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18 August 2011

The Google-Motorola deal is an iceberg ‘ 90% of it is not visible – yet

We have read much of what people have offered up as their First Take on the Google Motorola deal, and little or none of it makes much sense. That’s because there is an inherent contradiction in the deal, namely Google ownership of hardware. We think it will fix that in the not too distant future, so this is a bit like piloting the Titanic ‘ 90% of the danger (iceberg) is under the ocean ‘ as key elements of this deal are, we believe, being left unsaid.

Google needed to protect Android. This deal may seem an over-reaction for that, but in the perception of the technological world of partners that make up the Android eco-system and give it momentum ‘ Android was tarnished and without Android, Google itself goes backwards. This is to fix that.

Motorola for its own part needed to get shareholder expectation off its back ‘ Sanjay Jha has performed miracles with Motorola, but there is a brave new world in handsets and it was never going to regain its former glory, in fact in a handset world dominated by operating platforms a hardware designer is, more or less, screwed. This achieves that objective because Jha is now a hero among his investors, and they will shortly be out of the equation.

Does this put more pressure on Google with Motorola rivals? It does and it doesn’t. Google has learned by manufacturing the Nexus line of handsets that it has little to gain from competing with its licensees. It also knows the above fact, that the life of a pure handset designer is hard ‘ with the exception of Apple, which is anything but a typical handset designer, and HTC, which has extended the Apple envelope, all handset designers have had a few dodgy moments ‘ whether it is LG, losing market share, Sony Ericsson, unable to sustain profitability, Motorola, that is a fraction of its size, Nokia which has never adapted to touch, or Samsung which almost missed the boat on smart phones and now just as it has its touch back, it has only achieved that by slavishly copying Apple, resulting in a temporary tablet ban in Europe.

It is harder being a hardware designer in today’s cellular markets, those days are over. Interestingly Nokia’s previous CEO, Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, fully understood. His failure was like many visionaries, in the execution of a software vision. He failed to turn Nokia into Google or Apple, but he did try. Like many transitions, you would not have chosen to start from where Kallasvuo began, we suppose. And neither can Jha change Motorola and neither will anyone be able to transform any of the other ailing handset vendors that are rooted in pure hardware and to some extent, the past.

Today in handsets you have to be an eco-system designer, and here is the important thing, Google now knows that, and wants no part in being a pure hardware maker but has no choice for the time being.

If we parallel this outcome to the creation of the Wintel monopoly in PCs, this is a little like Microsoft buying IBM’s PC division, instead of it going to Lenovo. It would have appeared/been mad. But at that time even though IBM had a huge patent hoard, and Microsoft did not, IBM was not using its patents to undermine Windows (some argue that it should have taken more legal steps ‘ after all the OS2 and Windows development team worked side by side for a couple of years and all manner of ideas were introduced to Microsoft employees at that time which they might have ‘borrowed’).

But had IBM attacked via patents, Microsoft may have needed to buy someone with a hoard of patents back in the early 1980s in order to have survived. Microsoft DID try the same trick against both Unix and Linux ‘ using copyright claims to say that it had invented much of what was in these operating systems, and this slowed the arrival of open source software for years, but was ultimately unsuccessful.

The next issue is whether or not HTC, Samsung, LG and Sony Ericsson will be pushed elsewhere for their OS requirements and ultimately their eco-system requirements ‘ such as App Store and content stores? Well if Google was to favor Motorola with early access to technology, tighter integration, and more resources, then perhaps these other companies would have no choice ‘ which is why it is publicly saying that it will not do this.

And yet if it doesn’t do this, then it cannot openly change the fate of Motorola the handset maker, and Motorola hardware will live or die by the effortsof its own engineers. In which case what will be the point of continuing to own it? Of course there will be none. As soon as the fuss about patents has settled down, when this deal has been done and a few more salvos in the patents war have been fired, likely by a freshly litigious Google, ripostes at all and sundry, then it will be back to business as usual. And to set the minds of the Android faithful at rest one of two things has to happen, circa end of 2012 ‘ either Motorola is sold to private equity, later to be floated, at a price of this deal, less the patent hoard value, so $12.5 billion less perhaps $10.5 billion, so around $2 billion, plus a little profit on the deal. Or it can be sold to one of these other rival handset makers. In the meantime, licensing on this hoard of patents could be ramped up to way in excess of $1 billion a year, and that is in deals that focus on Apple, Nokia and Microsoft just as much as HTC, LG and Samsung and the Chinese ‘ although that revenue stream is probably already in place in Motorola’s favor .

Motorola does not break out royalty revenues but it has had some considerable royalty transactions over the past few years, in particular in one quarter in 2010 it announced a settlement and license agreement with another unnamed company, which included the upfront payment of $175 million to Motorola plus future royalties and recorded a pre-tax gain of $228 million in one quarter alone. The royalty streams at Motorola have not yet been worked hard enough, but with these types of settlements and a very good chance that Microsoft will be on the losing side of the recent royalty bust ups with Motorola, we feel comfortable anticipating that level of royalty revenue ($1 billion a year).

The patent hoard at Motorola we are talking about is 17,000 with 7,500 more applied for, compared to the 6,000 that made up Nortel’s hoard. If Motorola had auctioned that off, it might have brought, 4 times the value of the Nortel patents, if we valued each patent at the same value for each of the 24,500 versus 6,000, there are four times as many patents. A valuation of $9 or $10 billion is not unreasonable in the new post Nortel patent deal world. Of these some 15,200 patents and 6,200 pending patents were for cellular breakthroughs, the rest were about set tops and cable TV infrastructure.

Offering HTC and the Korean majors the protection of those patents within a single paid Android license will make them less likely to feel the need to jump ship to the WP7 bandwagon. If Google can force a Microsoft deal with the weight of the Motorola patents, such that it will stop harassing its partners with nuisance suits, then Google can rest easy.

In the market Android was winning in handsets, and with this move it will almost certainly continue to win as long as Google does not get greedy and try to turn Motorola into an Apple and ensures that it sells it off in the fullness of time.

All that was required was that Android was given a chance at winning the services war and the tablet war ‘ that means providing an App platform that developers are not frightened of working on, and that content business are not frightened of licensing onto, as well as making it easy for content to flow on and off its devices.

One critical area here are the new Motorola set tops launched at the Cable show in June in the US ‘ the Televation, understood to be destined for Comcast, and the DCX3600M ‘ thought to be a mainstay for Time Warner Cable. Both will allow the free flow of content from a set top to a tablet and back again, including commercial materials such as films and major TV shows, not only as steams, but also as stored program to watch on the road. These are advanced products yes, although not so advanced they are likely to offer patentability, but they are early to market and in the US virtually unique (there are other products like this in Europe and Asia and have been for a while).

This type of innovation, that Motorola has become less and less known for in the past, has happened on Jha’s watch, and he has to take some credit for a vision of future device usage in the home. We said at the time that ‘gone is the wishy, washy Motorola which always came last to a new technology, rather begrudgingly, and instead this is a business fighting for every deal that it has on its home soil.’

With this type of announcement not only does it secure the existing 30% plus market share among US cable operators for set tops, but with a renaming of these brands as part of the Google TV product range, and the addition of Android to them to run Apps, this makes for an open gateway to and from Tablets, and Google will also makes sure that new Android tablets have the wherewithal to absorb advertising intelligently when viewing video ‘ now that effort is more likely to be in partnership with Cable, than as a replacement deal.

So if Android was winning, it was winning in the same way as Microsoft won 30 years ago. Apple made hardware and gave away software but refused to license its software in the 1980s, so the PC won. Microsoft licensed its Windows software in the same way as Android becomes licensable with this deal. Windows allowed 20 companies to compete with Apple back then, and Android allows 20 companies to compete with Apple now (as does WP7).

So the mistakes of Apple’s past ‘ of wanting platform control but ONLY on its own hardware, are the mistakes of the future ‘ once bitten, twice bitten ‘ and Android and Chrome are back on track to unseat Apple with this deal.

There remains the small matter of Oracle to hold at bay and its Java issue ‘ but a judge has already told them both to sit in a room, take a few noughts off the numbers and cut a deal and if that deal can be extended to Android handset designers, then all the better.

So to sum up – Google eliminates the patents issues in one fell swoop and Android and Chrome are safe. It has to sell Motorola, the handset maker at some early strategic point in the future, but obviously it cannot say this out loud until after the deal is done ‘ likely to a management buyout led by Jha and a team of private equity players, although Jha may move on to pastures new, as he will be in great demand. It has to become aggressive in its defense of Android partners and perhaps obtain fighting funds through a paid patent license.

And it could not have done this by offering to buy Motorola’s patents ‘ because Apple and Co would have come along and tried to outbid Google. No it needed an agreed deal to recommend to shareholders. Even now someone might think about outbidding Google for Motorola, but with a 60% premium on its share price that’s a hard thing to do and justify it to your own shareholders and only Apple might get away with it, but it doesn’t want all those old Motorola designs around and it would have had to close much of it down. So this move eliminated another auction.

And that’s the pure genius part of this deal. The managers at Motorola Mobility such as Sanjay Jha, have executed everything they promised for the shareholders and anything else from here on in is for themselves.

Google might even keep set top operations of Motorola’s for perhaps $1 to $2 billion, and that makes the handset vendor worth very little on its books, so when it sells it, it may appear to make a bigger margin, or sell it for even less.

It could even sell off Motorola Home set tops to one of its Google TV partners so that it stays out of, or rather gets back out of, the hardware business and it can inject set top devices with Android and Intel chips end to end. So it begins its attack on the TV market at the same time.

For the time being WP7 has a captive handset vendor in Nokia; Android has one in Motorola and iOS has one with Apple, so it is tough to see where any of HTC, Samsung, Sony Ericsson and LG desert to, so no-one should completely desert the Android fold, just perhaps put money on both WP7 and Android, for safety.

Finally there are a few commentators who say this puts Google closer to anti-trust scrutiny. They should read the various acts. Buying a hardware player for 60% above market value, which has 3% to 4% of a market that the company is not already in, doesn’t increase its anti-trust liability. If it has anti-trust issues, they are already there. If Microsoft bought Nokia that might be true. Okay Google could conceivably force a hardware supplier that it owns to toe the line and offer Google search on all its phones, except that Verizon is Motorola’s biggest customer and what it says, goes. The Justice Department may insist that there is no change of software policy at Motorola, but the market swing in Android’s favor would be so small globally that we don’t even see this as a problem, especially since the company is going to run it at arms-length and Motorola always has to listen to its very powerful customers.