As with every other merger that creates a monster, a large, unwieldy, overpowering bully of a company, the friendly merger under which Comcast will buy Time Warner Cable is being sold on the same grounds which should be cited to actually deny it.
This week Comcast listed the reasons why it believes the deal is in everybody’s interest in its Public Interest Statement and they are net neutrality, TV service pricing, content diversity, broadband pricing and customer service.
As we said before, those same reasons are the very ones which should prevent Comcast from being allowed to merge with Time Warner Cable ‘ a threat to net neutrality, higher TV pricing, content stagnation, an end to broadband price falls and customer service that is already weak through lack of competition.
There has been something tugging at our memory ever since this deal was announced – Faultline can remember in 2003, after Comcast acquired AT&T Broadband to become the biggest cable business in the US by some margin, it told John Malone, then CEO at Liberty Media, that it was changing the terms on its Starz deal. Not many people can claim to have pushed John Malone around, but Brian Roberts, Comcast CEO is one of them.
There were two sides to the argument ‘ Liberty Media had cut a sweet deal with its in-house cable business, just before selling it to AT&T. Once Comcast inherited the deal, it preferred the terms that it had negotiated with Starz itself, and so imposed them on AT&T Broadband, and began short changing Liberty by around $200 million a year. It was a ‘de facto’ reduction which said ‘We are now your biggest customer, can you really afford to upset us?’
You can argue that Comcast was simply correcting the sweet terms that Malone had laid out prior to selling his cable operation to AT&T, but while Malone’s public argument with Comcast CEO Roberts was widely reported, the ‘renegotiations’ with all the other smaller content companies were barely mentioned, but Comcast continued to enjoy a lot of economies of scale there and in the process made a lot of enemies in the content world. Now is their chance to be heard.
Content owners have long memories and we can imagine that those memories are pouring out bleeding heart stories to anyone at the Justice Department, the FCC and the US Senate Judiciary Committee, who will listen. To the man in the street, it makes little sense. One rich company is claiming that another, richer company made life a little less profitable, and it’s hard to care about it. But these things never happen in isolation, and if Comcast and Time warner Cable merge, then there will be a similar blood-letting among content owners, except of course NBC Universal, which had its terms set, almost at arms-length by the merger condition imposed on Comcast when it acquired the studio.
Those content owners either simply make less money in total, or they charge other, less powerful groupings more for their content to make up for it.
Comcast might say that if it has more negotiation clout, it can in fact acquire content more cheaply and therefore have less need to raise prices, as it has done incessantly over the past decade or more ‘ always above the rate of inflation. But of course it is also saying very publicly that it will NOT actually lower prices.
What this fails to explain is that smaller cable companies could be hit harder with price hikes from the same content companies, making them have to raise prices by even more and hurting consumers. Then the new Comcast can afford raise its prices under that rising umbrella of US wide content costs.
If behavior after previous mergers is anything to go on, Comcast will ruthlessly exploit its scale advantages to harm consumers.
There is an old saying about carefully defining your competition, and in its statement Comcast is carefully picking who it should compare itself with. This graph on market capitalizations has nothing whatsoever to do with what the merger will mean to consumers, but it is Comcast saying, ‘Look we’re not that big, Apple and Google and Microsoft have huge market capitalizations, which mean they have access to money, and Google may well come after our business. Poor us, we need to be bigger.’
It also subtly says that cable companies like Comcast are not valued highly because their future is under pressure from Over The Top players like Netflix. It wants us to accept that the traditional boundaries between media, communications, and technology are obsolete and that it is in competition with everyone. In so doing it wants to define the market as anyone that provides a multi-channel video business.
You can imagine the same arguments being use with an extension of this graph but used by Dish and DirecTV, with Dish valued at some $27 billion and DirecTV at $40 billion, they look far smaller than Comcast, and would argue that they too need to huddle together for warmth against the might of the companies higher up the table.
And yet the gorilla on the block, Apple, found that it was too poor to negotiate the rights to full existing TV channels, when it tried on numerous occasions to set up against cable, so much so that it has been forced to go and sit at the foot of Comcast, to offer its devices for consuming pay TV. Before Apple, Microsoft went down the same route and recently Intel foundered on the same deal (and it’s market cap is $133 billion), selling the resulting deals off to Verizon, which has yet to launch anything. You might ask why these massive businesses are unable to compete with Comcast?
If Comcast as is, says to a content provider, ‘If you sell this to Apple, we can’t continue to sell this content,’ then about 30% of that content owner’s revenue will evaporate, so it cannot do such a deal. And if you can hold out against Apple and Intel when you are Comcast’s size, how much better will you control the content market when you are 50% bigger.
So on content issues alone, interested constituencies might want to deny this merger. But when you add in the other issues, that Comcast already treats customers with disdain, that it overcharges them, and makes a fortunes out of Broadband pricing (cable broadband pricing has stopped falling per Mbps, despite the underlying equipment and line pricing falling all the time), and Comcast has in the past shown a disregard for Network Neutrality issues. It claims on the Network Neutrality front that it is the only MSO that takes it seriously, but what that actually means is that it used to block VoIP traffic and an FCC intervention was necessary, and so it is bound over to take it seriously or take the consequences.
In the 2004/5 timeframe Comcast executives were equally derisory about the concept of Net Neutrality as those are today at AT&T.
The question remains for the Justice Department what exactly should it do about this situation? There are a wave of global consolidations going on in cable and cellular. That does not mean that they are all in the interest of the consumer. What the authorities are bound to try to achieve is a fair market, and that means one with competition. In fact Comcast’s success came about because the US government failed to intervene in the competitiveness of its Telcos.
Back in 2006/7 AT&T and Verizon simply refused to invest in broadband until the US government ruled that they would not have to share their broadband lines with CLECs. An FCC ruling which said that fiber which ran close to the home would not have to be shared, flew in the face of all global experience on how successful unbundling the local loop had been and then they began to invest with impunity.
Today, largely as a result of this lack of investment by US incumbents, Comcast has 20.7 million High Speed Internet lines and Time Warner Cable some 11.1 million, so that the converged business would have 31.8 million of the 95.2 million broadband lines installed in the US, or 33.4%. Certainly that is dominant enough to dictate broadband pricing throughout the US.
Throughout successive US governments the failure to prevent merger after merger in the Telco space, shows how the US produce less competitive markets in both cellular and in broadband. None of the US providers have managed to buy into overseas markets in either of these areas. This is because their returns would not have been anything like the huge institutionalized returns that they could get in the uncompetitive US, and so their shareholders would vote such deals down.
In the long run that will not do US business any favors when Chinese companies break out of their native markets and come up against US operators.
But the authorities do not have to do much. Look at what happened in the AT&T T-Mobile USA merger. Simply by blocking that deal, it shaped the US cellular market, and it will eventually achieve its aim of three major competitive US operators that have nationwide reach, out of today’s four. Okay that may require a merger between T-Mobile and Sprint before that it is achieved, but that now looks imaginable.
The Justice Department does not have a duty to co-ordinate the process of creating a competitive market, only preventing one that is uncompetitive. To pervert a famous paraphrase of Sherlock Homes, ‘When one merger possibility is shown to be uncompetitive, what you are left with is the truth (or the right deal).’
If we go back to how this all came about, Time Warner Cable was forced into a content negotiation corner by CBS, and as CBS blacked out for a few weeks, it began to shed customers, making its management look out of touch. It takes a long memory to realize that CBS was dumped by Viacom in 2006, because broadcast TV was thought to be a basket case, and it was bringing down the Viacom share price. But 8 years on, the great exodus of talent out of the US Movie industry into TV series, has now made CBS once again, essential viewing, on whatever platform.
The knee jerk reaction has been to regulate against how such content negotiations are conducted. Content is too strong suddenly. But the other way around things are far worse. We don’t yet know what Verizon will do with the NFL mobile sports right it has purchased, but it has been rare for a single pay TV operator to buy sports rights in the US. But we can imagine that a company as large as Comcast would become could change the face of sports rights ownership in the US overnight, triggering a drift from broadcasters to pay TV operators. The larger pay TV operators get, the more sports whey would take. Would a merged Comcast not be in a position to take out ESPN? Maybe?
In fact you could also argue that Internet content has been almost killed by the existing pay TV operators, using existing rights to create TV Everywhere strategies that are really hard for anyone new to compete with ‘ again this idea of content control by pay TV. The consumer would have enjoyed many more Netflix-alikes if Comcast had not pioneered Xfinity, with virtually no increase in its content costs.
We also have to look at the future. If every time any cable operator was approached for a deal, as Charter approached Time Warner Cable for a deal this time, it was to run to Comcast and merge with it for shares, then continued consolidation in the cable sector would move towards a single, dominant supplier. If Charter was to merge with TWC, this would not happen, and instead there would be a couple of islands of two dominant players ‘ retaining more content diversity, and posing less of an outright threat to broadcasters.
So if the Comcast deal goes through, the US broadband community looks very like the US cellular community, uncompetitive and in too few hands ‘ making tons of money at the expense of the consumer. If it doesn’t, then it may end up with two telcos and two cable groupings dominating broadband, which is far more healthy.
Comcast has now also filed its Hart-Scott-Rodino notification with the Department of Justice. This is the 1976 Act which built on the original Clayton Act anti-trust foundations. It prevents mergers going ahead unchallenged that create monopolies or skewed markets.
Among its comments it says it will move more consumers to faster internet, and offer more bundles, it will move more people onto its Xfinity TV Everywhere, its legal position regarding Net Neutrality will extend to Time Warner Cable and it will have a unified strategy and time scale to shift to all IP video delivery.
Presumably after it has cut it combined content bill by a few tens of percentage points, it will be straight onto the phone to Netflix to say that it has to pay Comcast even more to attach to all Time Warner Cable customers as well as Comcast customers, to the Netflix CDN. And its next call may be to its set top providers to cancel orders at one price and negotiate orders at the best rate that either MSO had previously received, in higher volumes. Oh, and of course, through movements like RDK, the margins will slowly be squeezed out of these businesses, making them globally less competitive.