as the leagues or events themselves, the teams and the players; the events, from individual matches to major extravaganza such as the Olympic Games and World Cup; rights for TV, media and marketing, which now drive the revenues that were once dominated by receipts at the stadium gates; and the video content that is packaged and distributed in various ways, subject to those rights.
TV binds all these together and increasingly influences both the properties and the events through the rights. In Spain football rights for the top division, ‘la liga,’ are allocated on a per team basis rather than aggregated across the whole division, which has had the effect of concentrating money and therefore power in the hands of two leading clubs, Real Madrid and Barcelona. They now take $380 million of the total $1.03 billion earned by the 20 clubs annually, which is almost triple the amount that the next biggest clubs Valencia and Atl’tico Madrid receive, and ten times that of the lowest ranked clubs in the division like Rayo Vallecano.
This has had the effect that the league has become less competitive, with nine of the last 10 league titles having been won by Madrid or Barcelona. Most recently this has been reflected in declining audiences and therefore TV revenues, along with an exodus of star players to the EPL and German Bundesliga in particular, given that they cannot all play for Real Madrid or Barcelona as many would like to.
These problems have been compounded by the Spanish economic slump that has only recently bottomed out, with the implication for the commercial broadcasting and pay TV industry that sport has become more than just its biggest cash cow, but an integral part of the business that needs nurturing and managing judiciously. It is true that the allocation of Spanish football sports rights was determined by the league itself, but increasingly major broadcasters are playing a key role. That was seen in the UK in the case of the Portsmouth pub landlady Karen Murphy, who tested the TV rights situation by broadcasting EPL matches received from outside the UK via Greek satellite broadcaster Nova, avoiding payment of around $10,000 a year to BSkyB. In that case the EPL joined forces with Sky to pursue the pub in court.
While that UK case had no immediate impact on sports broadcasting it helped open the whole Pandora’s box of rights, leading to regulatory threats to the lucrative business model. It emerged in November 2013 that the European Commission was poised to pick up the baton from the Murphy case by launching a formal anti-trust investigation into the way European sports rights are allocated, with the implication that it could end up acting against the division on a country by country basis and insist on EU-wide packages. We will discuss the unfolding rights saga later.
For the moment premium sporting rights are at the center of battles for viewers in North America and Europe in particular. As we have seen the battle is not just for immediate revenues, since a number of broadcasters are actually riding losses and using sports to build up their pay TV subscribers base. It is also playing an increasing role for providers of triple or quad play services in attracting subscribers to broadband, which is seen as crucial for the future of all entertainment, communication and digital home services.
Yet the trend is similar for major sports broadcasters. The perils of losing sports rights, especially when the whole business hangs largely on one particular package, was aptly demonstrated by the collapse of Irish sports broadcaster Setanta in June 2009, following loss of EPL rights to ESPN. This left many of the network’s 2.5 million UK viewers, who had paid up to $20 a month to watch EPL and other football matches, without compensation.
ESPN itself has been a dominant force in US sports broadcasting, but like Sky in the UK has faced a new challenge from a well-armed competitor, in this case Fox Broadcasting, owned by 21st Century Fox (previously News Corp).
Fox Sports was actually formed in 1994 with its acquisition of rights to NFL games, but distributed purely via third party pay TV operators. Then in August 2013 Fox launched its own channel Fox Sports 1 as part of a concerted move to take on ESPN and its $9 billion a year business. This was the biggest cable channel start up in history by audience size, being available at a stroke to 90 million US homes, and followed smaller moves by CBC and NBC in this direction towards distributing sports content directly to subscribers and their home DVRs. Crucially it came after a period of aggressive rights acquisition to ensure it hit the ground running and at the same time undermine ESPN’s market position. This included NFL, Major League Baseball, Pac-12 Conference and Big 12 Conference football, Big East Conference basketball, soccer matches including the UEFA Champions League, UEFA Europa League, and CONCACAF Champions League, UFC mixed martial arts, and a variety of motorsports events. It also included future US rights to the FIFA World Cup from 2018 onwards, meaning that this year’s 2014 event in Brazil will be the last time ESPN holds these rights.
This came at a time when ESPN had been agonizing over online, like a number of other sports broadcasters. This is all about timing really. ESPN knows that broadcast distribution and access are migrating towards the Internet and is also aware that in the US the traditional pay TV market is saturated, with zero net subscriber growth or even a marginal decline over the last few years. It needs to establish a position and begin to build online revenue, but in such a way that it minimizes the immediate impact on revenues from traditional pay TV distribution.
This is actually a story that has been running for almost 13 years, ever since 2001 when ESPN launched its first broadband service. This failed to gain much traction at the time, because of poor quality and lack of premium live content, but by 2010 broadband bandwidth was much higher and at the same time native US pay TV growth had ground almost to a halt. This had the dual effect then of making both ESPN and the operators wary of rushing into online for fear of turning a trickle of churn into a torrent. Out of this the WatchESPN App was born, launched on mobile devices in April 2011.
The original broadband service, by then called ESPN 3, could be accessed through the new app, but live TV events were phased out. Instead it became a conduit for thousands of events the company owned rights to but weren’t popular enough to be worth distributing via national or even regional TV, such as cricket and collegiate gymnastics. During this time ESPN has enlisted some colleges to handle production of their own events, to expand offerings while keeping costs down, heralding a significant development in online TV, towards proliferation of niche broadcasting, serving micro-communities defined either by geography or interest, or often both.
ESPN 3 then can be accessed without a pay TV subscription in most markets, with ESPN having been careful to avoid presenting it as an option for cord cutters. Even now its impact has been quite limited, for although it has been downloaded over 25 million times, its viewership remains far below TV’s. Around 26 million people watched college football’s national championship game on January 6th 2014, but only 773,000 viewed it online via WatchESPN. The fact is that WatchESPN is gaining ground as a way of watching lesser college matches at a local level rather than the fewer national events.
In the UK BSkyB has been bolder, having followed up its Sky Go OTT service confined to existing customers with Now TV in February 2012 aimed at non-subscribers, starting with movies and then following with sports in March 2013. Sky calculated it could afford to start introducing a stripped down service online, or rather it could not afford not to at a time when its rate of subs increase was slowing fast. The service is available on PCs, Macs, as an app on iOS devices, selected Android phones, Xbox 360 and PlayStation 3 consoles, as well as YouView and Roku set tops. It streams at up to 720p resolution depending on the playback device, using adaptive bitrate streaming. Sports access is via a £10 day pass that has typically proved attractive on days when there are two or more premium live events being shown.
ESPN will be far more concerned with what its rival Fox is doing with online, having launched its app for its online service Fox Sports Go at the same time as bringing out the Fox Sports 1 channel in August 2013. This is being previewed for the Super Bowl NFL title game on February 2nd, allowing users to access content on the day on iPads and desktops, but not smartphones except via subscribers of the NFL Mobile from Verizon service.
Fox is still tying the online service to a pay TV sub, so ESPN may be relieved there is no breaking ranks here. The Fox Sports Go service is currently accessible only to subscribers of six pay-tv providers, Comcast, AT&T U-verse, Cablevision, Suddenlink, WideOpenWest and Midcontinent. The business goal for now then is to try and attract more pay TV partners and use the app as leverage to push up carriage rates. But it is also about generating new ad revenues, since Fox is selling the digital inventory separately from the linear feed.
ESPN meanwhile is trying to exploit its app to help broadband operators attract customers to high tier services by offering ultra HD versions of its sports content. This highlights how premium sports will be the main driver for ultra HD, just as it was for original HD at 720p or 1080i resolutions.
While the likes of ESPN, Fox and Sky are competing in the premium live content arena, there is another category of sports broadcaster playing just beneath the pinnacle of sporting rights and trying to carve out leading positions on a continental or even global basis. A prime example here is Maryland based Discovery Communications, better known as owner of Animal Planet and TLC channels, but which decided to move into sports, starting with the $170 million acquisition of a 20% stake in Eurosport in December 2012. Discovery is now increasing this to a majority 51% stake with the possibility of buying the rest should the previous owner, Societe Television Francaise 1 (TFI) decide to exercise its ‘put option’, which is the right for the owner to sell stock at a given price.
Discovery was attracted by the fact that Eurosport was no longer just a European sports broadcaster, now reaching 133 million homes across 54 countries in 20 languages. The European version reaches 69 million households in 51 countries, while Eurosport Asia-Pacific reaches a further 16 countries there.
Eurosport does not generally compete for the ultimate crown jewels of sport, which within its territory really means just the major football leagues in their own countries plus the Champions League. It does however have a spattering of good football rights for non-primary events or markets. It also has a large collection of second tier, but still highly popular events, such as the Tour de France and also tennis, with rights to both the French and Australian Opens in many markets. On top of this it covers various niche and extreme sports, making the total package appealing to sports junkies, sometimes as top ups to premium packages, although it is bundled in the basic offerings for many pay TV operators. As a result, Eurosport appears to have had modest success selling its standalone online service available, unlike the main TV offering, without some pay TV subscription, with two options. One is the Crowd Pass for around $10, allowing users to take subscriptions just for a month with no commitment, and the other called ‘The Sports Fan’ for more like $7 a month with a minimum commitment of a year.
Now that Discovery owns Eurosport it will be interesting to see how and when it makes a play in the US market, aiming to extend the rights it has acquired, probably starting with some niche offerings. It will probably call itself Discovery Eurosport in Europe and just Discovery elsewhere.
Other aspects of sports broadcasting in the context of going online include the social networking dimension and the challenge of capturing ever larger numbers of events with limited professional filming and edited resources. This will be discussed later in this series.