Patents are very clearly a double edged sword. Without a well-protected patents system any individual economy risks invasion from locally controlled, but foreign built, copycats.
But with patent hoarding and the buying and selling of patents, mostly along nationalistic lines, we have the situation that occurred last week ‘ where all of Google’s enemies lined up behind a common purpose ‘ to keep Google’s hand from Nortel’s IPR assets ‘ a form of double negative, stopping their acquisition so that Google cannot stop their legal actions. Google and, particularly Android, is seen as the cash cow for many of these patents. In the end Google and its partners may pay, over time, considerably more than the $4.5 billion that was paid for the transfer of Nortel’s IPR.
Patents were supposed to be a solution to stop one person from copying another’s ideas without paying him something for the invention, but they are increasingly starting to look like a part of the problem, rather than any kind of solution ‘ a system which only works for large rich companies, which brings smaller companies (look at the years of grief TiVo went through) almost to their knees, where the law is selectively applied based on the size of your bank balance. No wonder it’s tough to make a call, as Faultline did on the TiVo action, on the outcome of suits ‘ half the time they are based on a desperate settlement rather than a genuinely fair legal outcome.
When an innovator has really invented something, it has one or two or maybe as many as 6 patents to aim at rivals who copy the invention. But when that company is Microsoft or Sony, with thousands of patents in all levels of technology, it makes it exceptionally hard for a newcomer to enforce those patents without getting a successful counter suit. A smaller company can end up having to pay more than it makes from its patents in order to build a device, and is countersued by a multitude of patents, some good, but others, when closely examined, often turn out to be are either obvious, or out of date patents which have been cleverly renewed within fresh applications. The trouble is that to find out you have to have a few hundred $million to go to war with.
All Google wanted was to become one of the big rich companies that already have a wad of patents with which to keep others at bay. And all that Apple, EMC, Ericsson, Microsoft, Research In Motion and Sony wanted was to collectively prevent that. That’s not a basis for stimulating innovation.
Interestingly Apple has very few genuine patents despite its claims to the contrary. In a US legal system that has fallen out of love with the idea of software patents through the 2010 Bilksi decision, many of Apple’s own patents in operating system design, graphics engines and gesture recognition, must be highly suspect against a challenge.
The Bilski decision was a step by the Supreme Court that pushed the US closer to many of its European partners on what is patentable. It was established that purely abstract ideas are not patentable, and also that the US test for saying that the invention is a computer which has a single purpose, has been somewhat undermined. The Supreme Court said that saying you can build a computer to process an invention is no longer a good enough reason on its own to say that it is patentable.
This single decision has thrown a harsh light onto many software patents, data compression and the manipulation of digital signals and some business methods, in some cases making them un-patentable and in others requiring some other proof of their patentability.
The Bilski decision was about patenting a system for hedging risks in commodities trading and is considerably more concrete than many of the ideas for controlling smart phones by two fingered gestures. Apple’s decision to suddenly join the Nortel consortium bidding, and the price that the bidding reached, may have been motivated in part at least by this Bilski decision. It is largely understood that any patents based on software processes or business models are no longer defensible in court, or at the very best, much harder to defend. So 2010 was perhaps a year in which Google and Apple both lost much of their intellectual property clout.
Was that decision partly instrumental in weakening Apple’s grip in the Nokia patent battle, where Apple came off considerably the worse of the two? It’s easy to speculate that at the very least Bilski set the current legal tone for considering the Apple position, because it’s the latest Supreme Court decision on the subject.
With the strengthening position of Apple as a US technology player, why wasn’t it Google who got that call to join the consortium, instead of Apple. Both are considered R&D outsiders who’s patents are largely software based. Both are considered upstarts in the established order of things.
At heart of that decision is a business model (not patentable we know). Apple doesn’t let anyone make iOS devices, but itself. But Google has the basis for inviting 100s of partners into the Android eco-system, in the process threatening iOS, WP7 and many other environments, all in one step. And Google doesn’t have to build a single device or risk a single major hardware investment. The only other player who has ever enjoyed that type of success that it is after with Android, is Microsoft with Windows. They can all see a time when Android is dominant across a whole swathe of personal devices and they don’t like it, because it that world no-one gets royalties for an OS.
Go back 30 years and imagine this happening to Microsoft. What might have happened if simple features like ‘program windowing’ and ‘cut and paste’ were patented and could not have been included in the Microsoft OS (they existed in both Xerox and OS 2 before being in Windows). So who would have owned them? The prior top dog in the computer industry IBM, or perhaps the winner of the mini-computer wars, Hewlett-Packard, or Apple or Xerox. Why were these companies unable to prevent major PC builders coming out with devices which clearly copied the way their computers worked and which used the same, or similar operating software procedures? Well because at the time software wasn’t thought to be patentable and neither were things like the use of a central universal bus in a hardware architecture or abstract concepts like windowing. Last year in 2010 they might have been. After the Bilski decision, perhaps once again they are not.
All of which makes the Microsoft efforts to call for licenses between $5 and $15 per device from Android rather moot and while we don’t claim any special knowledge of the negotiations, the elements that are Linux inside Android cannot realistically be considered patentable by Microsoft. It has been involved with many assaults on Linux dating back in to the 1990s both through law courts and through this trick of telling customers they have to pay a license, and been found wanting in all of them. Microsoft backed the attack on Linux brought by the Sant Cruz Operation and the company which bought it in the late 1990s. It failed abysmally.
So if Linux has a clean bill of health, how can a single derivative of Linux in Android, with some minor additions, be held so aggressively to account by Microsoft?
To some extent this is about suing foreign companies and fears that a home court decision might prevent HTC and Samsung being allowed to sell smartphones in the richest phones market in the world per head ‘ the US. HTC is said to have agreed to pay $5 per Android device, but this is thought to be considerably more than Microsoft is asking to license its own WP7. Legally HTC has to know that this is indefensible. But does it? Well to find out someone needs to challenge it.
Also surely there needs to be some relationship between what Microsoft charges and the percentage of the technology assets in the device, which it provides. So in a smart phone, where traditionally some 20% of the cost is in intellectual property, Microsoft has no claim on the baseband chip, no claim on the power management, no claim on the touch screen interface, no claim on Bluetooth, WiFi or second and third radios. It has no claim on the underlying ARM instruction set and no claim on the open source Linux parts of the OS. We’re not sure where Microsoft is making its claims or how it can suggest a charge which is quite so high for any intellectual property.
In WP7 handsets it offers the entire OS, versions of the screen and touch extensions and lots of APIs, but this is still not a substantial portion of the entire IP on the device. In a $400 device perhaps $80 might be paid out in total IPR, and while $5 will not break the bank, Microsoft’s contribution to this technology is tenuous to say the least.
If it were based on general purpose cellular technologies it could charge all smart phone makers, as perhaps Qualcomm, Ericsson and Nokia have every right to do. If it were general operating system features, it might charge Hewlett-Packard and Apple and Nokia’s Symbian just as much as it has asked from either HTC or Samsung. But of course Hewlett-Packard has a mighty patent treasure chest which pre-dates those at Microsoft, and Apple has been the R&D arm of Microsoft for years, creating new steps forward which are copied by Microsoft 2 to 3 years later, no royalties paid.
And core Apple’s OS borrows greatly from Unix, stemming initially from the Berkeley BSD variant of Unix. Innovations such as windowing, cut and paste, and using a mouse all pre-date Microsoft, and in most cases pre-date Apple. Multi-Touch commands belong to Apple, although they are probably no longer defensible in a US court.
Because the patent agreement with HTC is ONLY levied on Android phones, and because Android is open source, Microsoft is clearly arguing that it holds patents in Linux or the one or two areas where Android deviates from Linux, for instance its Dalvik machine. Now we know this is open source, but both Microsoft and Oracle appear to think they are owed dues on this. God knows why Microsoft thinks it has any say, but Oracle bases its claim on the fact that the Dalvik machine converts Java Classes, and relies on a deep knowledge of Java. But it’s only suing the Google implementation, not the author (but that’s its right to chase the money and not everyone). Effectively Oracle is suing because this OS runs Java without it being Java, and that is perhaps to the detriment of Java as a whole. Perhaps, though everyone knows this is a cynical re-interpretation of history after Oracle bought Sun.
Some reports have it that what Microsoft is actually suing for are issues relating to how the browser works on a smart phone and how things like documents are shown on a smart phone, neither of which are likely to survive a patent inspection. The truth is that US patents are requested and supplied, without reference to the Bilksi court decision from about 1990 to about 2010, so any patents confirmed during this time, have a potential challenge available.
Apple’s complaints are fairly clear, a mishmash of Operating system manipulations using object oriented programming which Apple cannot claim it owns since it has been taught for years throughout every university in the world and is a general set of abstract ideas, the like of which the Bilski decision ruins, as patentable. Apple also claims it invented scrolling on a touch screen (we saw it 35 years ago on a Hewlett-Packard screen ‘ sorry Apple) and comes back to Multi-touch and finally to pushing stuff around a phone in packets. These are typically the types of things where Apple solves a problem, files a patent, doesn’t wait to see if it gets one or it there is some prior art, and then it sues instinctively. ITC staff made it clear that few of these patents would survive if challenged, and all that did was make Apple pull out some more patents and sue again.
What is absent from all of this is a vigorous defense which Google has yet to mount. It hasn’t had to mount one because it’s not yet been sued directly, only its customers have been sued and the precise terms of the supposed infringements have been made very public in Apple’s case, and not public at all in Microsoft’s behind the door settlements.
But Android owners will find it hard to pay two patent settlements to two companies on more or less the same patents. Will Microsoft, having sold a patent agreement to HTC, come to its rescue and say that it has licensed all of its patents in the space, and therefore it’s now safe from Apple. Or will it shrug its shoulders and say that Apple is suing over something else and is entitled to its own pound of flesh.
Motorola so far has been unhappy about settling and plans to fight Microsoft and Apple both vigorously. It has more of a case than any others. It is American, so doesn’t fear the law being distorted because it’s foreign. It has more cellular patents than Microsoft and Apple put together. And it has perhaps the closest of all relationships with Google, the supplier of Android. Our belief is that Motorola wins huge countersuit royalties against both these companies, and it will stand its ground.
It also has a grudge to bear. Apple only got into the handset business in a Trojan horse maneuver with Motorola, pretending to work together on a phone which it knew would be a failure, the ROKR, and using everything it learned from Motorola during that experience to design the iPhone. Motorola’s fortunes have since gone into reverse and much of it at Apple’s hands. We think Motorola may be the unfortunate company that has to see one of these claims through US courts and win the day before this insane cluster of lawsuits stop.
Apple filed a further suit against HTC on July 8, claiming infringement of a further five patents, once again related to software and user interface design, touch screen hardware and movement sensors, another part of the infrastructure that Apple had nothing to do with inventing. It is desperate to prevent all imports of HTC devices. Meanwhile HTC sales almost tripled on smart phones sales.
There is a distinct difference in the approach of Microsoft and Apple which is only natural. Apple wants all other products crushed as it would never license any technology that it has to its rivals except on terms which make their products unprofitable. That was never the point of patents, but that’s how Apple sees it, and that’s why it cannot prevail.
Microsoft on the other hand realizes that the idea is to make money and so it has packaged up a cluster of patents and wants to make money out of them whether through WP7 or through Android. Yes it wants Android made to look expensive, but it is prepared to license its intellectual property without killing it. We have never heard of someone settling with Apple to pay them for a set of patents (mostly because they have never won a case) because that’s not what Apple sets out to achieve.
The world would be an exceptionally boring place if only the iPhone was allowed to have a touch screen or use movement sensors (they were in other phones before they were in Apple’s), and no-one else was ever allowed to copy it. But it would be equally boring if Apple had been sued out of handsets by Nokia and we all dropped the idea of touch screens. Patents are there to ensure that these ideas can be widely used, at a reasonable price, and Apple just hasn’t got the idea yet.
This is because capitalism has become all about the gradual collection of patents through acquisitions in order to tax other companies, or more to the point, other countries like China, who never invented very much during the past 150 years because the country was living in the technological dark ages. China has already shown that it is highly aware of how disadvantaged it is as a country by this historical heritage and is trying its best to put things right.
Would a US court have allowed Huawei to have successfully bid for those Nortel patents? Probably not, although Ericsson, a Swedish company, was in the winning consortium.
So we are left with the issue of whether or not it is legal or morally right that a group of companies who are supposed to be rivals, can gang up to prevent another company obtaining patents. And it is this which is perhaps at the heart of the matter and we ask the same question all over again that we asked the day the Nortel patent deal was announced? Do all of the bidders have access to all of the patents, or were there side deals that agreed which patents went to which homes after the deal with the court was done? And are such side deals strictly legal. Is there an agreement which the court is not aware of that these companies will each litigate some area of the patents, but not litigate against one another? And if there is, is this legal?
What we perhaps need are a set of principles which courts can follow, the equivalent of anti-trust for IPR, where more and more patents cannot be pushed into fewer and fewer hands in order to push an industry closer to an intellectual property monopoly, and prevent the innovation which patents were supposed to deliver.
Which is why anti-trust regulators at the Department of Justice are exploring whether the coalition bid for Nortel patent portfolio will hurt competition by blocking or harming Android. Android is the single most important operating system development since Linux, or even since Windows, because it frees businesses to do what they want with a certain class of devices.
So it the DoJ decides on an investigation and potentially a reversal or the sale of all or some of the patents (which let’s face it, it should) it would be the biggest single IPR legal case of the decade, if not the century so far.
Already the Canadian Industry Minister has said it will launch an investigation to ensure the sale aligns within the Investment Canada Act, so no-one will be suing anyone with these patents quite yet. Phew.