At last someone has explained clearly why the Comcast TWC merger cannot happen and it has fallen to Dish, one of the many companies that has much to fear from the proposed deal, to explain it in the types of terms Faultline has been using for the past 6 months. This week it has issued a petition to deny the deal to the FCC, making much of its logic public, while in a parallel filing it has issued more evidence directly to the FCC which will remain confidential.
At the same time, Netflix has issued a similar 256 page document that perhaps focuses more on the way the deal affects just OTT delivered content, rather than all of the MVPD markets as a whole.
The damages that Dish cites are that the combined company would be able to kill OTT service at three separate ‘choke points,’ secondly that it could deliberately arrange its data caps to a) not include its own service and b) preclude and obstruct OTT video services and finally it could coerce content owners into withholding online rights from OTT services, but it would be able to do this secretly without anyone knowing or even implicitly.
No single content owner would want to risk upsetting such a pay TV giant and would likely withdraw content from companies like Netflix as long as they got a contact with Comcast-TWC. Restrictive practice would not have to be written down, because the fear of cancellation and a nod and a wink from even junior Comcast-TWC executives, without telling their bosses, would be enough to prevent content deals being done with smaller concerns.
From Dish’s point of view, it can replace the name Netflix in any argument we make, with its own Dish brand. For as long as Dish does not own a major broadband supplier, its VoD content is provided Over The Top of hostile broadband networks, and Comcast is as toxic to the growing parts of the Dish business, as it is to Netflix.
Its filing says the three ‘choke points’ are points of interconnection to the Comcast-TWC broadband network, (the on-ramp); the last mile “public Internet” portion of the pipe to the consumer’s home; and managed or specialized service channels, which can act as super HOV-lanes (like the special lane treatment for High Occupancy Vehicles) and squeeze the capacity of the “public Internet” portion of the Comcast-TWC broadband pipe.
This last item is very real. If DOCSIS becomes the IPTV delivery route for all cable content, as it installs CCAP devices, then any increase in QAM delivered content reduces the available capacity for the internet, so that it is a constant varying pie.
There is also the issue of discriminatory data caps, where Comcast-TWC would be able to impose anti-competitive data caps on competing Multichannel Video Programming Distributor which are using OTT services.
This could be achieved by the simple expedient of exempting Comcast-TWC affiliated content from such data caps and then setting caps so low that consumers are incentivized to choose Comcast-TWC services over competing MVPD and OTT video services. Or where the experience of the OTT delivered service is so poor from other suppliers when delivered over Comcast-TWC lines, customers begin to believe that the poor quality is the fault of the MVPD supplier, not that of Comcast-TWC ‘ a move which seriously damages its brand.
The Netflix public document focuses very much on this aspect of using data caps to dissuade the public from using its services and the aspects of interconnection which Dish made such a detailed attack on.
Dish concludes that ‘The rapid rise of broadband-powered online video services has been great for consumers. In many ways, we are in the Golden Age of video. But this Golden Age risks being cut short by the proposed transaction.’
This is an idea that we have pushed for the past 8 or 9 years ‘ that this should be a golden age, but if the existing market leaders can block any moves by new suppliers, then it won’t be. Faultline even felt that TV Everywhere services should be banned from existing dominant suppliers, for much the same reason.
Then Dish turns its attention to the public interest benefits which Comcast-TWC has claimed over the past few months. These are ‘unlikely and speculative. ‘and do not come close to outweighing the anti-competitive effects of the transaction.’
Dish also makes the point that if the FCC approves the merger under a set of conditions designed to alleviate these harms, but the conditions fail to work, then competition and consumers would be irreparably and permanently harmed. And Dish goes on to point out what we have pointed out all along, that Comcast has a history of abuse on pricing and in anti-competitive conduct when the opportunity has arisen.
And if we go back to the conditions of agreeing the purchase of NBC-Universal, one idea was that it should not shut out rivals from its NBCU programming. In the past it could demonstrate it was sticking to this by giving that content to TWC as well as Comcast. Now that same approach would be simply lining its own pockets, but technically adhere to the ruling.